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FRONTIER POLITICS AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS: 
A STUDY OF NORTHWESTERN XINJIANG, 1949–1963 
Sheng Mao 
Arthur Waldron 
!
This is an ethnopolitical and diplomatic study of the Three Districts, or the former 
East Turkestan Republic, in China’s northwest frontier in the 1950s and 1960s. It 
describes how this Muslim borderland between Central Asia and China became today’s 
Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture under the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. 
The Three Districts had been in the Soviet sphere of influence since the 1930s and 
remained so even after the Chinese Communist takeover in October 1949. After the Sino-
Soviet split in the late 1950s, Beijing transformed a fragile suzerainty into full 
sovereignty over this region: the transitional population in Xinjiang was demarcated, 
border defenses were established, and Soviet consulates were forced to withdraw. As a 
result, the Three Districts changed from a Soviet frontier to a Chinese one, and Xinjiang’s 
outward focus moved from Soviet Central Asia to China proper. 
The largely peaceful integration of Xinjiang into PRC China stands in stark 
contrast to what occurred in Outer Mongolia and Tibet. Previous scholarship has 
attributed this to many factors, such as the flexibility of CCP’s ethnic and frontier 
policies, the success of local party building and cadre recruitment system, the use of 
!ix  
military power, and mass migrations of Han people to Xinjiang. While these studies 
broke new ground, the scarcity of archival documents weakened their arguments. By 
taking advantage of documents from Xinjiang local archives, the Archive of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs in Beijing, as well as the Russian archives recently made available, 
this study demonstrates that rather than implementing exceptional social policies in 
Xinjiang, the CCP excelled at strategic negotiation with the USSR, greatly aiding their 
bid for power. This dissertation also reveals that the relations between the Chinese 
communist state and its borderlands must be understood in the context of CCP’s nation-
building process. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Background 
In 1988, after traveling around Xinjiang, an American journalist wrote, “The 
longer I stayed in Kashgar, the more I began to realize that Xinjiang was a country within 
a country, one with far closer connections to its central Asian neighbors than to China. 
The Sunday market, the social event of the week, was an exhilarating mix of local 
tongues and minorities. Ethnic Kyrgyz and Tajiks from the surrounding countryside 
arrived on donkey carts piled high with watermelons, or trailing dispirited lines of sheep, 
to join the Uighurs and Pakistanis in selling their wares. The different languages vied 
with each other to such overpowering effect that I no longer felt I was in China.”1  
If the transnational characters of Xinjiang were impressive even in the late 1980s, 
after a series of political campaigns to Sinicize this vast Muslim borderland, it would be 
reasonable to ask how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) integrated Xinjiang with 
China proper after the Communist takeover in 1949. While “integration” involves many 
aspects such as politics, economy, culture, and the military,2 this dissertation focuses 
mainly on the ethnopolitical and diplomatic aspects; namely, how the CCP reoriented 
Xinjiang from Soviet Central Asia to China proper in almost every way. By placing the 
frontiers and their ethnic inhabitants at the center of the nation-building process in PRC 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 David Eimer, The Emperor Far Away: Travels at the Edge of China (New York: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 6. 
2 According to Dreyer, “integration” is defined as the process whereby ethnic groups come to shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities towards a new center, whose institutions assume jurisdiction 
over, and responsibility for, said groups. Theoretically, integration can take place among an infinite number 
of equal ethnic groups. In practice, however, it often involves a majority-minority group(s) situation. See 
June Teufel Dreyer, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities and National Integration in the 
People’s Republic of China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976). 
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China, I hope to shed new light on the role of the periphery in shaping the modern 
identity of “socialism” and “Chineseness.” 
After Qianlong Emperor conquered this vast borderland and renamed it “New 
Dominion” (ŠǢ) in 1768, Xinjiang had been served as a tributary nation rather than an 
integral part of China. Xinjiang functioned as a buffer state, tributes and exchanges of 
gifts symbolized friendly relations between Xinjiang and the Inland. In the mid-
nineteenth century, tsarist Russia rapidly annexed vast territories in Central Asia, 
bringing it for the first time into close contact with Chinese territories in Xinjiang. In 
1871, Russians occupied the Yili Valley and finally returned it to the Qing court after the 
signing of the Treaty of Saint Petersburg in 1881. To forestall Russian expansion into the 
Yili Valley, the Qing court institutionalized Xinjiang as a province in 1884, which was 
regarded by many historians as the beginning of Chinese sovereignty over Xinjiang in a 
modern sense.3  
From the collapse of the Qing court in 1911 until 1933, Xinjiang was isolated 
from both China proper and Soviet Central Asia. It was ruled by the warlord Yang 
Zengxin ƍ¼Š(1864–1928) and his successor Jin Shuren ʭƔ- (1979–1941). When 
Sheng Shicai ǥ8 (1897–1970) came to power in 1933 with essential support from the 
Soviets, Xinjiang became a Soviet satellite state, administered as a police state along 
Soviet lines. When Sheng Shicai broke with the Soviets and realigned with Chiang Kai-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 S. C. M. Paine, Imperial Rivals: China, Russia, and Their Disputed Frontier (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 
1996), pp. 110–25. 
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shek in late 1944, 4 a Muslim rebellion was instigated and supported by the Soviet 
government within the Three Districts in Northwest Xinjiang—Yili, Tacheng, and Altay. 
Direct Soviet military involvement in the Three Districts resulted in the 1945 
establishment of the East Turkestan Republic at Yili. The Three Districts became a Soviet 
frontier. In 1949, when the CCP’s military victory was imminent, Stalin encouraged and 
even facilitated the Chinese communists to penetrate the Muslim borderland. But the 
Three Districts remained within the Soviet sphere of influence. This dissertation focuses 
on how the Three Districts were transformed from a Soviet into a Chinese frontier 
following CCP’s penetration into Xinjiang in October 1949, especially after the Sino-
Soviet split in the late 1950s. 
 
Literature Review: Chinese Frontier Studies 
In the field of modern Chinese history, China’s transition from empire to nation-
state has been a widely discussed topic. The main questions are how traditional Chinese 
civilization, especially Confucianism, would be able to mediate globally diffused 
practices of modernization and how the frontiers and its ethnic populations adapted to 
such process of modernization.  
One major issue in regard to China’s frontier history is how to come to terms with 
various peoples and cultures inhabiting within the territory of so-call “China” today. In 
imperial China, the most important political strategy to unify various communities into 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Bruce A. Elleman & S. C. M. Paine, Modern China: Continuity and Change 1644 to the Present (New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2010), p. 325. 
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one single polity was the discourse of tianxia Â(all under heaven) and yixia zhi bian Å
¿ʎ (distinguishing the Chinese from barbarians). In the tianxia system, the closeness 
of a state’s relationship to the Son of Heaven, China’s emperor, relied on both physical 
proximity to the capital and cultural affinity with China proper. The cultural affinity was 
sustained by rituals formalized in the tribute system. Through the tribute system, 
barbarians could become Chinese if they were willing to accept Confucian rituals and to 
respect the leading role of “China.” In this regard, “Chineseness” was more a cultural 
term than an ethnic or racial one. John Fairbank’s edited volume The Chinese World 
Order (1968) describes how the Qing Empire used such ideas and practices to deal with 
foreign relations. Holding a Sino-centric worldview, China did not treat its neighbors as 
sovereign states in modern terms. The same reason can explain the rocky Sino-American 
relations in the nineteenth century. China made strides toward modernity only in response 
to the western threat. 5 Fairbank’s student Joseph Levenson challenged the  “Chinese 
world order,” emphasizing continuity in Chinese thought.  In Confucian China and its 
Modern Fate, Levenson concludes that, “the intimate association of bureaucracy with the 
mastery of high culture was cracked by modern western pressure and its concomitant, 
Chinese Nationalism.”6 In replacement of Confucianism, communism became the 
philosophical base of the Chinese intellectuals. Fairbank’s “Chinese world order” and 
“impact-react” paradigms and Levenson’s “culturalism-to-nationalism” thesis became the 
most influential approaches in the field of China studies in US during the 1970s and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 John King Fairbank ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China’s Foreign Relations (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). 
6 Joseph Levenson, Confucian China and Its Modern Fate: A Triology (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1969), p. 43. 
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1980s. Even today, the field of China studies in Taiwan and Mainland China has still 
been dominated by this modernization view, emphasizing that the lack of modernity 
impeded the progress of China as a modern nation-state in the twentieth century.7  
Another group of historians look at the Chinese history not from the center but 
from its frontiers. As early as the 1930s, Owen Lattimore, arguably the founding father of 
Chinese frontier studies, created the concept of a “reservoir zone.” By this term, 
Lattimore states that the multi-ethic, multi-cultural zone of China’s Inner Asian frontiers 
bridged the nomadic steppe and the central plains. It served as a possible source of 
administrators familiar with both nomadic and sedentary cultures.8 Mongolian historian 
Sechin Jagchid examines the relationship between economic tiles and confrontation along 
the Great Wall in the long Chinese history. He argues that nomads on the other side of the 
Wall depended economically on China proper to such an extent that they had to raid the 
Chinese when there were no markets or tributes accessible. Commerce was the major 
element that determined trade or raid (peace or war).9 Thomas Barfield challenged the 
traditional Chinese way of describing the tribes as barbaric. He noted that the tribes have 
complex society with basic stability; their relationship with the Chinese was not only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Tsiang Tingfu ɐĎ〈, Zhongguo jindaishi dagang­ʑ0Áȝ [A general history of modern China] 
(Taipei: Qiming chubanshe, 1959); Hsiao Kung-chuan, Modern World and a New World: Kang Youwei, 
Reformer and Utopian, 1858–1927 (Seattle, CA: University of Washington Press, 1975); Mao Haijian, The 
Qing Empire and the Opium War: The Collapse of the Heavenly Dynasty, Joseph Lawson, Peter Lavelle, 
and Craig Smith trans. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Kuo Ting-yee ʥĎ2, 
Zhongguo jindai shiguang­ʑ0ȝ [A general history of modern China] (Hong Kong: The Chinese 
University Press, 1979). 
8 Owen Lattimore, Studies in Frontier History: Collected Papers, 1928–1958 (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1962); Owen Lattimore, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (New York: American Geographical Society, 
1940); James Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism: How the Qing Frontier and Its Indigenes 
Became Chinese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 20–21. 
9 Sechin Jagchid and Van Jay Symons, Peace, War, and Trade Along Wall: Nomadic-Chinese Interaction 
through Two Millennia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989). 
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symbiotic but parasitic. Furthermore, nomads understood for sure that they heavily 
depended on a strong and settled Chinese state.10 Joseph Fletcher and Morris Rossabi 
depicted a more flexible and a “symbiotic relationship” between China proper and its 
frontier areas. Through this relationship, “trans-frontiersmen” crossed a fluid frontier 
zone carrying backward and forward both goods and cultures.11  
Following the first generation of Chinese frontier scholars, studies in and after the 
1990s demonstrates a dynamic “poly-ethnic” or “multi-state” system which is in a 
constant state of change. This trend of “new frontier history” corresponds to the change 
in American frontier studies, which transferred its perspective from Frederick Turner’s 
ethnocentric, nationalistic frontier to a focus on the diversity of Western settlers.12 Stevan 
Harrell’s edited volume, Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers, examines the 
relations between the ethnic peoples and the central state from this new perspective. 
Based on case studies of ethnic Naxi, Yi, Miao, Yao, Manchu, and Tai peoples, the 
authors show that the civilizing project imposed by a “cultural superior and economic 
powerful” center on the periphery is not a unified thing, either in its purposes and 
methods or in the reaction of the people imposed. In this way, this book intends to bring 
the frontier to the center of our understanding of the formation of so-called “China.”13 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10 Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China (Cambridge, UK: Blackwell, 
1989). 
11 Joseph Fletcher, Studies on Chinese and Islamic Inner Asia (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995); Morris Rossabi, 
China and Inner Asia: From 1368 to the Present Day (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Morris 
Rossabi, Khubilai Khan: His Life and Times (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988). 
12 Frederick J. Turner, The Frontier in American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1947); 
Patricia N. Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West (New York: 
Norton, 1987).  
13 Stevan Harrell ed., Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Hong Kong, Hong Kong 
University Press, 1996); Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, p. 21. 
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Accordingly, the study of Chinese state-border relations has shifted from a Sino-
centric perspective to a new approach that acknowledges the importance of the margins. 
The Sino-centric view considered the integration of the Chinese state and its peripheries 
as an ongoing process of how “barbarians” accepted Confucian culture and turned into an 
integral part of China after being civilized. The state adopted two competing frontier 
policies when dealing with the barbarians, cultural and military. The main strategy the 
state adopted was to “cherish” (huai’rou 0ƃ) and “assimilate” (hanhua ƽu) frontier 
peoples through education and moral indoctrination. In the meanwhile, a “loose rein” 
(jimi ȭȡ) policy was applied to maintain the boundary between xia (the Chinese) and yi 
(barbarians). When the barbarians were two evil and too stubborn to be civilized, the state 
would employ military tactics to forcibly bring them into the Chinese political sphere, or 
to prevent them from crossing the Great War and raiding the central plains.14 Many 
scholars consider the Sinification of ethnic peoples a way to empower the barbarians with 
higher culture. As Ping-ti Ho’s 1967 paper noted, it was one of the main factors that 
made the Manchu Qing rule so successful in territorial expansion, population growth, 
cultural development, and a greater degree of interregional integration.15  
Revisionist schools of Qing history have effectively challenged the Sino-centric 
approach by Ping-ti Ho and others. William Rowe points out that Qing historiography has 
been marked by three important revisionist turns in the past two decades. The first was 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Leibold, Reconfiguring Chinese Nationalism, pp. 22–23. 
15 Ping-ti Ho, “The Significance of the Ch’ing Period in Chinese History,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 
26, No. 2 (1967), pp. 189–95. The most eminent critic of Ho’s paper was Evelyn Rawski, who published a 
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the so-called “social history turn.” This school turned away from political and military 
history but focused on social, economic, and cultural structures whose rise and fall 
occurred very slowly over the longue durée. With critique of the “impact-response” 
model proposed by John Fairbank, historians emphasized the dynamic domestic history 
of China, which would have gone through significant changes even without stimulants 
from outside. The second turn was the “Inner-Asian turn,” which features an inter-
disciplinary approach that combines historical study and anthropology. Influenced by 
cultural studies, scholars representing “Inner-Asian turn” focus more on “representations” 
than “facts,” which de-constructed such categories as gender and race, seeing them as 
culturally historically formed rather than biologically determined. The third was the 
“Eurasian turn,” which was not just a geographic shift, but an intellectual trend 
integrating cultural studies, world history, and ecological studies. With this turn, the 
binary history of Western challenge and Asian response proposed by the Fairbank school 
has surrendered to a new emphasis on comparable developmental trajectory. The Qing 
empire was viewed by no means as an exception, but considered as equally dynamic as 
the Ottoman, Moghul, and even European empires.16 These three turns were often named 
as “New Qing History.” Thus, “ethnic sovereignty” and “Manchu identity” became key 
terms when historians discussed about the rule of the Qing dynasty.17  
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These three academic turns under the flag of the “New Qing History” have 
dramatically changed the way we view relations between the state and its periphery. With 
their efforts of seeing the border regions as places in their own right, scholars not only 
revealed the richness and complexity of the interactions between the center and the 
borderlands, but also challenged many so-called “historical truth.” For instance, it 
became problematic to consider borderland as “backward society” and border inhabitants 
as “under-developed, uncivilized peoples” when we put the frontier at the center. A 
collection of fine articles edited by Diana Lary in 2007 questioned the assumption that 
the center-border relations were fixed and static. The authors argue that: (1) the present 
borderlands of China were formed not from time immemorial but historically; (2) there 
were ups and downs in regard to the control from the center in the borderlands; (3) the 
borderlands were corporated into China proper mostly by military conquest rather than 
through a kind “civilizing” process; (4) Han migrants in the border regions were not 
civilizers but mainly criminals, refugees, and demobilized soldiers; (5) inhabitants of the 
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of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Rowe, China’s Last Empire; 
Matthew W. Mosca, From Frontier Policy to Foreign Policy: The Question of India and the 
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(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2016); David A. Bello, Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain: 
Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China’s Borderlands (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
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borderlands were and are more closely connected by ethnicity, religion, and culture to 
peoples beyond China than Han people.18  
The last two decades witnessed a fourth academic trend in the field of China 
studies in general and Qing history in particular—“the transnational turn.” Prasenjit 
Duara has pointed out in 1995 that historical consciousness in modern society has been 
overwhelmingly framed by the nation-state.19 Historians tend to see the past by regarding 
the nation-state as the basic unit of intellectual studies. When we question the center-
periphery structure and view borders as continuously changing, this naturally leads to 
viewing borders from a transnational perspective. From such perspective, borders are not 
the end of a nation-state, but a part of a cross-border community. Using the Pyrenean 
frontier of France and Spain as a case study, Peter Sahlins observes that “the zonal 
character of the frontier persists after the delimitation of a boundary line.”20 Sahlins’s 
study challenges our perception that one of the main characteristics of a nation-state is its 
fixed borders. Peter Perdue’s research on the frontiers of Ming and Qing reveals that 
Imeprial China’s borders were more like shifting zones of influence and contention, 
containing multiple flows of goods, soldiers, civilian migrants, weapons, and religions in 
both directions, than lands with fixed boundaries.21 Even national allegiance for one 
nation-state is arguable. Using the term “national indifference,” Tara Zahra challenges 
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19 Prasenjit Duara, Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China (Chicago, 
IL: University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 3. 
20 Peter Sahlins, Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, CA: University 
of California Press, 1989), pp. 4–6. 
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the nationalist narrative that had dominated European and Eurocentric historiography. By 
“national indifference,” she means the situation that some people hold an ambivalent 
attitude toward the nation-state, they do not necessarily have a clear national 
consciousness or a strong desire to belong to a specific national community.22 The most 
outstand example of peoples with “national indifference” were probably inhabitants of 
the hills of Zombia, the largest remaining area of Southeast Asia that has not been 
integrated into any nation-state. Through his well-known study of Zombia, James Scott 
argues that those “raw people” living in the highlands consciously choose to live outside 
the reach of the state. Given the possibility of being subject to states’ predatory 
behaviors—including conscription, slavery, taxes, forced labor, and war—people chose 
on their own initiative to stay away from state institutions.23 In an edited volume Empire 
at the Margins, authors focus on the issue of ethnicity and frontier during Ming–Qing 
transition. In historical moments when the cultural identities of imperial “centers” 
appeared contingent, where was the “periphery”? How should one position the ethnic 
others in physical and discursive landscapes? They argue that we should consider “center” 
and “periphery” as mutually constituted processes. 24 David Brophy investigates the 
formation of Uyghur national identity during the Qing dynasty. He states that the loosely 
controlled Xinjiang–Soviet Central Asian borders did not prevent “Xinjiang Uyghurs” 
and “Soviet Uyghurs” from forming a sense of community as the “Uyghur Nation.” On 
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the contrary, Xinjiang was a frontier that various Muslim peoples crossed without cutting 
their ties to the other side. Recovering the story of these transnational people, Brophy’s 
work complicates the familiar narrative of single nation-state.25 
In the field of Chinese frontier studies, it is a popular argument that Chinese 
regimes occupied border regions often not so much for the material value of the border 
land itself, but driven by strategic and political concerns.26 Allen S. Whiting’s classic 
study of Xinjiang, Sinkiang: Pawn or Pivot?, reveals how great powers, such as the 
Soviet Union, United Kingdom, United States, and China, used and controlled Xinjiang 
for their own geopolitical interests. As the most balanced narrative of Sheng Shicai’s rule 
in Xinjiang, Whiting’s work not only furthered our understanding of the vital role the 
Soviets had played during the period of Sheng Shicai, but also demonstrated the 
difficulties the CCP had to face in Xinjiang after its takeover in 1949: the non-Han 
population as the predominant majority, rampant anti-Han sentiment, and a Soviet-
dominated economy.27  
In a collection of papers examining the transition from empire to nation in the 
world, Joseph Esherick asks why leaders of Republican China abandoned their previous 
call to “expel the barbarians to restore China to the Chinese” in favor of a Greater China 
that intended to take over the land and peoples of the Qing empire. This sentiment of 
Greater China sentiment was a fervent nationalism designed to fight against imperialist 
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ambitions to tear Mongolia and Tibet away from China, especially the Russian and 
British. He gave two reasons why the Republic of China succeeded in keeping most of 
the Qing territory: First, the Chinese believed that the loss of frontier territories would 
threaten the Chinese core; second, the great powers trusted that a China with territorial 
integrity would best be able to pay off the debts and fulfill treaty obligations of the Qing 
dynasty.28  
Examining the strategies of political intervention and narratives of cultural 
innovation adopted by Han male elites, James Leibold highlights how the umbrella-like 
phrase Zhonghua minzu (ĖÍ°) was used by both the Nationalist Party and the CCP 
to construct a uniform community called China from the poly-ethnic fragments of the 
Qing empire.29 Hsiao-ting Lin’s study shows that the Nationalist Party’s expansion into 
Xinjiang and other frontier regions was not only motivated by nationalism but was linked 
to specific pragmatic concerns regarding regime consolidation and security, an accidental 
result of the Second World War.30 Xiaoyuan Liu further reveals that when Sun Yat-sen 
and his followers changed their ethnic policy from “expelling the barbarians to restore 
China to the Chinese” to “five races under one union,” their intent was to unify not “five 
races” but “the lands of the five races.” In other words, the Nationalists’ main concern 
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was keeping Qing territory as Chinese territory, and only for this purpose was the non-
Han population not expelled.31  
Justin M. Jacobs’ new book shows, to maintain Han rule in the Muslim 
borderland, Xinjiang was in effect ruled in the form of an inclusive empire during the 
Republican era, though under the name of an exclusive nation-state. In this regard, he 
suggested calling Republican China a “national empire.” Jacobs’s work indicates that the 
Han ruling class proved adept at countering threats to its rule both from within and from 
without, which guaranteed the preservation of Chinese sovereignty in a non-Han 
borderland until a strong central government (the PRC) was able to reassert control along 
the frontier. The continual Han rule during the Republican era explains why Xinjiang was 
integrated with China proper peacefully in 1949 while Tibet and Outer Mongol were 
not.32  
 
Literature Review: Xinjiang Studies 
A classic work on the Three Districts, later Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, 
is George Moseley’s A Sino-Soviet Cultural Frontier: The Ili Kazakh Autonomous Chou. 
The Three Districts in Xinjiang had been long subjected to Russian influence. 
Neighboring the Soviet Union’s Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Yili Kazakh 
Autonomous Prefecture was especially open to Soviet influence. Its non-Han peoples, 
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who composed almost 95% of the whole population, had natural ties with Soviet national 
minorities in culture, religion, and ethnicity. When the CCP took Xinjiang in 1949, 
China’s influence had been almost completely supplanted by that of the Soviet Union. 
Moseley analyzes a dilemma the CCP had to face: if it faithfully pursued the “proletarian 
internationalism,” which was the announced goal of its national minority policy, it could 
not justifiably restrict the influence of the Soviet Union, China’s fraternal socialist 
country. On the other hand, if it permitted Soviet influence to remain and even to grow, 
Beijing’s authority in Yili would never be secure. Since the principal purpose of the 
national minority policy developed by the CCP, though cast in the dialectical language of 
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, was to eliminate foreign influence from China’s frontier 
regions, “Sinification” and “socialist transformation” became the substance of the CCP’s 
national minority policy. The policy inevitably led to conflicts between the Han 
government and the ethnic people as well as the Sino-Soviet rupture.33 
Though Moseley’s work is among the best scholarship on the history of Yili 
during the PRC era, it is not without problems. In the 1960s when Moseley did this 
research, it was nearly impossible for foreigners to gain access to primary materials in 
China. As Moseley has confessed, his research was wholly based on official publications 
of the Chinese government, such as People’s Daily. Also not available was Soviet source 
materials. Even with the author’s strong ability to read between the lines, the scarcity of 
primary sources made the author’s analyses on Sino-Soviet relations and the CCP’s 
minority policy in Xinjiang too simple to be true. For example, Moseley overemphasizes 
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the contention between the socialist states. He failed to demonstrate that Sino-Soviet 
relations had ups and downs over time, which made the story in Xinjiang much more 
complicated than Moseley had portrayed.34 
June Dreyer’s well-accepted work, China’s Forty Millions: Minority Nationalities 
and National Integration in the People’s Republic of China, asks the question of why 
Beijing paid so much attention to China’s minorities, which constitute only 6% of its total 
population. She argues that the reasons are multiple, and among them, the first and 
perhaps foremost reason is strategic. Most minority groups live on China’s frontier. In 
many cases the borders as presently demarcated divide a minority community between 
two or more states. For instance, ethnic Kazakhs live in Kazakhstan and Xinjiang, and 
ethnic Mongols live in Russia, China, and the Mongolian People’s Republic. If the 
minorities are antagonistic to the Chinese government, they could challenge border 
defenses, increase the dangers of foreign invasion, or cause a loss of territory for the PRC. 
On the contrary, a sincerely pro-China minority community not only strengthens border 
defenses but also provides potential for exerting influence on a neighboring state’s 
borders and for increasing the PRC’s territory. Thus, what the CCP persists to call “the 
minorities problem” has played a vital role in Chinese policymaking. In fact, it is an issue 
of integration: for reasons of defense, economic and social well-being, and national pride, 
the current government attaches considerable importance to gaining the allegiances of 
minority peoples and putting them under Chinese jurisdiction. Dreyer’s book examines 
the steps the CCP had taken since 1949 to achieve integration. The CCP’s policy toward 
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minority groups was impacted greatly by the Soviet Union but adapted in many ways in 
order to better serve the purpose of the CCP. As a result, it differed not only from those 
of previous Chinese governments but also from that of the Soviet Union. Dreyer also 
claims that the ethnic policy the CCP adopted finally achieved great success in “solving” 
the nationalities problem.35 As an importnt study of CCP’s ethnic policies, Dreyer’s book 
was published in 1976 when foreign scholars had no access to archival documents in 
China. All source materials Dreyer used were propagandistic materials produced by the 
Beijing government. This book might be able to offer the reader a general picture of the 
policies the CCP had adopted to integrate ethnic people with their Han counterparts, 
however, it lacks detailed case studies to pin down the actualization of these policies at 
the local level and their effects. In Xinjiang’s case, whether the integration would be 
achieved by the Chinese depended more on how successfully to deal with the Soviets 
rather than the ethnic people. In this case, diplomatic policy was more essential than 
ethnic policy in the Xinjiang issue, which was completely ignored in Dreyer’s research.  
Donald H. McMillen’s Chinese Communist Power and Policy in Xinjiang, 1949–
1977 shares the same problem. McMillen focuses on the evolution of Communist power 
and policy in Xinjiang from the founding of PRC to the 1970s. Because the region’s 
ethnic minorities, strategic location, and natural resources have had such a crucial impact 
on the larger issues of PRC China, efforts have been made to assess the party’s attempts 
to achieve the ultimate political, socioeconomic, and cultural integration of Xinjiang and 
its overwelmingly Muslim population with the more “advanced” Han areas. Different 
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from Dreyer, who focuses on the ethnic policy at the top reaches of the CCP government, 
McMillen examines the party-building and cadre-recruitment policies at the local level in 
Xinjiang. Particular attention is given to describing and analyzing the emergence of a 
party-military-government hierarchy under Wang En’mao ǕĥɆ(1913–2001) and his 
Han comrades from the First Field Army of the PLA.  Based on CCP’s propaganda 
materials as well as newspapers and journals published by red guards, McMillen 
concluded that there were significant differences between the local and central powers.36 
Archival documents used for my dissertation put this conclusion into question—In fact, 
Wang En’mao faithfully implemented the policies and orders from Beijing; he also 
concealed the real reason for the severe death toll in Xinjiang in 1960, caused not by the 
inefficiency of transportation but by a shortage of grain.  
A fine book on Republican Xinjiang is Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central 
Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang, 1911–1949 by Andrew D. W. Forbes, a 
student of Owen Lattimore.  Forbes relied on archival materials from the British 
consulate at Kashgar, supplemented by English-language travelogues and memoirs of 
Western travelers and diplomats who visited Xinjiang. However, he failed to use either 
Chinese or Russian sources. By revealing the process of the deepening of Soviet 
involvement in Xinjiang affairs over time during the Republican era, Forbes’s study 
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furthered our understanding of the omnipresence of the Soviets in Xinjiang, which was 
what the CCP had to face after the takeover in 1949.37  
Linda Benson, another student of Lattimore’s, published two books on ethnic 
Kazakhs in Xinjiang. Her 1990 monograph, The Ili Rebellion: The Moslem Challenge to 
Chinese Authority in Xinjiang, 1944–1949, examines the origins of the second East 
Turkistan Movement in 1944. Different from most scholars, who attribute the Muslim 
uprising to Soviet mobilization,38 Benson argues that the Muslim rebellion, though not 
without heavy Soviet involvement, was part of the anticolonization movement that was 
pervasive at the end of the Second World War. In Benson’s eyes, the rebellion was more 
an autonomous political appeal for national independence within the Muslim community 
than a mere foreign intervention in the local affairs of Xinjiang.39  
Benson’s second book, the co-authored monograph China’s last Nomads: The 
History and Culture of China’s Kazaks, examines the experience of Kazaks as a minority 
population in China, focusing on the twentieth century and examining the Kazak 
experience in the multiethnic region of Xinjiang. This work, as claimed by Benson, is 
intended to provide an account of the history and circumstances of the Kazaks in China in 
the twentieth century, a period that saw them separated from Kazaks in the Soviet Union, 
introduced to Communism, and, most recently, allowed to return to the family-owned 
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flocks and herds that constituted the local Kazak economy prior to 1949. 40 As 
demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the days when Kazaks of the northwest pursued 
the independent lifestyle of their ancestors are gone. The future will be shaped by 
increasing interactions with the growing number of Han Chinese residents of China’s 
great northwest, and by Chinese policies that determine patterns of land and water use as 
well as market exchange. In addition to utilizing many of the same sources as Forbes’s 
work, Benson’s books also rely on US government records and sources in Chinese, 
Turkish, and Russian. Unfortunately, owing to the parameters of scholarly access at the 
time, these latter sources are mostly public-source newspaper accounts and exile 
narratives written abroad. No archival documents in either Chinese or Russian were 
consulted for either book. Though Benson’s books are flawed by their sources, they 
furthered our understanding of the anti-Han mentality that was pervasive among the 
Muslims in Xinjiang.  
An important study on Xinjiang in PRC China is Wu Zhe’s 2006 dissertation at 
National Taiwan University, “Xinjiang: National Identity, International Competition and 
Chinese Revolution, 1944–1962.”41 Relying on archival documents from Xinjiang, this 
828-page dissertation reveals how the CCP managed to integrate Xinjiang, turning this 
vast Muslim region from “a country within a country” into “a province among provinces” 
by military power, ethnic policy, political campaigns, and economic control.42 Most of 
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the archival documents the dissertation engaged had never been used before. However, 
Wu focuses mainly on Urumqi rather than the Three Districts. 
 
Primary Sources 
While the secondary literature on the integration of Xinjiang with China proper 
has inspired me in several ways, these sources all suffered from the scarcity of Chinese-
language sources. Since anything related to ethnicity and China’s frontiers is considered 
to be sensitive politically, related research is difficult to get approved by the censors, and 
the archives are classified. The Russian archives also held essential information regarding 
the unfolding of modern Xinjiang history; however, before the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, they too were unavailable for study. Without access to the Chinese and Russian 
archives, authors of the secondary literature published before 1991 had to engage with 
propaganda materials published in either China or the Soviet Union and refugee memoirs 
in the West. Russian archival documents finally became accessible to scholars in 1991, 
but the availability of Chinese archives is still limited and in recent years even more so.  
Fortunately, I was able to gain access to personal collections, including rich 
Xinjiang archival documents from both the Archives of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous 
Region (AXUAR) and the Archives of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture 
(AYKAP). These local archival documents revealed a detailed picture of how the local 
governments in Xinjiang interacted with Beijing and the Soviet consulates. What were 
the intentions of the CCP regarding Xinjiang in general and the former East Turkestan 
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Republic in particular? How did the ethnic community, especially the ethnic cadres, react 
to the Chinese policies? How much were the Soviets involved in local affairs?  
Besides local archives, archives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China (AMFA) in Beijing are important primary resources for this 
study. These materials include detailed information on the diplomatic negotiations 
between the Chinese government and its Soviet counterpart. In addition to archival 
documents, I extensively examined published administrative documents edited by local 
governments and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.43 These published 
documents and interviews, though carefully chosen to follow the government line, still 
serve well as historical sources. While Chinese archival documents form the bulk of my 
sources, Russian-language documents offered me a better understanding of the Xinjiang 
story from the Soviet perspective. The Russian documents and sources I have used are 
from Russian-Chinese Relations in the 20th Century: Documents and Materials and 
Soviet-Chinese Relations, 1945–1980 edited by O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov.44  
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Dissertation Structure 
Using the Chinese and Russian archives, in this dissertation I examine how, in the 
decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the CCP 
transferred the fragile suzerainty of the Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture from 
dependence on the Soviet Union to full Chinese sovereignty. The prefecture is located in 
the northwestern portion of Xinjiang, a region known as Dzungaria. It comprises the 
three frontier districts of Yili, Tacheng, and Altai, and is home to most of China’s ethnic 
Kazakhs. The remainder of the ethnic Kazakhs reside across the frontier in Kazakhstan 
and in the Mongolian People’s Republic. 
On the eve of the CCP takeover in late 1949, being all but isolated from China 
proper geographically and facing the historical inadequacy of transportation and 
communication, this region was more appendage to the Soviet Union than the Chinese 
state. Following the Russian penetration into Central Asia, the Three Districts had long 
been subject to Russian influence, both imperial and Soviet. The decades following the 
Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 were marked by a growing Soviet influence in Xinjiang’s 
affairs first economically and soon comprehensively. The Soviet influence was strongly 
strengthened under warlord Sheng Shicai, who granted the Soviets exclusive rights in 
exchange for their aid, which included troops, advisors, weapons, loans, and diplomatic 
recognition. Though the Soviet presence in Xinjiang was significantly weakened when 
Sheng broke off ties with the Soviet Union in 1942, the Soviets soon managed to stage a 
comeback through the Soviet-sponsored Yili Rebellion of 1944 and the establishment of 
the short-lived East Turkestan Republic (ETR) in the Three Districts. By the eve of the 
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communist takeover in 1949, the Three Districts were rapidly evolving as a de facto 
Soviet dependency. 
Using Xinjiang as a bargaining chip against the CCP for maintaining Outer 
Mongolian as Soviet satellite state as well as eradicating the presence of any other 
Western powers in this vast region, the Soviets invited and facilitated the CCP’s 
occupation of Xinjiang in late 1949. For the sake of national security, however, the 
Soviets still maintained this vast region as a Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet 
presence was more overwhelming in the Three Districts, the base of the former ETR. 
Through the Soviet consulates and the former ETR cadres who remained to serve the 
local government after 1949, the Soviets wielded dominant power over the CCP in this 
frontier region. While the Soviet presence worked more as a blessing than a curse for the 
Chinese government in the early years of the PRC, after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet 
relations in the late 1950s, the Chinese regarded it as an imminent threat that might cause 
the region to either declaim independence or be annexed by the Soviet Union. In this 
study I examine how the CCP eradicated the Soviet influence over the Three Districts and 
thus integrated this region with China proper after the Sino-Soviet rupture in the late 
1950s. While previous scholars have examined Xinjiang from the perspectives of ethnic 
policies or human rights, I argue that the relations between the Chinese communist state 
and its peripheries are better understood in the context of nation building than the 
conflicts between communist ideology and liberal ideology.  
Chapter 1 introduces the actors of the story, the Soviets, the CCP, and the former 
ETR cadres. With different motivations, they adopted different approaches to the 
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Xinjiang issue. The Soviets, on the one hand, provided whatever aid necessary for the 
Chinese government to penetrate and survive in Xinjiang. On the other hand, they 
diligently maintained their power over local affairs in this region so that Soviet interests 
could be well guaranteed in the name of proletarian internationalism. The former ETR 
side remained loyal to the Soviets in order to gain the authentic ethnic autonomy in their 
homeland that had been promised by both the Soviets and the Chinese. After 1949, the 
CCP launched a series of campaigns to socialize and Sinicize the ethnic community and 
used the Han-dominated Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps to control Xinjiang. 
The initial goal of the CCP was not to eradicate the Soviet presence but to integrate this 
region with China proper and impose a Chinese identity on the indigenous people. In this 
chapter I describe how the three parties pursued their goals individually and the role the 
Soviets played in this triangle relations.  
Chapter 2 focuses on the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations and how it 
contributed to the 1962 mass exodus and social unrest as well as how the Chinese 
government reacted to them. When Sino-Soviet relations started to deteriorate in late 
1958, the Soviets were perceived by the CCP no longer as a “big brother” but as a 
“revisionist” who had been pursuing its territorial ambitions in Xinjiang. In the mass 
exodus more than seventy-six thousand indigenous people fled to the Soviet side of the 
border. More than a thousand ethnic people in Ining demonstrated their desire to migrate 
to the Soviet Union and their protest devolved into a riot. These incidents formed a 
turning point for the three frontier districts, because the perceived Soviet aggression 
made the Chinese government believe that it was urgent to turn their suzerainty into 
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complete sovereignty. In this chapter I analyze how the failure of domestic policies and 
the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations contributed to the flight and riot and how the 
CCP viewed them mainly as a Soviet conspiracy.  
To eradicate the Soviet presence in the region, several overlapping measures were 
taken by the Chinese government. Viewing the Soviet General Consulate in Urumqi and 
the Consulate in Ining as the headquarters for the mass exodus and the Soviet national 
associations at all levels as the grassroots hands of the Soviet government, the Chinese 
government decided to force the consulates to withdraw and the associations to close. 
Chapter 3 reveals how the Chinese government forced the Soviet diplomatic institutions 
and all organizations to retreat. 
For historical reasons, in the three frontier districts, a significant part of the 
indigenous population in Xinjiang, especially ethnic Kazaks, had close Soviet ties. Some 
had immigrated from the Soviet Union or held dual citizenship. The others acquired 
Soviet passports from the black market. Soviet and Chinese government policies in 
dealing with them changed over time. Before the “virgin lands” campaign launched in 
1953, the Soviet policy was to dump Soviet nationals in China and for them to be 
naturalized. Since exploiting the previously uncultivated lands required manpower, the 
Soviets decided to recall their nationals to reclaim the wasteland. On the Chinese side, the 
policy transitioned from cooperation to restriction after encountering a labor shortage 
following the massive deportation in this sparsely populated region. When Sino-Soviet 
relations worsened, the Chinese decided to halt deportation and claim these people as 
ethnic Kazakh of China rather than Soviet citizens. Because of the mass exodus, the 
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Chinese government doubted the loyalty of those who had Soviet ties. For the security of 
the region, government policy thus changed to drive them out and hinder their reentry. 
Chapter 4 focuses on how these two socialist states demarcated the transitional 
population who had a complicated background regarding nationality, especially after the 
flight. As this chapter reveals, the fluctuations in Sino-Soviet relations and national 
interests were the main factors that greatly contributed to the change in migration policy.  
When the CCP occupied Xinjiang, the border defenses stationed in this region 
protected not against the Soviet Union but against China proper. The Xinjiang-Soviet 
border was “a frontier without boundary and a boundary without defense,” to quote the 
framework that the Chinese government used. When the Sino-Soviet alliance was at its 
peak, the Chinese side did not think it was necessary to have its own defense force. When 
the relations deteriorated, the Chinese side was planning to build its own border defense 
but was discouraged for fear of being criticized by the Soviets for violating Sino-Soviet 
friendship. Only after the mass exodus did the CCP determine to use the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps of the People’s Liberation Army to strengthen border 
defenses by building a farm belt along the Sino-Soviet border. Chapter 5 reveals the 
process of building the border defenses that isolated Xinjiang from Soviet Central Asia.  
In conclusion, the endeavor secured the frontier from perceived Soviet aggression, 
and never was this region so integrated with China proper in its history. With the sealing 
of the Sino-Soviet border and the railway being extended to Urumqi in late 1962, the Ili 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture and even the whole of Xinjiang were reoriented from 
toward the West to the East and Urumqi also replaced Ili to be the center of Xinjiang. 
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However, the Three Districts, the socially and economically dynamic zones of transition, 
where different peoples and states met and interacted and which were defined by the 
transitional nature of those interactions, turned into an isolated battlefield dominated by 
the ethnic Han Chinese. While the state-building campaign the CCP launched is regarded 
as a limited success, the nation building in Xinjiang remains an ongoing project. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SOVIET SHADOW 
 
Night is long. And slowly comes the crimson sun-moon dawn. 
Demons and monsters danced about and whirled for hundreds of years 
and five hundred millions were not a family. 
 
Yet in one song the cock whitens the world. 
Song pours on us from ten thousand corners 
And musicians from Yutian play. 
Never before were we poets so moved. 
 
—— Mao Zedong, “Poem for Liu Yazi,” October 1950 45 
 
Setting of Xinjiang and Soviet Presence 
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, historically known as the “East 
Turkistan,” is the largest administrative division of the PRC China, with an area of 
640,000 square miles, or one-sixth of China’s territory. Located along China’s western 
frontier, Xinjiang is bounded by Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan in the 
west; Mongolia in the northeast; Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Tibet in the south; and 
Qinghai and Gansu provinces in the east. Xinjiang consists of three major sub-regions: 
the Dzungarian Basin in the north, the Tianshan Mountains in the center, and the Tarim 
Basin in the south. While the center of Xinjiang is taken up by the barren deserts, its 
major population centers are located at the edges of the region, making Xinjiang a “land 
of borderlands.”46 On the northwest side, a series of strategic passes and low-lying gaps 
through the mountains on the western frontier of Xinjiang, including those near the Yili 
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River valley, and the Dzungarian Gates, offered relatively easy access from Central Asia 
and contribute to the region’s geographical orientation toward the west. 
Because of its greater distance from the national capital than from the Central 
Asia, historically, the integration of Xinjiang with China has been difficult to achieve. As 
a result, the indigenous non-Han inhabitants and the local Chinese administration 
centered in Urumqi have often been virtually independent from the central authorities in 
China proper and have been subject to a great deal of Russian influence in the modern 
period.47  
Russia not only exerted substantial influence on the area through embassies inside 
Xinjiang, but also fostered cross-border ties by supporting trade and interaction between 
Xinjiang’s Muslims and their respective Muslim subjects in the bordering areas of 
Russian Central Asia. Russian/Soviet influence reached a peak at that time through the 
close relationship between the Soviet Union and Xinjiang’s warlord leader Sheng Shicai 
ð  (1897–1970), who became a full-fledged member of the Soviet Communist Party, 
and Xinjiang under his rule became “a virtual dependency of the Soviet Union.”48 While 
Sheng made a break with the Soviet Union in 1942, Soviet influence remained extensive 
in the region during 1940s through the Soviet-sponsored Yili rebellion of 1944 and the 
establishment of the East Turkistan Republic (ETR) in Xinjiang’s Three Districts, Yili, 
Tacheng, and Altay.49  
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As Jamil Hasanli’s work reveals, the goal of Moscow’s policy from 1931 to 1949 
regarding Xinjiang was to make sure that this vast borderland was always under the 
Soviet control, and Stalin himself was the chief architect of this policy.50 In maintaining a 
tight grip on this region, Stalin was not going to help the Muslims gain the independence 
they dreamed of. This approach was clearly revealed by Anastas Mikoyan, then vice-
chairman of the Council of Ministers, when he met CCP leaders during his secret mission 
to China right before the Communist victory in 1949. He informed Mao Zedong and his 
comrades that “we [the Soviets] do not intend to make the independence of the ethnic 
community happen, and neither do we cast greedy eyes on Xinjiang. We believe that 
Xinjiang is and should be a part of China.”51 The main reason for the Soviets maintaining 
Xinjiang as a Chinese territory rather than creating an independent state as they had done 
with the Outer Mongolia was that Stalin feared that once a Muslim state was established 
in Xinjiang, the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia would pursue independence as well. 
Furthermore, an independent Muslim state would be hard to control, given that the 
independence-seeking Yili clique led by Elihan Tore had already caused a great deal of 
trouble for Moscow.52 Only after the Soviet KGB abducted Tore to the USSR on June 12, 
1946, and put him under house arrest after the signing of the peace agreements with the 
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KMT did Stalin bring the ETR under his control once more. To avoid this occurring 
again, Stalin envisioned using Xinjiang, especially the Three Districts, to serve first as a 
buffer zone for the safety of the regime and then as a market for Soviet goods and a 
supplier of raw materials for Soviet industry. In 1930s, the Soviets achieved this goal by 
supporting Sheng Shicai, who maintained a pro-Soviet approach as his main policy for a 
decade. After Sheng betrayed Stalin and turned to Chiang Kai-Shek, the Soviets achieved 
the same goal by mobilizing the Muslims in Yining to rebel against the Chinese 
government, thereby using the Muslims to serve Soviet purposes. 
On August 14, 1945, using the Xinjiang issue as a bargaining chip, the Soviets 
successfully forced the government of the Republic of China led by Chiang Kai-shek to 
sign the “Sino-Soviet Friendship and Alliance Treaty.” According to this treaty, the 
USSR would maintain control over Outer Mongolia and also regain the interests the 
Russians had seized in Manchuria but lost to the Japanese during either the Russo-
Japanese War of 1904–1905 or the Mukden Incident of 1931. In return, the Soviets 
promised not to support the military actions of either the CCP or the Muslim 
movement.53 However, when the American army landed in North China in September 
1945 right after the Japanese surrendered, in order to prevent the Americans from 
entering Manchuria, a Soviet sphere of influence at that time, the Soviets decided to 
break the treaty and support the CCP. For the same reason, in Xinjiang, the Soviets were 
wary of penetration by Americans invited and even intentionally manipulated by Chiang. 
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Regarding Xinjiang as a backyard where no other major powers should be present, the 
Soviets decided to support the Muslims and use them once more as a bargaining chip 
against the KMT,54 while at the same time keeping it a secret even from the CCP.55 
Supported by the Soviets, the ETR leaders maintained the Three Districts as a de facto 
independent state even after the Nationalist government made a major political 
concession to them by signing a peace treaty in 1946.56 
As the CCP’s victory loomed, Stalin considered cooperation with the Chinese 
communists to prevent possible American penetration of Xinjiang. After all, the USSR 
would benefit more from a Xinjiang ruled by the CCP than from one ruled by the KMT 
and American government.57 What worried Stalin regarding this decision was that Mao 
might become another Josip Tito, who had insisted on Yugoslavia having more latitude to 
pursue its own interests rather than Soviet interests, and who in 1948 even publicly broke 
with Stalin. To sound out the CCP’s policy toward the USSR and the frontiers, Stalin in 
late January 1949 sent Mikoyan on a secret mission to China to an initial top-level 
meeting in Xibaipo, the seat of the CCP leadership in Yan’an.58 Mikoyan reported that 
Mao repeatedly referred to himself as a disciple of Stalin and said that he would adopt a 
pro-Soviet diplomatic policy. Furthermore, Mao expressed strong support for Stalin’s 
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criticism of Tito’s so-called “nationalist line,” which meant he would put the interests of 
the USSR over Chinese interests. However, Stalin was also informed that Mao had taken 
the initiative to discuss the Xinjiang issue with Mikoyan and had been suspicious that the 
Soviets were supporting the Yili rebellion in order to separate Xinjiang from China. What 
worried Stalin most was that the frontier policy Mao adopted regarding Outer Mongolia 
was more nationalist than that of the KMT. While Chiang Kai-shek ultimately 
acknowledged the independence of the Outer Mongolia, Mao envisioned reclaiming 
Chinese sovereignty over Outer Mongolia after the founding of the communist China.59 
In order to maintain Outer Mongolia as a Soviet buffer zone, Stalin once again decided to 
use Xinjiang as a bargaining chip, even if it meant sacrificing the interests of Muslims. 
Stalin’s determination to play the Xinjiang card may have also been strengthened by his 
belief that by facilitating the CCP, the USSR might further legitimate its presence in 
Xinjiang and even control this region more tightly.  
When meeting a Chinese delegation led by Liu Shaoqi in Moscow to reach a 
consensus on the next steps and conclude concrete agreements on Soviet aid in June 1949, 
Stalin suggested and even ordered the CCP to penetrate Xinjiang in 1949, even though 
his Chinese comrades were still engaged in the Civil War in China proper and planned to 
occupy this remote vast borderland no earlier than 1951. Stalin informed the Chinese 
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delegation that the delay of occupying Xinjiang would trigger a possible intervention of 
the British government in the Xinjiang affairs. Once the British intervened, the Muslims 
and even Indian Muslims would be mobilized to carry on the civil war against the CCP.60 
As soon as this occurred, it would not only challenge the security of the Soviet Central 
Asia, but made the conflicts in Xinjiang an international issue that might legitimize 
possible international intervention rather than merely a domestic one.61 Therefore, Stalin 
claimed that “this should be prevented from happening.”62 It seems that one of the 
reasons that hindered the CCP to penetrate Xinjiang was the army of Ma Bufang, a 
prominent Muslim Ma clique warlord ruling the provinces of Qinghai and Gansu. To 
encourage the CCP, Stalin informed the delegation that Ma’s army was mainly cavalry 
and would easily be smashed by cannon. If the Chinese were willing, Stalin promised that 
the Soviets would provide the Chinese with 40 fighter planes which would smash Ma’s 
army promptly. Being informed that Mao was very interested in knowing the oil reserves 
Xinjiang had,63 Stalin also reminded the Chinese delegation that Xinjiang was rich in 
both oil and cotton, which were exactly the materials the CCP desperately needed.64  
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When Mao decided to follow the orders from Moscow, Stalin kept his promise 
and went all out to aid the Chinese comrades. Since the CCP was not well equipped to 
penetrate the vast region, Stalin offered them vehicles and airplanes that could ship 
enough PLA soldiers right away. Another obstacle the CCP was facing was the lack of 
any cadres in Xinjiang to rely on.65 All the CCP organizations there had been uprooted by 
Sheng Shicai when he turned to Chiang Kai-shek in 1942. Due to the ethnic tension 
between Han and Muslims, the CCP did not have any connections with the Yining 
clique.66  Therefore, the Soviets helped the CCP not only to build up connections with the 
Muslims but forced the KMT army in Xinjiang to give up resistance and surrender to the 
CCP.67 Arranged by the Soviets, the CCP could successfully send its representative to the 
Three Districts to form a connection with the Yining clique. Through the consulate in 
Yili he could negotiate with the Muslim leaders regarding the details of how to cooperate 
after the founding of the new Chinese government.68 On September 25, the KMT army 
finally made a declaration to switch its allegiance to the CCP.69 Obviously, it was only 
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through the Soviets that the CCP managed to occupy Xinjiang by political methods rather 
than through a bloody military conflict.  
After occupying Xinjiang, the CCP benefited significantly from the presence of 
its Soviet comrades. As the representative of the CCP in Xinjiang admitted, the authority 
the Soviet consulates and Soviet cadres had among the Muslims, especially the youth, 
offered the CCP great “convenience” in establishing its rule in this ethnic borderland.70 
The biggest challenge the CCP encountered when governing Xinjiang was how to 
recover the economy of Xinjiang, especially the former KMT occupied seven districts 
which were impoverished due to the halt of Xinjiang-Soviet border trade. Without the 
border trade, neither the civilians nor the PLA soldiers could survive. Thus, resuming and 
even enlarging the Xinjiang-Soviet border trade would be the most effective way to 
relieve the poverty.71 The Soviet side responded to the economic request actively and in 
December 1949 the Xinjiang-Soviet trade was resumed.72 On Feburary14, 1950, under 
Mao’s pressure, a new Sino-Soviet treaty was signed in Moscow and the Sino-Soviet 
alliance was officially established. Because of this treaty, the USSR could not keep the 
Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1945 intact but gave up significant interests the USSR had 
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gained in China before 1949 and offered the CCP economic aid, something “not only 
look good but taste good,” to use Mao’s wording.73 With all-sided cooperation, the Sino-
Soviet relations in Xinjiang, as confessed by the representative of the CCP in Xinjiang, 
were much more important than merely diplomatic relations.74 
However, the aid and cooperation Stalin offered the Chinese was far from free. 
Both the Soviets and the Chinese claimed that the close cooperation the two socialist 
states had constructed was based on “proletarian internationalism,” an idea based on the 
view that capitalism is a global system and therefore the working class must act as a 
global class in order to defeat it in class conflict.75 For Stalin, by proletarian 
internationalism, it not only meant that the Soviets should support the Chinese in the way 
a big brother helps a little one but the CCP should follow him and always put Soviet 
interests above Chinese interests. That was why Stalin was seriously offended by the new 
Soviet-Chinese treaty of 1950 which favored the Chinese at the expense of Soviet 
interests in China, though the PRC still admitted that the Outer Mongolia was an 
independent country.76 Ever since Mao Zedong’s rise to power during the Chinese 
communist revolution, Stalin had been regarding him as “the second Tito” because of his 
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unorthodox “Marxist theory,” and this new treaty furthered this impression.77 As Mao 
later complained, only after the Chinese joined the Korean War, fighting for Kim II-sung 
as Stalin had ordered, did the Soviet leader change his attitude toward the Chinese 
government and finally decided to offer the Chinese massive Soviet aid sincerely.78  
In the case of Xinjiang, Stalin continued to use this borderland to serve the Soviet 
purpose through close cooperation with the CCP. First, through the Supplementary 
Agreement to the new Soviet-China treaty of 1950, Xinjiang was made an official Soviet 
sphere of interest.79 By requiring the Chinese not to allow any foreign powers except the 
USSR to present in Xinjiang, the Soviets could still dominate this region and at the same 
time eradicate any possible threats from foreign countries.   
Second, all Soviet consulates were resumed, through which orders from Moscow 
could be put into practice. Before 1949, the USSR had already managed to have five 
consulates in this vast region. In the Three Districts, each district had a consulate and 
they were led by the one in Yining. Both in Urumqi and Kashgar there were consulates 
and the Kashgar consulate was led by the Urumqi one. The consulate in Yining and the 
one in Urumqi were equal bureaucratically and both were led by Moscow directly. 80 
Through this network, the Soviet presence in Xinjiang was made official and omnipresent. 
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After the political transition in 1949, these five consulates remained, actively intervening 
in local affairs.81 The Soviet intervention was taken advantage of by the CCP right after 
1949 to make its penetration in this region easier. However, as the following chapters will 
reveal, when the rupture of the Sino-Soviet relations occurred, the Soviet presence was 
no longer regarded as a blessing but a curse that should be eradicated promptly.  
Third, through maintaining the loyalty of the ethnic cadres the Three Districts had 
for the USSR, the Soviets managed to use the Northwest Xinjiang as a buffer zone. After 
the Yili rebellion in 1944, the people in the Three Districts were encouraged by the 
Soviet consulates to gain Soviet nationality. This caused a significant number of local 
people to become either Soviet nationals or dual citizenship holders. Therefore, most 
local cadres identified themselves as Soviet nationals and devoted their political 
allegiance to Moscow. Since the CCP occupied Xinjiang mainly through political 
methods, the so-call “peaceful liberation,” the bureaucratic composition of the Three 
Districts was left intact. The political allegiance the cadres there had, was not toward the 
Chinese, but still toward the Soviets.  
To better control Xinjiang through the cadres of the Yining clique, the Soviets 
even suggested that their Chinese comrades move the capital of Xinjiang from Urumqi, a 
city in the center of Xinjiang, to Yining, a city adjacent to the Soviet-Xinjiang border. 
Some ethnic cadres, being advocators of this plan, also exerted serious pressure on the 
Chinese side.82 The nominal reasons the Soviets provided were both political and 
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economic. As the place of origin of the Yili rebellion and where most “democratic cadres,” 
a term refers to the Soviet trained Muslim cadres, were located, Yining was more 
qualified to serve as the capital of Socialist Xinjiang. The economic reason was even 
more convincing. Serving as the passage of the Soviet-Xinjiang commerce, Yining was 
the economic engine of the border trade.83 But the CCP was reluctant to follow this 
suggestion, knowing that making Yining the capital would encourage the autonomy of 
Xinjiang. 
How to deal with the issue of dual citizenship and the political loyalty of the 
ethnic cadres was what both the Chinese government and its Soviet counterpart had to 
work on. As Chapter Three will demonstrate, this issue had been dealt with differently 
over time and finally it further worsened the already troublesome Sino-Soviet relations.  
Fourth, the USSR used trade as a way to serve the Soviet interests. The Soviet 
interests in the natural resources of Xinjiang had become obvious during the year of 
Sheng Shicai’s rule in the region, when the latter authorized the Soviets to exploit various 
natural resources in exchange for loans and military assistance from the USSR. This 
could be proved when Mikoyan informed Mao that the Soviets had exploited and refined 
a large amount of oil but failed to ship it to the USSR due to a lack of transportation in 
Xinjiang.84 After the Second World War, Soviet need for Xinjiang’s raw materials, such 
as wool, cotton, leather, and meat, all items that Xinjiang had previously traded to the 
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USSR, had grown.85 By trade, Xinjiang would serve as a source of raw materials for the 
USSR. Furthermore, Soviet-Xinjiang trade enabled the USSR to incorporate Xinjiang as 
a part of the Soviet economic empire. Ever since being ruled by the warlord Yang 
Zengxin, Xinjiang became a trade partner of the USSR and the border trade was an 
essential way for this region to survive economically after the halt of the financial 
subsidy from China proper on which Xinjiang once heavily depended.  As pointed out by 
Wang Ke, the border trade further isolated Xinjiang from China proper and facilitated 
integration with the USSR.86 Though economic cooperation triggered the USSR to exert 
tremendous pressure on Xinjiang, it would be unfair not to point out that the Chinese 
government depended on the cooperation more heavily than its Soviet counterpart. After 
the Chinese occupation of Xinjiang in 1949, to satisfy the Chinese needs for border trade, 
the Soviets reopened border ports and recovered the trade with the seven districts that 
used to be ruled by the KMT.87 Besides border trade, the Soviet-Xinjiang economic 
cooperation which granted Xinjiang an opportunity to take advantage of the Soviet 
investments was also an important part of the Soviet aid.88 After Stalin finally decided to 
compromise with Mao to sign a new Soviet-Chinese treaty, besides the Chinese 
delegation led by Zhou Enlai, the premier of the PRC, a Xinjiang delegation was also 
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sent to Moscow.89 Right after the signing of the new Soviet-China treaty, in March 1950, 
three agreements regarding establishing joint Sino-Soviet ventures in Xinjiang on 
airplane, oils, nonferrous metal were signed.90 Being backward technically, what the 
Chinese side could offer was some labor force. As a result, these companies were 
dominated by the Soviet specialists.91 In April, to further develop economic relations, 
both countries decided to set counsellors of commerce or bureaus of representatives of 
commerce as an embassy faculty.92 Accordingly, in Xinjiang, bureaus of representatives 
of commerce were also set. When the Sino-Soviet split occurred, as this project will 
demonstrate, the economic cooperation, no matter which side had initiated it, would serve 
as solid evidence by the Chinese government as economic aggression the Soviets had in 
Xinjiang.93 
Since the USSR was the leader of the socialist camp in which Communist China 
was one of the followers, the relations between the USSR and China were not equal but 
more like superior and subordinate. Being dependent heavily on the Soviet aid, the 
Chinese leader had to be as docile as possible in the name of “strengthening mutual 
friendship and cooperation.”94 With the Soviet presence in Xinjiang, and a significant 
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number of the local population being loyal to Moscow, the CCP merely had fragile 
suzerainty rather than full sovereignty over the Three Districts. In other words, the Three 
Districts were more a Soviet frontier than a Chinese one. 
 
The Yining Clique 
While the Muslims had to accept that Xinjiang would become a part of 
Communist China in 1949, the main strategy they adopted was to keep as much 
autonomy as possible. However, the Muslims were pretty sure that the extent of 
autonomy they could enjoy under the Chinese rule depended mainly on how much 
support the Soviets would be willing to offer. Thus, even after the Chinese occupation, 
the Muslims in the Three Districts still tried to maintain this region “a special zone” as it 
used to be, a de factor Soviet satellite state. Contrary to the pro-Soviet attitude, the 
Muslims were very cautious with any penetration the CCP had toward the special zone.   
The pro–Soviet attitude the Muslims had for gaining autonomy was to some 
extent an irony though they barely had any other choices. As mentioned earlier, the 
Soviets did not intend to make the independence of Xinjiang happen but merely used the 
Yili rebellion as a bargaining chip. When Mikoyan was sent to Xibaipo for a secret 
mission, he first claimed that the USSR acknowledged that Xinjiang was Chinese 
territory. Then he warned Mao and his comrades that the CCP should not let the ethnic 
people be independent. What the Chinese instead should do regarding Xinjiang, as 
Mikoyan ordered, was actually to “allow them to be self-governed but not be 
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independent.”95 What made the situation more ironic was that when the CCP planned to 
maintain the Muslim army but be adapted as the fifth army corps of the PLA, it was 
Stalin who suggested Zhou Enlai not to let the Muslims have their own army. Otherwise, 
they might have the possibility of declaring independence. It was the CCP, on the 
contrary, who declined Stalin’s suggestion and decided to let the Muslims keep their 
army at least nominally. Since the KMT army in Xinjiang would be maintained as a way 
to solve the power transition of Xinjiang, the CCP had no reason to disband the ethnic 
army who used to be strongly backed by the Soviets.96  Before 1949, though the 
independence of Xinjiang was not supported by the USSR, due to the tension between the 
KMT and the USSR, the Soviets still left the Muslims two choices: either be a part of the 
China or Join the USSR as a republic.97 After 1949, with the forming of the Sino-Soviet 
alliance, unification with Chinese proper was the only option the Muslims had to accept.  
Though the Yining clique had to follow the Soviet line, they were reluctant to be 
governed by the Chinese. The domestic reasons for the Yining rebellion as being pointed 
out by Linda Benson are still eloquent in explaining the attitudes of Muslims after 1949. 
The antipathy among Muslims toward the Han Chinese caused by the Chinese policies 
adopt by the KMT government served as a collective trauma that hindered the Muslims 
from accepting the Chinese communist rule. Furthermore, the “Turki nationalism” the 
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indigenous people developed, no matter what the origins were, was fostered by the Han 
suppression and thus served as an ideology to be resisted.98  
Besides the anti-Han mentality and nationalist consciousness, the reasons that 
hindered the Yining clique from accepting the Chinese penetration were multiple. After 
the Yili rebellion, the Three Districts had already formed a quasi-Muslim Republic with 
all the elements a nation state should have: defended territory, bureaucracy, homogenous 
Muslim population, Islamic legal system, independent financial system, an economy 
based on border trade with the USSR, and a Soviet equipped army. For the leaders of the 
Yining clique, though different schools had different approaches, emulating the path 
Outer Mongolia had already taken was always considered the final goal.99 No doubt, to 
be unified with China proper for them meant a big loss: not only would it be impossible 
to gain national independence but what they had already gained would diminish soon. 
Furthermore, being trained and led by the Soviets directly and having founded their own 
socialist Republic as early as 1944, the Yining clique considered themselves as more 
revolutionary than the CCP. The sense of superiority made the Muslims feel reluctant to 
be led by the CCP and they refused to follow the campaigns the CCP had ordered to 
launch because the Three Districts were “already a liberated zone” and thus did not need 
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to be socialized anymore.100 This attitude was regarded by the CCP as “arrogant mood of 
these self-claimed liberators,” and should seize whatever opportunities available to 
punish them harshly so that they would “docilely follow the party and listen to the party’s 
order.”101  
While independence was no longer a realistic goal, the Yining clique had been 
aggressively pursuing the authentic autonomy that had been promised by both the Soviets 
and Chinese. In the process of bargaining, what they had gained from the KMT would be 
the bottom line for the Muslims regarding the kind of autonomy they should be granted 
by the CCP. “The Peace Agreement” of January 2, 1946 signed between the Yining 
clique and the KMT was a big compromise for the KMT under serious pressure from the 
USSR, and as a result it offered the Three Districts a series of privileges for self-
governing.102 Furthermore, though the KMT and the Yining clique had signed a 
supplementary agreement on how to adapt the Muslim army to be a part of the KMT 
army, but the Yining clique finally managed to maintain its own army and because of the 
military power, they gained de facto independence.  
The Muslims hoped the same thing would happen when dealing with the CCP. In 
February 1951, the CCP published a draft of the framework for Regional National 
Autonomy and asked Yining for their feedback. To offer the CCP a response that might 
represent the will of the people in the Three Districts, on March 4, some Muslim elites 
held a conference, which later was called “colloquia of fifty-one intellectuals.” When 
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responding to the question, “the autonomy given to us should be in what kind,” the 
Yining clique detailed their expectations to Beijing. The main points are as follows: 1) 
Xinjiang should be established as Uyghurstan Republic; 2) The name of the Uyghurstan 
Republic should be added on the national emblem of the PRC; 3) The PRC should be in 
charge of military and diplomacy; 4) However, the PLA should retreat from Xinjiang and 
the defense and the security of the Uyghurstan republic should be authorized by the 
national army composed of local youth; 5) the rights of constructing direct connections 
with the Soviet republics regarding education and culture should be granted; 6) An 
observer of Uyghurstan Republic should be set under the full-fledged representative of 
PRC to the United Nation; 7) Xinjiang (new territory) literately meant “a new land being 
conquered” and thus should be changed to either “Tianshan mountains,” “Turkistan,” or 
“Three Districts,” etc.103  
Obviously the expectations were based on the peace agreement of 1946, but much 
higher than both the peace agreement and the autonomy the Kazakhstan Republic had 
gained from the USSR. For example, the Yining clique still wanted to maintain their own 
army, the privilege neither the KMT compromised to grant to the Muslims nor the 
Soviets had granted to any of its republics. The Yining clique’s high expectation revealed 
that they believed that as an ethnic community and liberators of this region, they were 
entitled to enjoy more advantages than the Muslims on the Soviet territories were 
enjoying. Two months later, however, the expectations the Muslim elites had raised were 
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criticized harshly as aiming to “separate the fatherland and seriously destroy the national 
unity.” The medals that were decorated with a star and crescent the military officers wore 
were seen by the CCP as an evidence of promoting “Pan-Turkism,” a movement to unify 
all Turkic-speaking people as a country.104 It was a serious accusation because in January 
1950, the Xinjiang government had already claimed that “Pan-Turkism was supported by 
the British and American imperialists and their running dogs” and thus violated the 
nationalist policy and should be fought against.105 Soon these “arrogant” “self-claimed 
liberators” would be labeled as promoters of “local nationalism,” a Chinese term for 
“Pan-Turkism,” and be punished harshly through a series of political campaigns.106  
If the Muslim’s “separatist tendency,” to use the term of the CCP, was something 
that made the Chinese government worry, the maintaining of the leader-follower relations 
between the Soviet consulates and the ethnic cadres after 1949 was the evidence of this 
tendency. It was first and foremost a legacy of the Yili rebellion, which was mobilized, 
organized and led by the USSR. Being led directly by the Soviets before the Chinese 
occupation, the ethnic cadres still took the Soviet leadership in this region for granted. 
Moreover, since Moscow was the superior leader of the global socialist movement and 
even Mao himself declared that China would join the socialist camp headed by the 
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USSR,107 the ethnic cadres had every reason to believe it was better to listen to the 
Soviets who usually had the final say.   
Furthermore, many local people, especially ethnic cadres, were either Soviet 
nationals or dual citizenship holders and not willing to give up their Soviet citizenship. 
Local people, especially the ethnic cadres believed that “the Soviet Union is better than 
China and therefore being a Soviet is more revolutionary and glorious.” 108 During the 
Yining rebellion, many local people gained Soviet nationality. As once briefed by the 
Soviet consul-general in Urumqi, there were more than 100,000 to 200,000 dual 
citizenship holders in the Three Districts. The number of the transitional population was 
so significant there, that neither the Soviet government nor the indigenous people would 
keep it as a secret.109 That was also why one of the expectations the Muslim elites raised 
was to maintain “the rights of constructing direct connections with the Soviet republics 
regarding education and culture.”110 In other words, people in the Three Districts still 
wanted to be a part of the Soviet Central Asia at least culturally.  
Actually, after 1949, the Soviets were careful with this issue to avoid being 
criticized by both the CCP and any capitalist governments as using the local cadres to 
control Xinjiang. When the Xinjiang government asked the Soviets to recommend some 
Soviet nationals to serve as cadres who were desperately short of ethnic cadres, the USSR 
was cautious with it. Although they agreed to recommend some Soviet nationals in 
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Xinjiang to serve, the head of the Soviet Foreign Administration advised the Soviet 
consulate in Urumqi to ask the Xinjiang government to propose it to the Central 
government of the PRC in advance.111 In other words, the Soviet government was careful 
not to make Beijing think that using Soviet nationals to serve the Xinjiang government 
was a Soviet plan for controlling this region but an aid offered by the Soviet side, but 
initiated by the Xinjiang government.  Furthermore, as a result of criticisms from the 
Capitalist states and some Chinese, that the USSR was colonizing Xinjiang through 
Soviet nationals who served as top officials of the local government, in October, 
Saifuddin Azizi, then the vice chairman of Xinjiang province, gained permission from 
both Stalin and Mao to quit his membership of Soviet Communist Party and join the 
CCP.112 Then, in February 1950, the Political Bureau of the Soviet Central Government 
abolished 16 Soviet nationals who were ranking officials in Xinjiang, including 
Saifuddin.113 
Though the Soviets tried to show their hands-off position, the local people, 
especially the ethnic cadres still regarded the Soviet government as their government and 
the USSR as their fatherland. Though nominally the ethnic cadres acknowledged the 
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Chinese government as the legal government of Xinjiang, they still followed the Soviet 
consulates and worked with them directly. In 1949, it was merely a Soviet decision for 
the Yining clique to cooperate with the CCP with whom the Muslims had no contacts but 
distrust. Thus, all the interactions between the two sides were made possible mainly 
through the Soviets.114 This situation has remained ever since.  
The local ethnic cadres, when dealing with local affairs, still went to the Soviet 
consulates either for instruction in advance or briefed them afterwards.115 Even the Soviet 
consul-general in Urumqi confessed to the Chinese side multiple times that cadres there 
were willing to offer him secrets of the state.116  
Beside the political allegiance and administrative relations, local officials 
developed economic cooperation directly with the USSR without realizing that now any 
interactions between Xinjiang and the USSR should be considered as diplomatic relations, 
and thus should be done through the diplomatic organizations of the Chinese government. 
For example, in 1950 a deputy head of the Communication Department of Xinjiang, 
without the permission from Beijing, went to Almaty and signed a contract with the 
Soviet government to establish postal and tele communication between Xinjiang and the 
USSR. The Xinjiang government, without asking for any instruction from Beijing in 
advance, permitted the deputy head’s trip to the USSR.117 When the Sino-Soviet alliance 
worked well, the “diplomatic mistakes” were viewed by Beijing as the “backwardness of 
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the ethnic cadres.” After the Sino-Soviet split, they were criticized by the CCP as not 
being able to “differentiate the inner (China) and the outer (the USSR).”118 In other words, 
it demonstrated that the status of the sovereignty the Chinese government had over 
Xinjiang had yet been accepted by the local ethnic people.  
The role of the Soviets on the Yili side was more than a leader but a patron. The 
degree of political autonomy the Muslims could gain, depended heavily on this 
relationship. Furthermore, with so many Soviet nationals in Xinjiang, the Soviet presence 
was the only way for maintaining a sense of belonging to this region though now a part of 
China. Therefore, any retreat Soviets did in the region would cause insecurity in the local 
communities. For example, on October 12, 1954, China and the USSR signed a joint 
communique, claiming that the Soviet share of four Sino-Soviet joint ventures, two of 
them in Xinjiang, would be turned over to the Chinese government by 1955.119 For 
Beijing, it was a diplomatic victory over the USSR and a sign of a good form of the Sino-
Soviet alliance. The Soviet nationals and ethnic people, however, viewed it 
pessimistically. For the ethnic people of Soviet nationality, the turnover shocked them. 
Some were confused why the Soviet share was turned over to the Chinese four years after 
the signing of the treaty since the treaty claimed that the period of validity of the joint 
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ventures was for 30 years. They began to worry about what they should do when the 
Soviets returned home after the turnover. They were thinking of returning to the USSR as 
well. Those who only spoke Russian and ethnic languages were scared because they 
might lose their jobs as translators. “Life would become hard for people not speaking 
Chinese.” The indigenous ethnic people were no better. Some worried that without the 
Soviets serving as leaders and mediators, it would be hard for the ethnic people to survive 
in the companies dominated by Han Chinese.  “The Han comrades are like the right eye, 
the Soviet comrades the nose and the ethnic comrades the left eye. If the nose were gone, 
the right eye would eat the left one up.” 120 This quotation indicates how much the ethnic 
population depended on the USSR politically, economically and psychologically. This 
not only made the integration of the Three Districts with the rest of Xinjiang and the 
China proper a difficult task for the CCP to fulfill, but can also explain why the Sino-
Soviet rupture contributed greatly to the mass exodus of 1962 which will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
 
Dilemma of “Leaning to One Side” 
The goal of the CCP regarding the Xinjiang issue was to incorporate this vast 
Muslim region into China, which involved at least two missions: one was “to eliminate 
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foreign influence from China’s frontier regions,” as noted by George Moseley,121 and the 
other was to prevent the Muslims from claiming independence. The first mission was 
about dealing with the foreign powers, including the USSR, and the other was how to 
interact with the Yining clique. Since the dependence of the Three Districts would only 
be possible with the Soviet support, the second mission was still how to deal with the 
USSR. Therefore, the Xinjiang issue for the CCP was mainly a diplomatic issue.  
On June 30, 1949 Mao Zedong published the article, “On People’s Democratic 
Dictatorship,” and announced his “lean to one side” policy, which explained how to deal 
with the Sino-Soviet relations after the victory of the CCP.122 By this approach, the CCP 
decided to give up the “third road” approach which was represented by the opinion of 
General Zhang Zhizhong, a former close associate of Chiang Kai-shek and former 
governor of Xinjiang province but joined the CCP. He suggested that the new China, 
while uniting with the USSR, should seek accommodation with the United States and 
other western countries.123 Envisioning that the whole world was divided into capitalism 
and socialism, the CCP decided to side with the camp of socialism. The Chinese thus 
regarded their cause as a part of the Soviet-led international proletarian movement and 
were willing to follow the Soviet leadership in future. One of the main reasons for the 
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CCP’s adoption of this approach, as pointed out by Chen Jian, was to gain enough 
support from allying itself with other socialist countries to protect the new born China 
from the possibility of military intervention from imperialist countries, especially the 
U.S..124 In Mao’s own words, “we need friends,” so that “if the imperialists would attach 
us, we have already hired a helper.”125 In the case of Xinjiang, as this chapter showed 
earlier, the CCP’s willingness to be allying with the USSR was also why Stalin decided 
to invite the Chinese to penetrate this Muslim borderland.  
For the Chinese side, the implementation of the pro-Soviet approach in Xinjiang 
was even more pragmatic: only by working closely with the Soviets could the CCP 
survive in this remote Muslim borderland. The authority the Soviets had among the local 
ethnic people, especially among the youth, as confessed by a high Chinese official in 
Xinjiang, “offered us (the CCP government in Xinjiang) great convenience in dealing 
with local affairs.”126 Since the CCP did not have any organization established in 
Xinjiang before the takeover, the Soviet consulates were the only power to rely on. 
What was most urgent for the CCP after taking Xinjiang was how to feed the 
more than 240,000 people in the region who were soldiers of the PLA and the National 
Army, soldiers crossed over from the KMT Army in Xinjiang, and the administrative 
personnel. The local finance revenue was far from making the local government self-
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sufficient: only 30% of the expenditure could be covered by the local government while 
the rest 70% should be allocated by the central government, which itself already had 
many financial difficulties to cope with.127 Economically, Xinjiang had been relying 
heavily on the USSR ever since the suspension of the annual financial subsidy after fall 
of the Qing rule. Due to the halt of the Xinjiang-Russian trade in 1942 after Sheng Shicai 
changed tack from Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek, the financial situation was worsened 
significantly in the seven districts controlled by the KMT. After the Chinese takeover in 
late 1949, the financial condition further deteriorated with inflation skyrocketing more 
than 100 times. Therefore, the CCP was desperately seeking to restore the Soviet-
Xinjiang trade to feed not only the indigenous population but the PLA soldiers.128 It was 
also in this context that Peng Dehuai, then the leader of the First Field Army of the PLA 
controlled Xinjiang militarily, asked the central government not only to restore the border 
trade but also to resume the agreement that had been already drafted by the Soviet 
government and KMT on establishing two joint-stock companies of metal and oil in 
Xinjiang. By taking advantage of the Soviet investment and technology, the Chinese 
government might exploit the resources and modernize Xinjiang.129  
As noted by Yang Kuisong, the Sino-Soviet alliance based on the “lean to one 
side” policy and the Chinese nationalists who advocated national independence had been 
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conflicting ever since it had been issued in June 1949.130 After the Second World War, a 
wave of decolonization and nationalism as two sides of a coin was pervasive all over the 
world. The anti-Chinese sentiment and the dream of the Turkic state among the Muslims 
in Xinjiang was impacted heavily by this worldwide movement.  So also, abolishing all 
the unequal treaties signed between Chinese governments and the Western powers and 
therefore forming diplomatic relations with foreign countries based on equality was a part 
of this movement. Among the unequal treaties, the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 was the 
most notorious. In a declaration made in connection with the Treaty of Friendship and 
Alliance signed by the KMT and the USSR, the Nationalist Government of the Republic 
of China accepted the independence of Mongolia.  It granted the Soviets the privileges of 
using Lushun (Port Arthur) and Dalian as navy bases and partnership in the Chinese 
Eastern Railway for a 30-year period.131 The expectation for eradicating any unequal 
treaties was further flamed by Mao’s emotional slogan, “the Chinese people have stood 
up!,”132 and the anti-Western presence policy put into operation by the CCP as soon as 
they took control of the areas of the Western population.133 As Liu Shaoqi reported to 
Stalin, the CCP refused to acknowledge the foreign diplomats in China as diplomats but 
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merely foreign aliens. The purpose for doing this, as Liu emphasized, was to make the 
Chinese feel China has stood up and the CCP did not fear the imperialists at all.134  
While playing the card of nationalism contributed greatly to the CCP’s victory 
over the KMT,135 the “lean to one side” diplomatic approach adopted by the CCP after 
victory challenged the nationalist position the CCP had been promoting: how to maintain 
a nationalist independence but lean to USSR at the same time? The idea of “proletarian 
internationalism” both the USSR and the CCP had been promoting served as an evidence 
to justify that “the CCP has never attached enough importance to ‘country’ ideologically.” 
After 1949, the CCP had been demonizing Chiang Kai-shek by blaming him for “always 
following American government.” However, the nationalist card the CCP used was no 
longer effective. If Chiang was “a running dog of the American Imperialists” though he 
had never claimed to adopt a pro-America policy, someone argued, how about the CCP 
who claimed the “lean to one side” approach publicly and went all out to “learn from the 
USSR.”136 Domestically, this radical diplomatic policy diminished the CCP’s legitimacy 
as a nationalist party and made it as merely a Chinese agent of the USSR. Both the 
democratic parties and some students and workers, regarded the Soviet privileges in 
China as aggressions that should be abolished. As Liu Shaoqi informed Stalin, the issues 
these people were considering included the Soviet military presence in Port Arthur, the 
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Soviet backed independence of the Outer Mongolia and the machines left by the Japanese 
and the weapons left in Manchuria after their surrender but transferred to the USSR by 
the Soviets.137 With the influx of the Soviet specialists invited by the Chinese government 
and allocated to working units nationwide, some began to worry that the domestic 
economy would be totally controlled by the Soviets as a trophy. When the Soviet 
specialists began to dominate the schools and colleges and Russian became a language 
that most faculty were ordered to study, elites who believed that China should be 
independent culturally worried that under this cultural policy, not only the “demise of the 
regime” (wangguo )­) but the “demise of the human society” (wang tianxia)Â) 
would occur, using Ming loyalist Gu Yanwu’s quotation.138  
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The social mentality of nationalism sometimes was extreme. On December 16, 
1949, when Mao Zedong arrived at the North train station in Moscow, he was welcomed 
by the No. 2 Soviet leader but not Stalin himself. This was viewed by some Chinese 
nationalists as a sign that the USSR had not treated the Chinese leader with respect and 
dignity. The surveillance report revealed that “many were surprised that Stalin had not 
been to the station to meet Mao in person.” Mao’s journey to Moscow was viewed as 
something similar to a vassal state to pay a tribute to the Suzerain state, and thus 
“violated the dignity of the country.”139 The new Sino-Soviet treaty signed on February 
14, 1950 was considered by the CCP as a big diplomatic victory and a big compromise 
by Stalin. The treaty dealt with a range of issues such as Soviet privileges in Xinjiang and 
Manchuria and one of its most important points was the provision of a $300 million loan 
from the USSR to the PRC.  By this treaty, the Sino-Soviet alliance was formed legally. 
With the USSR serving as an ally, the CCP could safely “do constructive work 
domestically” and “fight jointly with the Soviets against possible imperialist 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
¤˟ǶǽȼŢȀ# [On Tang Gao Emperor submitted himself to the Turks],” in Chen Yinque ji: Han liu 
tang ji ʾàĦ˅ˮâƆ·˅ [Collected works of Chen Yinque: Volume of Hanliutang] (Beijing: Sanlian 
shudian chubanshe, 2001), pp. 108–21. In 1954, when culturally the Chinese government ordered people to 
learned from the Soviets, Chen became pessimistic. He then published another paper ,“On Hanyu,” to 
imply how wrong the CCP’s cultural policy was. Han Yu, Tang Confucian scholar, promoted 
Confucianism but deeply opposed to Buddhism and Daoism. He contrasted the Chinese civilization and 
barbarism where people were “like birds and wild beast or like the barbarians.” He considered Buddhism to 
be of barbarian origin, therefore an unsuitable religion for the Chinese people. By emphasizing Han Yu’s 
cultural approach, Chen implied that the CCP’s “learning from the Soviet Union” campaign might put 
Soviet culture above the Chinese one, just as in Tang dynasty the emperor put the barbarism such as  
Buddhism and Daoism over the civilization, Confucianism. The right approach regarding culture should be 
maintaining the independence of the Chinese culture with Confucianism as its mainstream. See Chen 
Yinque, “Lun Hanyu” ɰːĪ [On Hanyu] (1954), in Chen Yinque Ji: Jinmingguan conggao chugaoʭŨ˘
Ǿ`ȟ [Collected works of Chen Yinque: Jinminguan manuscript] (Beijing: sanlian shudian chubanshe, 
2001), pp. 319–32. 
139 “Xia’ai minzuzhuyi sixiang de biaoxian” ǒˁƠŤȯģĩǤɗǗ [Representation of narrow nationalist 
thoughts], Zhongguo xinwen zongshuUÄŠȴȢȫ ed., Neibu cankaoOʤȰ [Internal reference], 1 
January 1950; Yang Kuisong, Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jianguoshi yanjiu, Vol. 2, p. 84. 
!62  
aggression.”140 In order not to give the democratic parties and other nationalists any 
excuse to consider the new treaty as “treason,” Mao himself had to carefully revise the 
editorial of the Xinhua News Agency and praised the signing of the treaty as a signal of 
“a new age of Sino-Soviet friendly cooperation.”141 At the same time, he ordered that 
when organizing mass conferences to celebrate the signing of the treaty, all the comments 
should follow the line of the editorial of the Xinhua News Agency. No “improper” 
opinions should be expressed.142  When the news that the signing of two Sino-Soviet 
joint-stock companies in Xinjiang was announced, some students in Beijing suspected 
that the agreements would violate the Chinese sovereignty. They questioned the 
government and asked for an explanation. Some even attacked the “Soviet aggression” 
and “the traitors of the government.” Some students decided to quit their Youth League 
membership and protest against the government.143 If the domestically the pro-Soviet 
approach was viewed as violation of Chinese sovereignty and even treason, 
internationally, the CCP was viewed as a puppet of the USSR. Mao Zedong, Liu shaoqi, 
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Zhou Enlai and their comrades were marionettes controlled by Moscow through the 
Soviet specialists serving in China.144  
Facing both domestic and international criticism, the CCP had to balance between 
“lean to one side” and “self-dependence.” As mentioned earlier, the adoption of the pro-
Soviet diplomatic approach was for practical reasons, such as the security of the regime 
and financial aid. The Civil War experience had taught the CCP that surviving sometimes 
was more important than following orthodox Marxism and Leninism. A story told by 
Khrushchev which can also be proved by archival documents, serves as a good example 
by demonstrating how practical Mao was as a strategist. When the PLA was approaching 
Shanghai, Mao halted the march and refused to capture the city. When asked by Stalin 
why he did not take Shanghai, Mao answered that if the CCP took the city, they would 
have to feed all these people which would become a huge burden.145 Being a communist 
party leader but refusing to take the city where the biggest Chinese working class were 
located, Mao’s pragmatic way was labeled by Stalin as “margarine Marxist” and blamed 
by Khrushchev as not a Marxist: “always relied on the peasants and not on the working 
class.”146  
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Mao dealt with the issue of Port of Arthur and Dalian in a similar pragmatic way. 
Mao himself told Mikoyan that a female Chinese woman serving as a law maker in the 
legislature of KMT once claimed that it would be a great achievement if the CCP could 
reclaim Port Arthur from the Russian. Mao commented that this woman did not really 
know politics.147 Mikoyan informed the Chinese that the Soviet government believed that 
the Sino-Soviet treaty regarding the Soviet privilege in Port of Arthur was an unfair treaty 
and therefore the USSR decided to abolish it. If the CCP believed that the Soviet army 
should retreat promptly, the Soviet government would do it accordingly. The reaction of 
Mao and his comrades was the same: At this point, the Soviets should not retreat from the 
Liaodong Peninsular and Port Arthur. Otherwise, this would offer the Americans an 
opportunity to take advantage of the military weakness. Mao further claimed that the 
CCP would never consider revising this treaty until with the Soviet aid and “we (Chinese 
government) finally can govern ourselves.”148 According to Mikoyan’s reports, Mao and 
his comrades knew very clearly that without the Soviet presence, the impending new 
communist regime would hardly survive. For the security of the regime, the CCP would 
rather risk being blamed as a Soviet puppet. 
It would be unfair to blame the CCP for being “never attaching enough 
importance to ‘country’ ideologically.” Mao and his comrades had a strong “victim 
mentality,” a mind-set that sees China as a victim of imperialism while regarding the 
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Chinese as an ethnic group bullied and discriminated against by the Westerners.149 
Therefore, Mao and his comrade were very sensitive to anything related to international 
relations. When Mikoyan visited Xibaipo in 1949, Mao was cooperative and even docile, 
as this chapter has already shown. However, Mao later complained to Yudin, the Soviet 
Ambassador to China then, that he was very dissatisfied with Mikoyan. “He (Mikoyan) is 
always arrogant just because he is senior. He regards us as inferior as sons. He is acting 
big. So arrogant. In 1949 when he first came to Xibaipo, he put on airs. Later, he has 
been to China several times and every time he was like that.”150 In the case of Xinjiang, 
Beijing had been promoting the Xinjiang-Soviet trade and even risked taking blame for 
betraying China for signing joint-stock company agreements and inviting Soviet 
specialists to the remote borderland. However, though “lean to one side” propaganda was 
pervasive, the way the CCP dealt with the Xinjiang-Soviet commerce agreements was 
nationalist. When being asked to advise on how to revise the commerce agreements 
drafted by the Soviets, the Xinjiang representatives were not willing to find any fault with 
the Soviet draft, regarding the USSR as a “country of the working class” as well as an 
“elder brother” of China. However, Zhou Enlai reminded them that “as Chinese 
Communist Party members, you not only should consider what is good for the USSR but 
should also consider what is good for us (Chinese government). The agreements were 
something between two countries. Not only both countries should respect each other but 
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be equal with each other.”151 In order words, during the negotiation, what Zhou meant 
was that the Chinese side should put national interests over the interests of the USSR. 
To further claim the sovereignty over Xinjiang, at the end of 1950, the Xinjiang 
Foreign Affair Bureau was established. Since the only foreign power allowed to present 
was the USSR, the Bureau was merely targeted at the Soviet consulates. With the 
establishment of this organization, Beijing intended to inform both the Soviets and the 
local ethnic cadres that Xinjiang was not a “special zone” as it used to be and any 
interactions between the USSR and Xinjiang should been done through the diplomatic 
organization that were authorized by Beijing. From 1951 to 1952, branches of the Bureau 
had been set in South Xinjiang, Yili, Tacheng and Altay. With these organizations 
established, according to the local report of 1953, Beijing gradually transformed “direct,” 
“individual” interactions between local governments and the Soviet consulates, to a 
“normal foreign relations.”152 That means the Xinjiang-Soviet interactions were changed 
from administrative relations to diplomatic ones. In 1960, when the tensions between 
Beijing and Moscow tightened, any direct interactions between local cadres and the 
Soviet consulates, such as asking the Soviet consulates for a favor or leaking any 
domestic information to the Soviet would be criticized and even punished for “not being 
able to differentiate the domestic and the foreign.” Otherwise, it might do harm to the 
“normal” relations between Xinjiang and the Soviet consulates. 153 By “normal,” the 
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Chinese government obviously meant that any interactions between Xinjiang cadres and 
the Soviet consulates not going through the diplomatic organizations, would be 
considered as violating the diplomatic relations between these two socialist states. 
The nationalist emotions pervasive nationwide as the backlash of the “lean to one 
side” policy impacted the CCP’s policy towards the USSR heavily though the Party was 
reluctant to admit. Right after the founding of the PRC, Mao went to Moscow and 
determined to revise the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1945 so that he could gain something “not 
only beautiful but also tasty,”154 even if it meant offending Stalin who was afraid that any 
change of the treaty might challenge the world order that was maintained by the Yalta 
Treaty singed at the end of the World War Two.155 One of the purposes for signing the 
new Sino-Soviet treaty was to achieve a so-called “diplomatic victory” over the USSR,156 
convincing the nationalists that “lean to one side” policy did not mean “the CCP was a 
Soviet running dog,”157 and always putting the Soviet interests over the Chinese ones. 158  
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Even after the signing of the new treaty, the pressure for national independence 
from the democratic parties and the society had been challenging the political legitimacy 
of the CCP rule ever since the founding of the PRC. To mold peoples’ minds for 
supporting the pro-Soviet policy, the Sino-Soviet friendship associations of all levels 
were established with Liu Shaoqi as the chair.159 A series of campaigns to promote a 
friend like the USSR and a father like Stalin had been carried all over the nation. Many 
examples testify to the pervasiveness of the propaganda of the Sino-Soviet friendship 
even in the countryside. When Mao Zedong visited a small village near the Yellow River 
in October, 1952, an old woman with bound feet ran to see Chairman Mao. She was very 
happy to see Chairman Mao, and said to Mao, “Chairman Mao! You’ve come! Has Stalin 
come too?”160 To an illiterate old person living in a remote village, who did not even 
know the exact geographic location of the Soviet Union, the “friendship” between 
Chairman Mao and Stalin in propaganda posters impressed her so much that she thought 
Chairman Mao must always be accompanied by Stalin. 
Besides the propaganda campaigns, the CCP was under pressure and eager to 
show its nationalist position when dealing with anything related to the USSR. For 
example, the industrial projects initiated by the Chinese side to hasten Xinjiang’s 
economic recovery and development, the Sino-Soviet Nonferrous and Rare Metals Joint-
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Stock Company (ɓŷɂǻŷʭóȹ5S) and the Sino-Soviet Petroleum Joint-
Stock Company (ɓǰƪȹ5S), were viewed by many as Soviet aggression made 
possible by the cooperation of the CCP. The agreements were signed on March 27, 1950 
and the agreements would be effective over the next 30 years.161 However, the 
agreements gradually turned from a Chinese initiation for the joint exploitation of mineral 
resources in Xinjiang into “an insult to the Chinese people,” a treaty that Stalin forced his 
Chinese comrades to sign, as claimed by Mao and Khrushchev, both of them intending to 
use this case to demonize Stalin.162 Mao had been asking the Soviet government to turn 
over the companies to China after the death of Stalin in 1953. To gain the support from 
Mao, the new leader Khrushchev decided to do Mao a favor. It served, for the Chinese 
side, as a diplomatic victory which could be used for propaganda purpose. However, the 
turnover was too early for the Chinese side to be ready at least technically. Some in a 
factory worried that “after the turnover, the Soviets will not offer us machines and 
materials anymore. Neither can produce them by ourselves. What should we do?” 
Technicians claimed that “the agreement was supposed to let the Soviets and the Chinese 
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run the company cooperatively for 30 years. Therefore, our plans for being trained as 
technicians were designed on the basis of a 30-year term. However, only after four years 
the Soviet specialists would retreat. What should we do since we have not mastered the 
technology at all?”163 For the purpose of developing industry in Xinjiang, the Sino-Soviet 
cooperation should have lasted longer so that the Chinese side would be better prepared 
technically. However, too eager to relieve the pressure from the nationalists, the CCP 
believed that showing self-sufficiency of the Chinese government was more important 
than gaining aid from the Soviet side.  
At the local level in Xinjiang, the Chinese officials sometimes loathed the Soviet 
consulates for being involved in local affairs too much by instructing ethnic cadres. A 
military commander, as a report reveals, was reluctant to contact the Soviet consulate in 
Yili and showed his dislikes directly. He was reported by the consul in Moscow for 
having “narrow nationalist attitude.”  When the CCP needed the Soviets desperately for 
controlling the ethnic cadres and aid in Xinjiang, the attitudes among the Chinese cadres 
toward the Soviets were being criticized for being “narrow minded,” and “not realizing 
the Sino-Soviet relations were more than diplomatic ones.”164 Due to the nationalist 
positions both the Chinese and the Soviets adopted, the “proletarian internationalism” 
would be more rhetoric than a lasting policy. The Soviet presence in Xinjing would soon 
be no longer a blessing but an eyesore that should be pulled out. 
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CHAPTER 2  
MASS EXODUS 
 
Big rat, big rat, 
don’t eat my millet! 
Three years I’ve served you 
but you won’t care for me.  
I’m going to leave you 
and go to that happy land, 
happy land, happy land 
Where I’ll find my place. 
 
—— “Big Rat, Big Rat,” Book of Odes, 1122–249 B. C.165 
 
In the spring of 1962, a mass exodus took place in Yili Kazakh Autonomous 
Prefecture (YKAP), the Sino-Soviet borderland in northwestern Xinjiang. Between late 
March and the end of May, more than 67,000 border inhabitants, most of whom were 
ethnic Kazaks and Uighurs, successfully fled to the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
(KSSR).166 In Yining, the capital of YKAP, the mass exodus triggered social unrest. On 
May 29, a crowd of 2,000 demonstrated in front of the Communist Party headquarters, 
asking for permission to migrate to the Soviet Union. The CCP government opened fire 
on the protesters: five demonstrators were killed and more than ten were seriously injured. 
In the parlance of the Chinese government, this became known as the Yi-Ta incident. 
The Yi-Ta incident had a wide-ranging impact, leading directly to the extensive 
de-Sovietization campaign launched in Xinjiang by the CCP in the name of halting illegal 
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border crossing. As a consequence of the campaign, the loosely controlled Sino-Soviet 
border of Xinjiang, which had been a symbol of the friendship between China and the 
USSR, was abruptly sealed, and would not be re-opened until 1983. Mao Zedong also 
interpreted the Yi-Ta Incident as a conspiracy of “Soviet revisionism,” a term used to 
attack the Soviet regime under Nikita Khrushchev, and even called on his comrades to 
“be prepared for a war.”167 Xinjiang was thus transformed from a remote hinterland of 
China proper to a battlefront.168 This chapter first examines how the domestic policies, 
ethnic policy regarding Xinjiang and the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations 
contributed to the Yi-Ta incident. Then, this chapter also demonstrates CCP’s perceptions 
on what caused this incident and how the perceptions caused the campaign of Sinification 
in Xinjiang.  
 
The Yi-Ta Incident 
Xinjiang officials began receiving the first reports on people successfully fleeing 
to the USSR in late March of 1962.169 On April 9, a dozen ethnic Kazaks traveled across 
the Bakhtu border and entered the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR), along with 
all their cattle and belongings. This group originated from a commune in Tacheng County, 
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17 kilometers away from the Bakhtu check point on the Sino-Soviet border.170 This was 
the beginning of a mass exodus that would have a serious impact on Xinjiang. Within less 
than a week, a large number of people from across the county had fled as well. According 
to official records, Tacheng County lost 28,984 residents by the end of May, or 88% of 
the total population of 33,000. Of the 50 production teams in Tacheng County (a 
production team being equivalent to a village), 48 were abandoned. The only two 
production teams that remained stable were overwhelmingly composed of Han Chinese. 
26,610, or 90%, of the emigrants were ethnic Kazakhs.171 This mass exodus spread not 
only to nearby counties like Yumin, but also to Huocheng, a county between Yining and 
the border of Kazakhstan. Uighur slogans such as “Brothers, let’s run to the Soviet 
Union!” circulated among the local people. Thousands of lost animals were scattered near 
the border.172 In less than ten days, Tacheng and Huocheng counties lost more than 
50,000 residents. At first, the flight often occurred at night, in secretive small groups. As 
the border crossing snowballed, in some places, whole villages were abandoned in an 
organized public exodus led by local minority cadres. At first, most participants in the 
exodus were peasants, herdsmen, and local cadres from rural and pasturing areas. Later, 
urban residents, students, state employees, and even minority officials at the county level 
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also began crossing the border. In Tacheng, more than 150 county-level cadres fled.173 
The early emigrants were mainly Kazakhs, but the movement soon swelled to include 
Uighurs, Hui people, Kyrgyz people and even Han Chinese.174 Local governments sought 
in vain to halt the exodus through administrative measures and propaganda. In May of 
1962, it was reported that more than ten counties were involved, despite their greater 
distance from the border. For example, some 14,000 residents of Emin County reached 
the border, but were forced to turn back when the Soviets began denying entry under 
serious pressure from the Chinese government.175  
The mass exodus ended on May 29, when a riot broke out in Yining City, the 
capital of YKAP. Large numbers of people had passed through Yining Bus Station in late 
May, to purchase bus tickets for Huocheng, as the distance from Yining was too great for 
a journey by foot. The ballooning demand for bus tickets left an agitated crowd stranded 
at the bus station, including some Soviet nationals, some of whom assembled before the 
offices of the Yili CCP Sub-Bureau on May 21, seeking permission to travel to the USSR. 
On the afternoon of May 29, a crowd of five hundred people of mixed ethnicity gathered 
to demand more bus tickets. The road between the bus station and the Yili CCP Sub-
Bureau was filled with demonstrators and bystanders. When Kuerbanali Osman, the 
governor of the YKAP and an ethnic Kazakh, went to the bus station to negotiate with his 
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fellow Kazakhs, he was instantly besieged by the crowd. Labeling the demonstration an 
anti-revolutionary rebellion and the demonstrators a violent mob, the local government 
ordered militiamen to disperse the crowd, with force if necessary.176 Militiamen from the 
Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps were dispatched under the lead of the Yili 
party secretary, but their truck was intercepted by the demonstrators, who beat up the 
secretary and several militiamen, and seized one of their guns. The demonstrators then 
drove the truck to the Soviet consulate and turned in the gun to the consuls, in the hope 
that the Soviets could help them leave.177 
However, the Chinese government had applied heavy diplomatic pressure 
demanding that the Soviets return all refugees without proper immigration documents. In 
the face of such demands, the Soviets were compelled not only to reject new border 
crossers, but also to repatriate some of the migrants they had already accepted.178 Caught 
in this predicament, the Soviet consuls refused to offer any assistance to the 
demonstrators, instead instructing them to obtain permission from the local government 
before heading to the Soviet Union. Seeking to overcome the obstacles imposed by the 
Communist Party, a crowd of 2,000 gathered in front of the local prefectural government 
building, shouting slogans such as “Sell us bus tickets!” “Let us go to the Soviet Union!” 
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“Abolish grain rationing!” “The Hans have been suppressing us for 12 years. Down with 
the Chinese Communist Party, eradicate the Han Chinese, release the political dissidents!” 
One group seized the offices of the prefectural government, while other protesters sought 
to occupy the headquarters of the Yili CCP Sub-Bureau next door. The demonstration 
was put to an end when the government opened fire on protesters, leaving five dead and a 
dozen seriously injured.179 The People’s Liberation Army moved into Yining shortly after 
to prevent further social unrest. According to a witness, the city was under martial law for 
one month after May 29. Work units were barricaded with sandbags, and all Han Chinese 
were ordered to remain in their units and armed with weapons for their defense.  
According to official reports, by the end of the mass exodus, more than 67,000 
local inhabitants had fled, leaving a vast swathe of empty villages and uncultivated land. 
While the emigrants were overwhelmingly of Kazakh and Uighur ethnicity, a few Han 
Chinese crossed the border as well.180 Since the majority of the people fled from the Yili 
and Tacheng areas, this exodus is often referred as the Yi-Ta Incident. 
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Causes of the Exodus 
When news of the Yi-Ta Incident reached Beijing, Saifudin Azizi (1915–2003), 
the regional Chairman of Xinjiang and the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), petitioned the central 
government to let him return to Xinjiang. Just prior to Saifudin’s departure, Zhou Enlai 
discussed with him how to handle the crisis in Xinjiang. Zhou attributed the incident to 
two factors: foreign interference (from the Soviet Union), and domestic causes. Though 
Mao claimed in late August that the USSR held complete responsibility for the incident, 
source documents reveal that Zhou Enlai’s interpretation was more balanced and 
comprehensive, though still problematic. With regard to domestic causes, Zhou admitted 
that “in past years, we have not properly considered the ethnic minorities, the religion, 
and the local economy.”181 In other words, Zhou Enlai attributed the decision of the 
emigrants to leave for the USSR to the failure of the domestic policies implemented in 
Xinjiang over the previous 12 years.  
Some American scholars, sympathizing with the ethnic minorities under 
communist rule, tend to emphasis domestic reasons while ignoring foreign causes. In his 
groundbreaking work on Yili, George Moseley argues that the people who fled to the 
USSR can be divided into two categories. The first category included so-called “local 
nationalists” and their sympathizers, who were Soviet-oriented, while the other group 
was comprised of Kazakh herders with family ties or previous business connections with 
the Kazakhstan Soviet Socialist Republic (KSSR), who fled to seek material benefits in 
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the USSR. In other words, Moseley believes that some people left for political reasons, 
such as being disappointed with the policy of self-governance, while others were seeking 
a better economic life during the time of the Great Chinese Famine.182 Linda Benson 
argues that, while the poor economic conditions caused by the Great Leap Forward were 
partly to blame for the flight, the steady influx of Han Chinese settlers was another 
important factor in the growing Muslim discontent.183 She points to an economic decline 
exacerbated by issues related to ethnic equality. In his overview of Xinjiang history, 
James A. Millward also asserts that some or all of the policies from the era of the Great 
Leap Forward engendered disaffection in northern Xinjiang. He lists several elements 
that may have contributed to the exodus, such as campaigns against Sovietism and local 
nationalism, heightened CCP penetration and control of the former East Turkestan 
Republic (ETR) and Kazakh lands, a surging inflow of Han Chinese, economic disruption 
associated with communization and industrialization (especially among nomads), the 
commandeering of pastureland for agriculture, and grain requisitions that seemingly 
favored Han over Uighur areas in a time of famine. Unlike Benson, who merely criticizes 
the Chinese government, Millward notes that Soviet propaganda helped incite people to 
flee.184 The literature above offers persuasive insights, but the arguments are too 
generalized. Without access to Chinese or Soviet archives, the above authors had to base 
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their conclusions primarily on reading between the lines of the propaganda materials 
available at the time.  
The landscape of research on this issue changed dramatically when a Chinese 
scholar finally gained access to the Chinese archival documents. Based on the collections 
from Xinjiang and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Li Danhui argues that, 
although the great famine had an enormous death toll in China proper, it “had a smaller 
impact on Xinjiang than on other parts of the country.” Xinjiang accounts for one sixth of 
China’s territory, but it is sparsely populated. The Great Leap Forward did lead to the 
development of economic troubles, but the burden was far lighter than in China proper. 
On the contrary, during the time of the Great Famine, Xinjiang had a utopian reputation 
as a refuge for people from across the country. Li acknowledges some cases of death by 
starvation, but argues that the primary cause was not food shortages, but rather 
inadequate transportation, limited manpower, and lack of telecommunication equipment, 
which were the same excuses offered at the time by Wang En’mao (1913–2001), then 
Party Secretary of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). 185   
Though the Great Famine had a light impact on Xinjiang, Li admits that the 
somewhat diminished living standards of the local population created psychological 
support for admiration of the Soviet life. However, she asserts that the exodus was caused 
not by famine but by mobilization from the Soviet Union. Li supports the argument that a 
Soviet conspiracy incited border crossings after the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, 
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based on evidence collected by the local Xinjiang government to demonstrate active 
Soviets intervention in mobilizing Soviet nationals to leave for the Soviet Union.186  
Li accurately points out that Moscow changed its policy toward the repatriation of 
Soviet nationals after the Sino-Soviet rift widened.187 However, it is still difficult to pin 
down how much weight the Soviet penetration carried with regard to the exodus, since 
Li’s argument is supported only by the Chinese archives. The declassified Russian 
archival files, as she has admitted, fail to demonstrate direct Soviet involvement.188 The 
Chinese archives were produced in 1962, at a time when anti-revisionism was the main 
objective of the CCP. Therefore, the local government’s fact-finding mission was 
intended to serve the diplomatic struggle against the Soviets. Most documents produced 
by the local government point fingers at the Soviet consulates and the Soviet National 
Association as the power behind the scenes. However, the evidence provided is far from 
convincing. For example, the Chinese pointed to the letters and parcels mailed from the 
USSR by relatives and family members during the famine as evidence of Soviet efforts to 
mobilize Xinjiang people to flee.189 
However, my research demonstrates that people asked their relatives to mail 
parcels of daily necessities to Xinjiang due to the restriction or even banning of imported 
goods from the USSR during the Great Leap Forward campaign. Some letters did contain 
vivid depictions of the good life enjoyed by Kazakhs in the USSR, accompanied by 
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suggestions that the recipients leave Xinjiang, but these appear to be more of a family 
matter than a conspiracy of the Soviet state. In the archival documents, the local 
government stated: “The incident of May 29 was clearly an organized and planned 
conspiracy, but our security department has not found a direct organizer behind the 
scenes as of yet. It can be concluded that this incident is closely related to the Soviet 
consulate, but no clues have yet been uncovered.”190 In other words, the conclusion that 
the Soviets were responsible for the mass exodus was based more on speculation than 
actual facts. In the service of foreign policy objectives, one high-ranking local official 
even scolded his subordinates for accusing too few demonstrators of having Soviet ties 
and working for the Soviet consulate, and suggested that more people be added into this 
category to strengthen the critique of the Soviets.191 By accusing the Soviets of 
mobilizing the border inhabitants to flee, Beijing could convince the Communist world 
that the Soviet Union, rather than China, was responsible for the rift between the two 
parties. The local government also benefited from blaming the Soviets, as this allowed 
them to evade responsibility for the incident of May 29. The Chinese archives should 
therefore be read with a critical eye.  
I argue that there should be two focal points in exploring the origins of the mass 
exodus: the first is popular sentiment among ethnic minorities regarding the policies in 
Xinjiang, and the second is changes instituted by Beijing to Xinjiang policies following 
the incident. Popular sentiment was expressed via the so called anti-revolutionary slogans 
recorded in the official archives, which are a rough snapshot of people’s dissatisfactions. 
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The policy changes can obliquely demonstrate what mistakes the government felt it made 
leading up to the unrest. I argue that the economic decline, ethnic conflict, and the 
deteriorating relations between Beijing and Moscow and other related problems were all 
important factors contributing to the Yi-Ta Incident of 1962. 
 
Impact of the Great Famine 
Common sense tells us that when a famine occurs, refugees will flee to seek 
material benefits. This was the case in the Chinese borderland of Xinjiang. As discussed 
above, Western scholars generally believe that the famine was the main cause for the 
exodus, but lack solid evidence to reveal how much the lives of the people in the border 
region were impacted. In contrast, Li Danhui believes that the deteriorating standard of 
living in Xinjiang was not grave enough to cause people to flee, but did increase yearning 
for life in the Soviet Union among the border inhabitants. Based on evidence found in 
archives and gazettes, this study argues that the famine impacted the region more heavily 
than Li believes, and that 1961 was a pivotal year during which the standard of living for 
local people worsened sharply. Furthermore, dissatisfaction among local people was not 
solely in response to the decreases in food and grain rations (the key factor on which both 
Li and the Western scholars focus), but also to the way in which the government sought 
to resolve the problem. To relieve the pressure of urban food shortages, a significant part 
of the urban population and ethnic cadres in YKAP were transferred to rural areas. This 
population shift further worsened the standard of living among both the urban and rural 
people involved, leading to increased dissatisfaction. 
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The evidence that Li relied upon to argue that the Great Famine had little to no 
impact in Xinjiang is problematic. According to the report by Wang En’mao, the first 
secretary of the CCP Xinjiang Committee, around 5,000 people died of starvation in 
March 1960 in Baicheng, a county not far from the border. The surrounding counties 
experienced approximately 1,000 deaths. Around 1,000 prisoners died of hunger. Wang 
claimed that the loss of 7,000 people was merely caused by “the clumsy handling of the 
food problem at a time of abundant grain reserves.” In other words, Xinjiang had no food 
shortages at the time, but “the serious bureaucratism and subjective planning by leading 
members of the county party committee” delayed the transportation of the grain.192 
However, a recently-published memoir reveals that this was a complete fiction. The truth 
was that Xinjiang had a shortage of food-grain, because the reports of good harvests all 
over Xinjiang were fictitious. Under the huge pressure of the competition to produce 
more grain in a shorter time period during the Great Leap Forward, local cadres 
audaciously padded reports on the amount of food-grain harvested. He Jinnan, a former 
Party Secretary of Aksu Prefecture, where Baicheng County is located, expressed similar 
excuses at the time, but later confessed that he and other local officials dared not 
contradict the cover-up by Wang En’mao.193 
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Northern Xinjiang, where YKAP located, is a pasturing area. Its nomadic 
residents depended on herding and hunting, which left them perpetually short of grain. To 
obtain these essential goods, the nomads became heavily reliant on the agricultural 
economy. This is the reason why nomadic peoples historically adopted a policy of “trade 
or raid” in dealing with China, as pointed out by Sechin Jagchid: “This economic 
dependence, more than any other factor, was the chief cause for nomadic incursion into 
China.”194 Since northern Xinjiang was so dependent on agriculture, the Great Leap 
Forward impacted this border region in two ways: first, the supply from southern 
Xinjiang diminished sharply, as shown in the case of Baicheng; second, northern 
Xinjiang saw a decrease in production. Evidence from gazettes shows that the great 
famine had a grave influence on the Tacheng and Yili regions. The available data 
demonstrates that the economic situation had declined in comparison to 1960, 
plummeting sharply in 1961 in almost all respects. As Table 2.1 below shows, in 1960, 
the output of grain decreased by 2,630,100 kg. 1961, however, witnessed a sharp fall of 
7,861,000 kg, nearly a threefold increase of the decline seen in 1960. 
 
Table 2.1: Grain Production in Tacheng, 1958–1961 (ten thousand kg) 
Year 1958 1959 1960 1961 
Yield 3031.80 3265.66 3002.65 2216.55 
Changes —— +233.86 –263.01 –786.1 
Source: Yao Kewen ed., Tachengshi zhi, p. 154. 
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The production of rapeseed oil in Tacheng, as Table 2.2 shows, plummeted by 
1,062,100 kg in 1961; the situation worsened further in 1962, with a drop of 585,600 kg. 
Furthermore, the establishment of “large, collective” People’s Communes limited the 
amount of private livestock herdsmen could own, leading to a sharp decline in privately-
owned livestock after 1960.195 This policy not only interfered with the Kazakh way of life, 
but also heavily curtailed their income. As Table 2.3 on Page 85 shows, the annual 
income of an average person in rural Tacheng had been slowly increasing since 1959, but 
plummeted by 106.21 yuan in 1960, falling further by 52.92 yuan in 1961. This could 
well explain how Soviet propaganda that “people in the USSR can have more livestock 
and a more prosperous life” could serve as a stimulus for the Kazakhs to flee.196 The 
grave economic situation of Tacheng in 1961 also applied to the rest of the YKAP, which 
experienced a dramatic decline in overall grain production.  
 
Table 2.2: Rapeseed Oil Production in Tacheng, 1958–1961 (ten thousand kg) 
Year 1958 1959 1960  1961 
Income 114.79 121.55 127.56  74.64 
Change ——  +6.76  +6.01 –52.92 
Source: Yao Kewen ed., Tachengshi zhi, p. 154. 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195 Compared with the amount of livestock in Tacheng in 1949, after Yi-Ta incident in 1962, the amount 
declined by 19.69%. See Yao Kewen ed., Tachengshi zhi, p. 166. 
196 “Xinjiang waiban guanyu Yili Tacheng diqu bianmin taowang Sulian de baogao” ŠǢÀʍʸŢ6Ǒº´
°xʣƠʗęɓȵǤ¸ [A report from the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Office on the border people of Yili 
and Tacheng who fled to the Soviet Union] (21 April 1962), AMFA, File No. 118-01100-06. 
!86  
Table 2.3: Average Annual Income in Rural Tacheng, 1958–1961 (yuan) 
Year 1958  1959  1960  1961 
Yield  74.07  200.71  94.50  35.94 
Change —— +126.64 –106.21 –58.56 
Source: Yao Kewen ed., Tachengshi zhi, p. 155. 
 
Table 2.4: General Grain Production in Yili Prefecture, 1960–1961 (ten thousand tons) 
Year Wheat Corn Rice Beans 
1960 30.32 3.33 2.00 0.06 
1961 20.21 2.96 1.28 0.03 
Decrease 10.11 0.37 0.72 0.03 
Source: Song Jiaren chief ed., Yili hasake zizhizhou zhi, p. 473. 
 
Table 2.4 above shows that in the YKAP, production across all the primary grain 
categories of wheat, corn, rice, and beans dropped sharply in 1961. Grain rationing for 
herdsmen was instituted in 1958 as a policy of the Great Leap Forward following the 
establishment of the first People’s Commune in Tacheng in August of that year.197 The 
standard for food-grain was set as 120 kg per person annually in 1958, and later increased 
to 150 kg. The nomads complained of low rations, even after the increase. During the 
famine, the rations dropped to 100-120 kg per year.198 Sources show that in December of 
1961 and January of 1962, the rations were decreased to a monthly per capita of 10 kg, 
while in February and March of 1962, the rations further dropped to 8 kg. Since even 
rations of 12.5 kg were still insufficient for most nomads, one may conclude eloquently 
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that most people in Tacheng were seriously short of grain. In the Yili region, since 
natural conditions were better than in Tacheng, the food-grain rations were 11 to 13 kg 
per capita each month. However, these rations were also significantly reduced compared 
to 1958. Moreover, the grain was of reduced quality, because the only grain available was 
coarser than the refined grain that ethnic minorities in Yili were used to consuming. In 
March of 1961, people in counties like Huocheng suffered edema, an illness caused 
simply by malnutrition.199 This was why demonstrators on May 29 shouted slogans like 
“Everything is rationed,” “Abolish rations!”, and “Great Leap, great slaughter!”200 
Common sense tells us that people choose to emigrate based on their standard of living as 
well as their confidence in the future. The sharp economic decline of 1961 led some to 
believe that things would be much worse in the years to come. Although the standard of 
living in the Yili and Tacheng regions was better than in China proper, even in 1961, 
people in such a border region might still seek migration, since crossing the border was 
convenient. One might convincingly argue that the events of 1961 set the stage for the 
mass exodus in the spring of 1962.  
 
Shortage of Daily Necessities 
The dissatisfactions of the local people were caused by a shortage not only of 
food but also of daily necessities. In his report to Beijing on the causes for the mass 
exodus, Xu Huang, then the deputy director at the Consular Department of the Chinese 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, wrote that daily necessities such as sugar, tea, cloth and 
boots were all of short supply.201 He even claimed that people were more dissatisfied 
with the unavailability of daily necessities than the shortage of grain, since the shortage 
of necessary goods was more severe.202 As shown above, 1961 was the year that the 
negative effects of the Great Leap Forward campaign on the Yili and Tacheng regions 
became salient, with a sharp decline in almost all economic areas, including the supply of 
daily necessities. 
The difficulty of purchasing daily necessities was mainly caused by the import 
policy adopted by the Chinese government in Sino-Soviet trade. When the CCP took 
control over Xinjiang in October 1949, its economic situation was characterized by 
poverty and deprivation. Historically, Xinjiang was heavily dependent on trade with the 
Soviet Union, as it was far from China proper but neighbor to Soviet Central Asia. 
However, following the implementation of the anti-Soviet policies of the Chinese warlord 
Sheng Shicai in 1942, Sino-Soviet trade was brought to a halt for several years 
everywhere in Xinjiang except the Three Districts of Yili, Tacheng, and Altai, which later 
formed Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture, causing the production of furs, cotton, and 
silk in Xinjiang to shrink to half of the figures seen in the 1930s. From 1944 to 1949, the 
Three Districts area of northwestern Xinjiang was briefly under the control of the Soviet-
backed East Turkestan Republic, leading to the resumption of cross-border trade between 
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this area of Xinjiang and the USSR. The imports mainly consisted of daily necessities, 
with a total trade volume of 11.23 million rubles between 1946 and 1949. The Soviet 
goods shipped to the Three Districts primarily included cotton fabrics, silk fabrics, 
clothes, sugar, tea, matches and some petroleum products.203  
Because the distance between Xinjiang and China proper rendered regular trade 
impossible, the remaining seven districts of Xinjiang outside of Soviet control 
experienced extreme market shortages of daily necessities in the late 1940s. To relieve 
this serious economic pressure, in December 1949, Peng Dehuai, then the commander-in-
chief of the Northwestern Field Army, reported the problems in Xinjiang to Mao Zedong, 
who was visiting Moscow. Peng suggested to Mao that China must seek tremendous 
support from the Soviet Union to resolve its current economic problems and exploit 
Xinjiang. Xinjiang should promptly resume official trade with USSR, exchanging local 
products for necessary Soviet goods.204 Peng’s report demonstrates that Sino-Soviet trade 
restarted in 1950 to satisfy the local people’s needs for daily necessities.  
However, Beijing’s principles in regard to trade with the USSR changed 
dramatically after the founding of the PRC: imports should first satisfy the need for 
socialist construction in Xinjiang. With this precondition, the needs of the market and 
people’s live should be met moderately. In other words, the first objective was to import 
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large quantities of essential production goods, and daily necessities fell second.205 Under 
this principle, between 1950 and 1952, the import ratio of production goods to daily 
necessities was far from balanced. Table 2.5 shows that the percentage of daily 
necessities as part of Sino-Soviet trade, declined from 52.04% to only 13.9% over the 
course of three years. 
 
Table 2.5: Ratio of Goods Imported from the USSR, 1950–1952 
Year Production Goods Daily Necessities 
1950 47.96% 52.04% 
1951 85% 15% 
1952 86.1% 13.9% 
Source: Li Sheng, Xinjiang dui Su (E) maoyi shi, 1600–1990, pp. 585–86. 
 
The Great Leap Forward campaign was launched in 1958: to develop Xinjiang’s 
economy as quickly as possible in line with this policy, the import percentage of 
production goods further increased while that of daily necessities fell. Although the total 
Sino-Soviet trade volume only amounted to 197,243 rubles in 1958, the only necessary 
good that China imported from the USSR that year was 10,000 tons of sugar.206 
In 1960, although the total Sino-Soviet trade volume declined due to the 
deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations, trade in Xinjiang increased by 1.8% year over 
year. However, due to the policy of rapid economic development, the import percentage 
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of daily necessities further declined to 0.12%.207 With the surfacing of the great famine, 
in 1961, the central government enacted the “Instructions on Reducing the Purchasing 
Ability of Social Groups,” ordering provinces and cities to reduce foreign exchange as 
much as possible. According to this policy, non-emergency goods were not to be 
purchased through foreign trade, or only purchased in small quantities. Even emergency 
goods, the instructions noted, should only be bought after careful calculation and 
consideration. Under this policy, Xinjiang significantly reduced its imports from the 
USSR, and unfulfilled contracts with the USSR dating to the past few years were 
suspended. Under the dual impact of restrictive trade policies and worsening Sino-Soviet 
relations, 1961 witnessed a decline in import volume to 148,665 rubles, only 51.2% of 
1960.208 The situation was exacerbated by the government’s view of daily necessities as 
“non-emergency” goods: virtually no daily necessities were imported in 1961.209 
As shown above, from 1950 to 1961, the import percentage of daily necessities 
declined from 52.04% to 0%. The shortages led to deteriorating living standards for the 
local people, who resorted to asking their relatives on the other side of the border to mail 
them daily necessities such as food, cloth, and clothing. For this reason, the number of 
parcels mailed from the Soviet Union to Tacheng skyrocketed to 1777 in 1961. In the 
early months of 1962, 562 parcels were mailed to Tacheng, and 2519 were sent to Yili. 
The Chinese government regarded the increasing parcel volume as solid evidence that the 
Soviet Revisionists were taking advantage of the temporary economic difficulties faced 
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by China using material stimulations to mobilize local people to cross the border.210 The 
shortage of daily necessities reached its peak in 1961, worsening the living standards of 
the people. Unlike the populace in other parts of Xinjiang, the people in YKAP only 
began to suffer shortages of necessary goods under the rule of the CCP. This experience 
intensified their dissatisfaction with the CCP as well as their admiration for the USSR. 
This was one reason why people in YKAP decided to cross the border to pursue a better 
life in Central Asia.  
  
Influx of Han Migrants 
In January 1962, a report on how to halt the influx of the people from China 
proper submitted by the Committee for the Allocation of the Work Force in the 
Autonomous Zone became a headache for the XUAR Party Committee. Xinjiang had 
gained 1,700,000 residents between 1959 and 1961, many of whom were refugees 
traveling to Xinjiang without permission. By November 1961, around 890,000 refugees 
had arrived in Xinjiang. The Youth for Frontier Support (Zhibian qingnian) were another 
group that contributed greatly to the growing population. Between 1959 and November 
1961, some 800,000 youths, mostly from eastern China, were mobilized by the central 
government to contribute to the socialist construction in remote borderlands, and resettled 
in Xinjiang.211 Based on the fact that many migrants survived in Xinjiang during the 
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years of the Great Chinese Famine, Li argues that the economic situation in Xinjiang was 
much better than that in the China proper. It might be true that a higher standard of living 
was maintained in Xinjiang than in China proper, but the large number of refugees 
pouring into Xinjiang put further strain on already tight food-grain rations. This was the 
predicament faced in the Yili and Tacheng areas. 
Since 1949, the Chinese government had been systematically moving Han 
Chinese into Xinjiang to strengthen its grip on this vast region populated mainly by 
ethnic minorities, offering veterans jobs that were not available anywhere else. 
Furthermore, in the eyes of the Chinese central government, though not the Kazakhs, 
Xinjiang was a vast and sparsely populated land. The government therefore believed that 
the main obstacle to accelerating the so-called socialist construction of Xinjiang and other 
frontier lands was the lack of manpower.212 The state moved 82,245 people into YKAP 
between 1949 and 1953. When the Great Leap Forward campaign was launched, the 
central government made plans to mobilize two million more people from China proper 
into Xinjiang.213 The number of migrants to YKAP reached 735,303 between 1954 and 
1966, for an annual average of 56,563 migrants entering this area. Some were sent by a 
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state project “youth for frontier support” (zhibian qingnian Őʣˋą).214 However, this 
sharp uptick in the number of migrants occurred in the context of the Great Chinese 
famine. People from provinces such as Sichuan, Gansu, Qinghai, Henan and Shandong 
sought refuge by moving to Yili without official permission. The tables below show the 
changing population in YKAP between 1949 and 1961. 
 
Table 2.6: Total Population in Yili Prefecture, 1949–1961 
Year Households Population Change 
1949 101,765 432,655 –––– 
1950 103,089 438,669 +6,014 
1951 104,634 445,699 +7,030 
1952 106,624 459,780 +14,081 
1953 107,865 480,402 +20,622 
1954 102,813 489,433 +9,031 
1955 98,625 477,205 –12,228 
1956 103,470 496,269 +19,064 
1957 109,959 531,570 +35,301 
1958 115,106 560,527 +28,957 
1959 123,286 558,357 –2170 
1960 120,116 577,459 +19102 
1961 152,379 661,844 +84385 
Source: Song Jiaren chief ed., Yili hasake zizhizhou zhi, p. 172. 
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Table 2.6 on Page 94 shows that the population in YKAP had been increasing 
since 1949. Only the years of 1955 and 1959 witnessed declines, a change caused merely 
by the repatriation of the Soviet nationals and their family members. The fastest increase 
of the population was in 1961, with an unprecedented addition of 84,385. The Tacheng 
region experienced a similar influx. 
 
Table 2.7: Population in Tacheng from 1949–1961 
Year Total Households Total Population Change 
1949 10315 45524 –––– 
1950 10460 46116 +592 
1951 10614 46808 +692 
1952 10816 47697 +889 
1953 11598 48746 +1049 
1954 11330 48839 +93 
1955 11014 46127 –2712 
1956 10331 45185 –942 
1957 10656 45950 +765 
1958 10691 46219 +269 
1959 11186 49784 +3565 
1960 11645 51459 +1675 
1961 15992 60363 +8904 
Source: Yao Kewen ed., Tachengshi zhi, pp. 93–94. 
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Except the years in which many Soviet nationals and their families were sent back 
to the USSR, Table 2.7 on Page 95 demonstrates that most years since 1949 experienced 
significant increases to the population. In a reflection of the overall situation in the 
YKAP, Tacheng took in the most migrants in 1961, reaching another unprecedented total 
of 8904. Table 2.8 below provides a breakdown of the migrants by ethnicity. As Table 
2.8 shows, between 1949 and 1959, the population of Han Chinese in Yili Kazakh 
Autonomous Prefecture increased by 327,151, including only 65,770 Kazakhs and 67,047 
Uighurs. Han Chinese gradually became the majority in Yili. By 1969, the number of 
Han Chinese had skyrocketed to 1,196,477, an increase of 1,158,378. 
 
Table 2.8: Population of Ethnic Kazakh, Uighur, and Han in 1949, 1959 and 1969 
Ethnicity  1949 1959 1969 
Kazakh 361,655 427,425 471,770 
Uighur 171,823 238,870 295,153 
Han 38,099 365,250 1,196,477 
Source: Song Jiaren ed., Yili hasake zizhizhou zhi, p. 177. 
 
According to the analysis above, 1961 was the worse year economically in the 
Yili and Tacheng areas, while also witnessing sharply rising numbers of the Han migrants 
to the YKAP. One might fairly note that the region experienced “one disaster after 
another” in 1961.  In its official report, the Chinese government was also forced to admit 
that the sharp drop in food-grain rations was caused not only by “natural disasters” (a 
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euphemism for the failed agricultural policies of the Great Leap Forward), but also by the 
influx of outside refugees in 1961.215 
  
Reducing and Transferring Campaign  
The campaign of reducing and transferring urban people to rural areas (Jingjian 
xiafang ȑȎœ) was launched just after the end of the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957. 
Those who had made mistakes during the Anti-Rightist Campaign were to leave for the 
countryside, in an effort to purify the Party. In Xinjiang, following the end of the Anti-
Rightist Campaign, the Party Committee of XUAR officially distributed instructions for 
the “Cadre Reduction Project in XUAR,” which sought to transfer 60,000 cadres within 
Xinjiang; 10,508 were transferred in that year.216 Official documents reveal that, in order 
to avoid further angering ethnic minorities, the Party Committee of XUAR instructed 
local governments to implement this policy in accordance with practical local 
circumstances. The lack of data makes it difficult to judge how well the local government 
followed these instructions. Since most local cadres in YKAP were minorities, the 
campaign would have had a heavy impact on this community, leading to dissatisfaction 
with the CCP and the Han Chinese. 
The great famine caused by the Great Leap Forward created huge pressure on the 
supply of food-grain, especially in cities and towns. To relieve pressure on the urban food 
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supply, by the end of 1961, the Chinese government had transferred 41,700,000 urban 
residents to rural areas all over the country.217 As early as late 1960, the Yili region also 
faced the task of reducing the urban population. According to the decision issued by the 
Party Committee of the Yili region, cadres at the prefectural, zone, county and commune 
levels were to be transferred to rural areas. Around 10% of the cadres at the prefectural 
and zone levels, and no less than 5% of the cadres at the county and commune levels 
were to be transferred.218 In December 1961, Tacheng County transferred 292 local urban 
residents to rural areas.219 By the end of 1961, the whole prefecture had transferred 
17,335 urban employees to rural areas, meeting 124.45% of the requirement set by the 
XUAR, along with 25,107 urban civilians (not including the Tacheng region), or 
127.33% of the requirement. In other words, unlike many other cities involved in this 
campaign, the local government in YKAP transferred more people to rural areas than 
they were assigned. As a result, more urban minority residents lost their jobs and homes 
in the cities, causing more complaints among those impacted. At the same time, these 
people were relocated to rural areas, placing more economic pressure on the already 
impoverished countryside. 
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In February of 1962, the campaign was expanded to the whole YKAP.220 In 1962, 
YKAP transferred 25,700 urban employees and 56,600 urban residents to rural areas.221 
From 1959 to 1961, Yili also resettled 10,695 zhibian qingnian (Youth for Frontier 
Support) and their families.222 After 1960, refugees from all over the country poured into 
the YKAP. Yili had to establish two Accept-and-Repatriate stations to process and 
resettle these migrants.223 As a result, the Yili region faced a dilemma: the influx of Han 
Chinese into Yili was pushing out local minorities, who were forced to leave for rural 
areas. The resettlement program may have been the best solution for famine relief, 
especially in China proper, but for local ethnic minorities, this was a sign of Han Chinese 
suppression of ethnic nationals in their own homeland. In other words, ethnic minorities 
saw the daily shortages of food-grains as a result not only of the Great Leap Forward 
campaign launched by the Han-controlled government, but also of a food distribution 
policy that obviously favored the Han Chinese, most of whom had migrated to Yili 
illegally. This could explain the slogan people shouted during the May 29 demonstration: 
“You Han Chinese have eaten all the grain here!”224 
To make matters worse, the transfer of Han Chinese to villages and communes to 
live amongst local ethnic minorities gave rise to direct ethnic clashes. These former city 
residents, workers, cadres, and unofficial migrants had no experience as herders, which 
was often a more complicated job than farming or working in a factory, and their 
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performance fell far short of local people’s expectations. Resentful of being forced out of 
their urban homes and jobs, the migrants usually lingered over their work in the 
commune. Local people had to make up for the shortfall of labor to fulfill the heavy 
workload assigned by the commune. 
Furthermore, due to the famine, the financial support provided by the state for the 
transferred residents was barely enough to live on. According to official reports, in order 
to survive, some Han Chinese in the communes were forced either to steal local people’s 
belongings or borrow money from the commune, which they never repaid. The local 
people were most offended by Han Chauvinism, which violated the local Muslim way of 
life.225 The local ethnic people regarded life in general, and the Han in particular, through 
the lens of their cultural and ethnic identity. When living in isolation, ethnic people may 
have had a stereotypical image of the Han Chinese, but little real experience in dealing 
with them. Once they were living together, their sense of Han Chauvinism was confirmed 
by their daily interactions, and relations were even polarized by trivial matters. In other 
words, the campaign of Reducing and Transferring may have relieved urban economic 
pressure, but it led to the worsening of ethnic relations between the Han Chinese and 
Kazakhs. This is why anti-Han Chauvinism was so common among ethnic minorities, 
contributing greatly to the mass exodus.  
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Anti–Han Chauvinism 
Anti-Han chauvinism was caused by many reasons, both historical and of the 
present. After the Qianlong Emperor conquered Xinjiang, the local minorities were ruled 
first by the Manchus and later by the Han Chinese. Xinjiang borders with Soviet Central 
Asia, a vast place with a robust demand for labor from the early twentieth century to the 
1930s. To make a better living, ethnic people in Xinjiang, especially Uighurs, often 
crossed the border to do seasonal labor or conduct business. Ethnic and religious ties led 
to active cross-border relations. Although the Soviet Revolution of 1917 halted the 
connection, once the USSR implemented its New Economic Policy in 1924, some 20,000 
to 30,000 Uighurs and Khalkha Mongols annually travelled to Soviet Central Asia to seek 
work opportunities.226 As Saifudin recalled in his memoir, the Xinjiang minorities were 
exposed to the national Soviet policy of self-governance in their travels, which they 
found deeply appealing. In the eyes of the minorities in Xinjiang, the Soviet Kazakhstan 
Republic and the other four Soviet Republics in Central Asia were perfect examples of 
how Kazakhs and Uighurs could be governed by leaders of their own ethnicity.227 
During the early part of the warlord Sheng Shicai’s rule over Xinjiang, he 
essentially governed Xinjiang according to pro-Soviet policies. As a result, “equality 
among ethnicities” was not only a new slogan for the region but a policy more or less 
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implemented by Sheng.228 As increasing numbers of Soviet-educated minority elites 
returned to Xinjiang, they sought opportunities to emulate Soviet Central Asia. However, 
in 1942, Sheng reversed his policy to crack down on connections to the USSR. In 1944, a 
Soviet-supported ethnic rebellion rose up to establish the East Turkestan Republic, with a 
minority army occupying the Three Districts. One of their main objectives was to “drive 
out Han Chinese,” and most of the Han Chinese in the Three Districts were 
slaughtered.229 The USSR primarily supported the rebellion in order to find a new way to 
penetrate Xinjiang after its betrayal by Sheng Shicai, but the goal of the Kazakhs and 
Uighurs was to build an independent Islamic state ruled by leaders of their own 
ethnicity.230 In 1946, the so-called Eastern Turkistan movement ended with the signing of 
a peace treaty between the ethnic army and the Nationalist Chinese government (KMD) 
through the intercession of the Soviet government. Even after the founding of the united 
government, the Three Districts were still separated from the other seven districts in 
Xinjiang. Though the military conflict came to a halt, the Three Districts still maintained 
a military presence and self-governance. The nominal cooperation between the ethnic 
government and the KMD was fragile, and it came to an abrupt end in early 1947.231 
Under pressure from the Soviet Union, in September 1949, the representatives of both the 
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KMD and the Three Districts government expressed their loyalty to the CCP, welcoming 
the Chinese First Field Army into Xinjiang.232  
Since Xinjiang was peacefully occupied by the CCP and no underground CCP 
organizations were available to begin performing administrative tasks, cadres from the 
Three Districts government remained the main body of the local government in this 
area.233 For the CCP, maintaining the ethnic cadres as the main administrative body in the 
borderland was an expedient policy. The goal was first to penetrate the borderland 
politically, before integrating Xinjiang with China proper. However, cadres in the Three 
Districts sought to establish a Soviet-style relationship between Xinjiang and China 
proper, with Xinjiang joining China as a satellite state. For example, on the eve of the 
first National Holiday on October 1, 1950, representatives from all over the country were 
invited to Beijing to attend the celebration ceremony. On the night of September 30, 1950, 
during a banquet for the representatives from Xinjiang, a Uighur official in the national 
army proposed to toss for the establishment of the Uighur Republic, while a Kazakh 
military official instead proposed tossing for the establishment of the Kazakh Republic. 
The quarrel was swiftly mediated by someone tossing for “the big unification of all the 
nationalities in China.” However, this event was regarded by Beijing as a kind of 
“separatist behavior,” as Wang Zhen later revealed.234 Beijing was further worried by a 
proposal offered by the “Conference of 51 Intellectuals” in Yili. In May of 1951, the 
central government published the “Draft Regulations for the System of Regional Ethnic 
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Autonomy” (SREA) and “The Survey Outline of the Nationality Committee of the 
Northwest Bureau.” Saifulayev organized a conference along with other fifty ethnic elites 
in Yili to propose a different plan for the administrative relationship between Xinjiang 
and China. Their main ideas involved the establishment of a Turkistan Republic and the 
continuing military presence of the national army in Xinjiang. The proposal was regarded 
by Beijing as evidence of serious separatist tendencies among ethnic leaders, and the 
organizers and attendees were harshly criticized.235 
While Beijing was always on the alert for “separatist tendencies” among ethnic 
leaders, the autonomy of the Three Districts posed difficulties for the CCP’s penetration 
of the borderland. Local cadres resisted the “Reduce Rents, Anti Landlords” campaign 
launched by the YKAP CCP Sub-Bureau in 1951, which was a kind of land reform 
targeting the owners of large lands and pastures. They claimed that the Three Districts are 
liberated zones and have no need for such a campaign,” but their main objective may 
have been to present obstacles to CCP intervention in the border region.236 Wang Zhen 
revealed that Beijing regarded such objections from the borderland as “openly engaging 
in separatist actions, and thinking of yourself as a king so that you can continue to 
suppress and exploit the people!”237 
The political campaigns in Xinjiang differed from those launched in China proper 
in that almost all were aimed at crippling the autonomy of the minority cadres. For 
example, the “Three Anti” campaign was launched in Xinjiang and China proper in late 
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1951, targeting cadres at a local level. Official documents indicate that the primary 
objective of the campaign was “anti-embezzlement, anti-waste, and anti-bureaucracy.”238 
Although the Northwest Bureau instructed the Xinjiang Sub-Bureau to approach the 
problem of embezzlement among minority cadres cautiously to avoid ethnic conflicts, the 
results were precisely the opposite.239 The Xinjiang campaign treated the cadres harshly 
due to the campaign’s ulterior motive of punishing and menacing minority officials.240 As 
the official in charge of the campaign later revealed in his memoir, Wang Zhen’s 
intention in launching this high-profile campaign was not to catch “big tigers” (a 
nickname for officials who embezzled large amounts of money), but to counter the 
“arrogance” among ethnic officials who regarded themselves as the liberators of 
Xinjiang.241 In other words, the goal of the “Three Anti” campaign was not to uncover 
financial misconduct among the cadres, but to stir up trouble for autonomy-minded ethnic 
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officials, thus forcing the local officials to realize they had to docilely obey the Party’s 
instructions. Therefore, the targets of the campaign, as Wang suggested, were high-
ranking ethnic officials. The strategy for attacking them was to mobilize other cadres to 
expose and report any problems these officials might have. To achieve the goal Wang 
had set, harsh methods were employed in the campaign in Yili. As a result, many cadres 
had to confess their “crimes,” and two cadres even took their own lives.242 
The CCP claimed that it sought to eliminate two problems related to ethnic issues: 
Han chauvinism, and local nationalism. However, the main goal of the CCP was to 
eradicate elements of local nationalism.243 Ethnic minorities in Xinjiang were largely 
silenced under the enormous pressure imposed by the CCP, but they were more vocal on 
the issue of autonomy when possible. In 1957, the campaign “let a hundred flowers 
blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend” was launched in Xinjiang as in China 
proper. On May 26, the Xinjiang Party Secretary Saifudin Azzi published an article 
entitled “Let All Flowers Blossom and Let Every School Argue.” He also organized a 
series of conferences, mobilizing people to advise the Party.244 At the Party’s invitation, 
local elites criticized the policies adopted by the government and the use of narratives 
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such as “today is worse than the past,” claiming that “the leadership of the Party equals 
Han chauvinism.” They argued it was in Xinjiang’s best interests to establish the “East 
Turkistan Republic” and nationalize the Party organizations in Xinjiang.245 When such 
ideas became public, Saifudin reminded people to choose the correct position to argue 
against these “wrong views.”246  
In August of 1957, the “Anti–Rightist campaign” was launched in Xinjiang, 
primarily targeting the organs of local government.247 The central government noted that 
the goal of the campaign among ethnic minority cadres was to struggle against local 
nationalism in order to “further strengthen the unification of the fatherland.”248 
Campaigns targeting “local nationalism” were organized directly by the Party Committee 
of XUAR. In December 1957, a conference held by this Party Committee revealed and 
criticized the views and deeds of ethnic cadres related to “local nationalism,” and issued a 
“Resolution to Oppose and Overcome Local Nationalism.” On May 14, 1958, the Party 
Committee distributed its “Plan for the Implementation of the Rectification Campaign 
among Ethnic Cadres and Intellectuals.”249 This led to a widespread campaign against 
local nationalism across Xinjiang. By the end of the campaign in March 1959, 1,612 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
245 Zhonggong Xinjiang weiwu’er zizhiqu weiyuanhui dangshi yanjiushi UŠǢȜǍȾƫxË¡ŵ˧
ǱǿÞ ed., Zhonggong Xinjiang difangshi UŠǢ°š [A history of Xinjiang in PRC China] (Urumqi: 
Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 1999), p. 307; Wang Yongqing, Lishi de huisheng, p. 108. 
246 Chen Chao and Liang Keming, Xiandai Xinjiang shishi ji 1949.9–1985.12, p. 86–87. 
247 3,172 people were labeled as Rightists in Xinjiang in 1957. Later the Xinjiang government admitted that 
the range of the campaign was too extensive so that more people were impacted than otherwise should. 
From 1959 to 1964, some “Rightists” were removed from the list of “Rightists.” See Xinjiang weiwu’er 
zizhiqu difangzhi bianzuan weiyuanhui ed., Xinjiang tongzhi 14 juan: Gongchandang zhi, p. 253. 
248 Wang Yongqing, Lishi de huisheng, p. 108. 
249 According to the official “plan,” the anti–local nationalism campaign aimed at uncovering and 
criticizing those who intended to destroy the national unification and the integrity of the country. For the 
vast majority with general nationalism idea, they should be educated to realize their mistakes under the 
principal of “unite-criticize- unite.” See Xinjiang tongzhi 14 juan: Gongchandang zhi, 428. 
!108  
people had been categorized as “local nationalist elements” in Xinjiang, and some 700 
were punished in one way or another.250 By June 1959, 679 local cadres in Yili had been 
labeled either as “rightists” or “local nationalists,” and punished harshly.251 In Tacheng 
County, 34 people were punished as “rightists.”252  
The winding down of the “Anti–Rightist” campaign and the campaign against 
local nationalism did not mark the end of the CCP concerns over local nationalism.253 
Another four-month campaign was launched in April 1959 against local democratic party 
members and non-CCP members.254 An anti–rightist campaign was launched in Tacheng 
County in October 1959, and lasted until March 1960. A fifth political campaign against 
“bad elements” was launched two months later to eliminate “counterrevolutionaries.” 
That campaign ended in June with the supposed capture of 9 “bad elements.” The 
purpose of the movement was not only to eliminate Party enemies, but also to purify the 
members of the local CCP organization. The purification campaign was combined with 
the Party’s struggle against anyone with an anti-commune attitude.255 Anyone who 
opposed the People’s commune movement in any way would face harsh punishment. 
Most of the victims of these movements were undoubtedly ethnic minorities.  
These campaigns against the ethnic minorities seeking autonomy in the 
borderland had many consequences. First, although “over 85% of the county magistrates 
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and deputy magistrates in Xinjiang were ethnic minorities by mid-1961,” the key 
positions were overwhelmingly in the hands of the Han Chinese.256 With the influx of 
Han Chinese, the nominal predominance of ethnic minorities among the administrative 
leadership of Xinjiang saw rapid change. Second, as the never-ending campaigns against 
the ethnic elites continued, hope for the autonomy promised by the CCP before marching 
its army into Xinjiang faltered. The pro-Han policies implemented in Xinjiang intensified 
anti-Han and pro-Soviet sentiments. This was the reason why one of the most appealing 
slogans during the May 29 demonstrations in Yining was “The Han Chinese have 
suppressed us for 12 years. Down with the CCP! Exterminate the Han Chinese! Free all 
state criminals!”257 Even after the incident in Yining was suppressed, some minority 
nationals still insisted that “the riot was caused by the Party, because the autonomous 
zone is not autonomous, and no Party secretary is an ethnic minority.” “The number of 
the ethnic cadres is declining, and national policy is no longer working.”258 Some people 
believed that “Wang Enmao is now in charge of everything, while Saifudin has 
surrendered.259 In a natural response, some people asserted that “Xinjiang should 
establish a Turkistan Republic…If Albania can be self-supporting, so can be 
Xinjiang.”260 Xinjiang residents had the advantage of convenient border crossing, while 
the growing belief among ethnic elites that Xinjiang was no longer their homeland led 
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them to advocate leaving Xinjiang for the USSR. When presented with viable 
opportunities to travel to the USSR, some local cadres even became organizers of the 
mass exodus, leading their fellow minorities to flee.  
 
The Sino-Soviet Split 
As shown above, the sharp decline in the standard of living and the intensifying 
anti-Han attitude caused by the CCP’s policies in Xinjiang seeded a pro-Soviet attitude 
among ethnic minorities, leading them to prefer a life in the USSR over remaining in 
Xinjiang. However, the deteriorating relations between China and the USSR were a more 
direct cause for the mass exodus of 1962. The Chinese government responded to 
worsening Sino-Soviet relations by implementing a less cooperative policy for the 
repatriation of Soviet nationals. This shift imposed serious obstacles to the migration of 
local people. With such barriers to legal migration, the convenience of crossing the 
border made it the next best option. When the rift between the formerly amicable 
countries surfaced after the 22nd Soviet Conference, people in Xinjiang believed that a 
war between China and the USSR was not only inevitable but imminent. Frightened by 
the prospect of war and the diminished opportunities to migrate to the USSR, people with 
family ties on the other side of the border sought any chance to flee. When the Soviets 
changed their border policy to accept unofficial migrants rather than repatriating them to 
China as before, border crossing became a possibility for increasing numbers of 
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people.261 The changing Soviet border policy was another factor in the May 29 
demonstration. When the Soviet side stopped accepting border crossers under the 
immense pressure from the Chinese government, the people of Yili had to ask the local 
government for permission. Their reaction to being rejected led first to demonstrations 
and then to rioting.  
 
“Cannot Go Back Anymore!” 
The USSR began calling for the Chinese government to repatriate Soviet 
nationals just after Nikita Khrushchev launched the 1953 Virgin Lands Campaign in 
Central Asia to boost the Soviet Union’s agricultural production. 1954 witnessed the peak 
of the Sino-Soviet honeymoon, and the Chinese government began to repatriate Soviet 
nationals in accordance with the USSR’s demands.  The Party Committee of YKAP 
established a special committee to assist in the repatriation of Soviet nationals.262 In a 
demonstration of fraternity, the Chinese policy for the identification of Soviet nationals 
always ruled in favor of the Soviet government. People with Soviet nationality and even 
stateless people were allowed to leave. 5620 Soviet nationals, stateless people and their 
families were repatriated from Tacheng County between from 1954 and 1963.263 In the 
whole YKAP, 186,295 Soviet nationals, stateless people and their families were 
repatriated between 1954 and 1963.264  
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However, the repatriation of the Soviet nationals gave rise to several problems 
within Xinjiang. First, since Soviet Central Asia was much more prosperous than 
Xinjiang, almost all people who were qualified to go, especially those with Soviet ties, 
chose to leave for the USSR. The departure of a vast part of the population had a negative 
impact on the development of the already sparsely-populated Xinjiang due to labor 
shortage. The matter was worsened by the enormous number of stateless people in 
Xinjiang. The total population in YKAP was around 900,000, and 60% were stateless. If 
they and their families were allowed to leave, the government was very worried that “the 
whole Yili Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture would no longer exist.”265 To maintain a 
sufficient labor force in Xinjiang, the Chinese government began demanding that the 
Soviet government identify the stateless people as Chinese rather than Soviet. When 
Sino-Soviet relations were positive, the USSR agreed to let the stateless people to stay. 
When the relations became problematic, the repatriation of Soviet nationals was soon 
halted altogether, and both countries began competing for more labor forces. The Soviets 
changed their policy to claim that the stateless people were originally from the USSR and 
that they were Soviet nationals. According to Premier Zhou Enlai’s informal instructions 
issued in November 1960, the Chinese government claimed that these people should be 
regarded as Chinese citizens and be issued Chinese passports.266 Since 60% of the 
population in Yili was stateless, the changing policies had a heavy impact on local 
people’s lives. People of mixed Chinese-Soviet descent in Xinjiang who had at one point 
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been allowed to choose their nationality freely were categorized as Chinese citizens. The 
local government also employed many methods to compel those with Soviet citizenship 
to stay. The government began with persuasion, especially for the Soviet nationals who 
worked as cadres. Faced with the continuing plans of most Soviet nationals to leave, the 
government used various pretexts to delay their applications. If all these methods failed, 
the government would punish them to apply pressure to other Soviet nationals who 
continued to resist. If those diehards were cadres, the government promptly dismissed 
them from their positions, leaving them jobless. If they were students, they were soon 
dismissed from school.267 Since it took almost half a year for the Soviet government to 
finish processing immigration documents, some Soviet nationals had to wait in Xinjiang 
and make a living by selling their property.268 With the tightening of the immigration 
policy, local people despaired that “they could no longer go to the USSR because of the 
worsening Sino-Soviet relations.”269 
 
Rumors and Panic 
The border inhabitants promptly sensed any changes in the relations between 
China and the USSR, and even had access to information from the other side of the 
border. Sino-Soviet relations began to fail in 1958 and continued to deteriorate thereafter. 
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In December 1961, the 22nd Conference of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was 
held in Moscow. During the conference, Khrushchev publicly criticized the Albanian 
Labor Party and its leader, who had openly supported the CCP at the Bucharest 
Conference of 1960. Realizing that Khrushchev’s main target was the CCP, Zhou Enlai 
condemned Khrushchev and retreated from the conference in protest.270 As a result, the 
already problematic relations between these two socialist states not only worsened but 
also became public. Rumors quickly spread of the bad Sino-Soviet relations.271 
As Ralph L. Rosnow points out, rumors “give vent or expression to anxieties and 
uncertainties as people attempt to make sense of the world in which they live.”272 The 
anxious concerns among the border inhabitants caused by the tensions between the 
country in which they lived and the country to which they were eager to migrate 
generated many rumors, primarily revolving around two issues. One was updates to the 
changing migration policies enforced by both China and the USSR; the other was the 
prospect of war between these two socialist countries.  
While Chinese immigration policy were tightened, the message spread about the 
policy of the Soviet government regarding who would be accepted as Soviet nationals. 
Some people heard that the Soviets had claimed, “All Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Tatars are 
Soviet citizens, and all should return to the USSR.”273 There was also news about the 
people of Tacheng: “Most people in Tacheng are originally from the USSR. Even today, 
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the Soviet government regards them as Soviet citizens. The door of the USSR is still open 
for them.”274 The most difficult aspect of migrating to the USSR was obtaining official 
permission from the Chinese government. The rumor that “anyone with any identification 
issued by the Soviet government can go to the USSR” fell on glad ears.  There was even 
better news for those who lacked immigration documents either for the Chinese 
government or for the USSR: “Anyone who originally came from the USSR, regardless 
of whether they have a Soviet passport or not, is a Soviet citizen. Once you cross the 
border, you will be issued with a Soviet passport.”275  
If legal documents were not a problem, the question became how to cross the 
border. Local people spread rumors that “the Soviets have opened the border,” and “the 
Soviets will send buses here to pick us up.” But what about their families and relatives? It 
was said that the Soviets had instructed them, “When you come, do not come alone. 
Bring your relatives and friends with you. If you come, we will give you money and 
houses. We will let you learn to drive buses. We will reward you.” Once the border was 
opened, people were afraid that it would close again if they did not hurry. Someone 
claimed “the border will be closed on the date of the 25th.” Others believed that matters 
were more urgent: “The border will be closed on the date of the 22nd.”276 With the 
widespread percolation of such messages, it is not surprising that local people were eager 
to migrate by any means available.  
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The urge to migrate to the USSR was heightened by rumors of imminent war. 
Historically, Xinjiang had suffered greatly from war. Most Xinjiang minorities in the 
1960s would have had vivid memories of the wars that occurred in previous decades. In 
the early 1930s, a war had broken out between Muslims and Hans under the regime of Jin 
Shuren, a Han warlord who ruled over Xinjiang between 1928 and 1933. Both northern 
and southern Xinjiang were drawn into the conflict. The war did not end until Sheng 
Shicai gained support from the Soviet Union to replace Jin Shuren. The Eastern Turkistan 
Movement of 1944 was also unforgettable for people in the Three Districts. Each of these 
conflicts echoed the tensions between the Han Chinese and the ethnic Muslims of 
Xinjiang. One individual claimed to have witnessed that “Gani Batur has returned. He 
lives in a mountain and will lead all Muslims to leave. If the government does not allow it, 
we will fight.”277 “The downfall of the CCP is imminent. I dreamed of fighting against 
the Han Chinese. I also dreamed of Allah. He instructed me that all Muslims should unite 
in a revolution, and victory will be achieved in three or five years. All people will rise 
with us sooner or later.” “We go to the USSR, leaving Xinjiang to the Han Chinese 
(Китай).”278 
Rumors flew that the Muslims would rebel, and the two former allies were on the 
verge of war, as soon as the coming August, according to some claims. Some even 
believed that the war would come much sooner, and Xinjiang would be the battlefield. 
Official documents demonstrate that such terrifying messages led many young people in 
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Yili to cross the border, leaving their families behind.279 In the absence of any official 
statement, people who were used to the word of mouth tended to believe the messages 
circulating in their community. The snowballing of such rumors set the mass exodus in 
motion. 
 
Soviet Factors 
Although Chinese archival documents depict the Soviets as the black-hand behind 
the scenes of the Yi-Ta Incident, as shown above, the Chinese government did not find 
any convincing evidence for direct interference by the Soviets. However, it can be pinned 
down that the Soviets contributed to the incident in at least two ways: propaganda, and 
changing policies on border defense.  
Soviet propaganda targeting residents on the Chinese side of the border 
perpetuated and even incited the idea that people could go to the USSR for a better life. 
As mentioned earlier, one of the advantages border inhabitants had was convenient 
access to information from the other side of the border, rendering the Soviet propaganda 
targeting Xinjiang even more effective. One factor contributing to the Sino-Soviet split 
was the disagreement between Khrushchev and Mao regarding Chinese domestic policies, 
including the campaign to “Let one hundred flowers to blossom, let one hundred schools 
of thought content” and the Great Leap Forward. The main objective in targeting 
Xinjiang with the Soviet propaganda machine was to demonstrate that the policies in the 
USSR were right, and the Chinese ones were wrong. The nominal friendship between 
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China and the USSR compelled the Soviet propaganda machine to make a detour to 
criticize the CCP. To reveal that the food-grain shortages were caused by the failure of 
Chinese policies, the Soviet media went all-out to depict the “happy life” enjoyed by the 
Soviets. After the “hundred flowers” campaign launched by Mao abruptly turned into the 
Anti-Rightist campaign, the Soviet propaganda machine mentioned in its programs some 
eminent writers and actors who had fallen into the category of the rightists, to ridicule 
Mao’s self-defeating policy and likely also to demonstrate sympathy for Soviet nationals 
who were labeled as rightists.  
Chinese source materials show that such propaganda intensified with the 
deterioration of the former alliance. In 1961, the newspaper The Communist Flag, 
published in Kazakhstan in the Turkic language, doubled its circulation. Radio programs 
in the Turkic language, created before 1949 but terminated in 1950, were relaunched in 
1961. 462 publications from Soviet Kazakhstan circulated in the Tacheng region in early 
1961. By early 1962, this increased to 923, a year over year increase of 99.8%.280 
Needless to say, the propaganda played an important role in inciting people to flee. 
 
“The Soviet Border is Open!” 
If the propaganda served as an incentive, the opening of the Soviet border was the 
key factor that made the mass exodus possible. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the Sino-
Soviet border was essentially “a frontier without a clear border and a boundary without 
defense.” This phrase appeared frequently in reports by local officials. The Sino-Soviet 
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border was geographically ambiguous, without natural boundaries such as rivers, 
waterfalls, mountains, or boundary stones.281 On the Chinese side, the border was 
undefended. The amicable relations with the USSR led China to put off deploying any 
defense forces along most sections of the Sino-Soviet borderland, and its border control 
force was rather weak. The YKAP bordered the USSR for a stretch of 2,000 kilometers, 
but the Chinese side had only two border-control stations and one checkpoint along the 
entire length, thus the Chinese government only exercised actual control over about 300 
kilometers.282 Furthermore, the Chinese border guards only patrolled about 30% of the 
border area every few days, and some other areas were not even accessible. The border 
was essentially porous due to the loose control on the Chinese side, though the Soviet 
side was controlled more strictly.283  
Although Xinjiang had a long history of border-crossing activities, the forging of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s tended to discourage the Chinese state to strengthen 
the border, both ideologically and diplomatically. Ideologically, the Marxist-Leninist 
view was that proletarians should uphold internationalism, rather than nationalism. Based 
on this viewpoint, both the Soviet Union and China claimed that the Sino-Soviet border 
was merely nominal. Both announced that the sole reason for a border between the two 
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great fraternal socialist countries was to avoid providing imperialists with an opportunity 
to suggest that China had lost its sovereignty and territorial integrity, which would give 
the West an excuse to engage in a global war of aggression. Both the Chinese and Soviet 
border guards of course were not defending against each other, but rather against 
imperialism. Both sides were to work together in cracking down on the activities of spies 
and secret agents dispatched by the imperialists, so as to coordinate closely in protecting 
the common interests and security of the people of their two countries.284 As the 
relationship between China and the USSR was more than diplomatic, it was not 
diplomatically appropriate for the Chinese to strengthen the border. The CCP feared that 
the Soviets would blame the Chinese side for creating obstacles to Sino-Soviet friendship. 
Even when the split surfaced in 1961, the only way for the Chinese government to 
strengthen the 5000-kilometer border was to build up a militia. The main reason why it 
was “inappropriate to station a formal army” was to avoid giving the Soviets an excuse to 
attack the CCP.285   
Border crossings were frequent, especially from China to the USSR. Between 
1954 and 1957, according to government reports, dozens to hundreds of people from 
China crossed the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Soviet border each year.286 
Before 1962, both sides of the border normally dealt with illegal border crossers by 
blocking them before entering. If the migrants had already crossed the border, border-
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control stations would contact their counterparts on the other side and repatriate them.287 
On March 28, 1962, the Soviet consul asked his Chinese counterpart to repatriate 
disputed “Soviet nationals.” Having failed to gain any response from the Chinese, in 
April the Soviets abruptly loosened their border.288 Although the Soviet diplomats 
claimed that they accepted these refugees only for humanitarian reasons, it was quite 
possible that the Soviets were taking advantage of the Chinese famine to gain more 
workers, whom the Soviets claimed to be their nationals.289 Based on available sources, it 
is difficult to tell how much the Soviets contributed directly to mobilizing the people on 
the Chinese side to flee. However, Soviet archival documents reveal that the Soviet 
government had already obtained intelligence regarding the mass exodus before it 
happened. Rather than repatriating the migrants, Soviet archival documents demonstrate 
that on April 26, 1962, the Communist Party Central Secretary of the Soviet Kirghiz 
Republic received instructions on how to welcome and resettle the forthcoming border 
crossers from the Chinese side in an organized manner.290 In early May, as the number of 
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refugees escalated, the Kirghiz Republic even established a Resettlement Committee and 
instructed local governments to treat the refugees like the Soviet nationals who had been 
repatriated by the Chinese government several years earlier.291 The border crossing wave 
did not diminish until the Soviet side of the border was sealed and some of the refugees 
were repatriated under pressure from Chinese government.  
 
As discussed above, multiple factors, both domestic and foreign, led to the 
outbreak of the Yi-Ta incident. However, the direct cause for the mass exodus was the 
diplomatic conflict between China and the USSR following the deterioration of Sino-
Soviet relations. The impact of the crisis extended beyond the loss of labor power 
damage of property across Xinjiang, particularly in the YKAP. The Chinese side of the 
border, once undefended, was closed and further militarized. The population along the 
border was largely relocated, minorities with Soviet ties were repatriated, and cross-
border economic activities were halted. A series of campaigns were also launched just 
after the incident to remold local minorities’ minds to identify themselves as Chinese. As 
a result, the USSR was barred from direct involvement in Xinjiang, particularly in the 
Yili region.  
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CHAPTER  3 
BORDERLAND PEOPLE 
 
The roc wings fanwise,  
Soaring ninety thousand li 
And rousing a raging cyclone. 
The blue sky on his back, he looks down 
To survey Man’s world with its towns and cities. 
Gunfire licks the heavens, 
Shells pit the earth. 
A sparrow in his bush is scared stiff. 
“This is one hell of a mess!  
O I want to flit and fly away.” 
“Where, may I ask?” 
The sparrow replies, 
“To a jewelled palace in elfland’s hills.” 
Don’t you know a triple pact was signed 
Under the bright autumn moon two years ago? 
There’ll be plenty to eat,  
potatoes piping hot,  
Beef-filled goulash.” 
“Stop your windy nonsense!  
Look, the world is being turned upside down.” 
 
——Mao Zedong, “Two Birds: A Dialogue,” Autumn 1965 292 
 
Chinese efforts to rule Xinjiang faced many obstacles, among them that a 
significant part of the population had a fluid national identity. The fluidity was more 
evident among residents of the Three Districts, a frontier zone bordering the Soviet 
Kazakhstan Republic. This unsettled situation of the indigenous people challenged the 
Chinese government in governing this area; even who exactly were the subjects was 
unclear. As indicated by Eric Lohr, the sovereignty of a state is not limited merely to 
physical boundaries, but extends to all of a country’s citizens regardless of their place of 
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residence.293 In this case, who were the Chinese by nationality was about not just the 
human resources the government could exploit, but also the reach of China’s claims to 
sovereignty in this region. This chapter focuses on the changes of the “citizenship 
boundary” in the Three Districts set by the Chinese government with the fluctuations of 
Sino-Soviet relations. This chapter demonstrates how the Chinese government 
demarcated the transitional population and thus populated this region with homogenous 
people by nationality. 
 
Transitional People 
While originally trying to understand why the state has always seemed to be the 
enemy of “people who move around,” James Scott gradually came to see sedentarization 
as “a state’s attempt to make a society legible, to arrange the population in ways that 
simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription, and the prevention of 
rebellion.”294 The demographic composition of the Three Districts was far from legible to 
the Chinese state: it was not only heterogeneous but also mobile. 
The vast majority there were not Han Chinese but Muslims of multiple ethnicities. 
According to the official source, in 1949 the whole population in the Three Districts was 
675,125, whereas the Han Chinese numbered merely 38,099.295 The non-Han people 
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were of multiple ethnicities, including Kazaks, Uighurs, Russians, Huis, Kirghiz, 
Mongols, Han, and others. 
In this case, though they were minorities compared to the Russians and Chinese, 
these ethnic people were actually majorities in their own surroundings. Among the ethnic 
peoples, a significant part was nomadic pastoralists, living on mountains and steppes. As 
Table 3.1 below shows, in 1949, there were more than 360,000 ethnic Kazaks, more than 
50% of the whole population of the Three Districts.296  
 
Table 3.1: The Ethnic Demographic Composition of the Three Districts in 1949 
Ethnic group Kazak Uighur Han Hui Mongol Uzbek Kirghiz Russian 
Population 361,655 171,823 38,099 24,279 24,210 7,008 10,758 17,853 
Source: Song Jiaren, Yili Hasake zizhizhou zhi, p. 177. 
 
Furthermore, the ethnic people there are indifferent to their nationality but hold a 
pragmatic attitude about choosing whether to be Chinese or Russian. There are many 
reasons for the national indifference. Historically the Kazaks, Kirghiz, and other non-
Chinese people became “Chinese ethnic minorities” due to the contest of power between 
imperial Russia and Qing China in Central Asia. The Russian conquest of Central Asia 
started in 1730 and was completed by 1884 with the acquisition of most of the Kazakh 
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Steppe.297 During a century-long conquest, Russians competed first against the British 
and later the Chinese. The result of the Russo-British “great game” was that most of the 
Kazakh Steppe became Russian territory while the ethnic Kazaks there were forced to be 
subjects of imperial Russia. With relative Russian strength economically and militarily 
and weak Qing China, the Sino-Russian competition ended up with Qing China losing its 
vassal states in Central Asia to Russia and being forced to demarcate its territory in 
Xinjiang to the advantage of Russia. No matter which power was the winner, the Kazaks 
and other ethnic peoples were always the losers: their lands were conquered either by 
Russia or China, while they themselves were forced to become Russian or Chinese by 
nationality. Therefore, as Zhao Zhucheng argues, the community in Central Asia based 
on a common culture was torn apart by the Sino-Russian national boundaries, which were 
demarcated according to a series of treaties ending military conflict between Qing China 
and imperial Russia. It was mainly the military conquest by these big powers that divided 
the Kazakhs and other ethnic peoples into cross-border ethnic populations. The 
indigenous people themselves had little active participation.298 The coercion might have 
functioned well to impose on them a nationality but not a national identity.  
The frontier between China and Russia in Xinjiang was geographically a vast 
zone rather than a line, as indicated by Owen Lattimore.299 Limited by the low level of 
technology and lack of communication infrastructure, the Sino-Russian borderland was 
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demarcated roughly and defended nominally. Weak though they were, the ethnic people 
had been taking advantage of the porous border zone and chose to live on a side where 
the government was less hostile. As Lattimore states, “If one powerful neighbor follows a 
policy of subjecting the border peoples by force, the other works by attracting them, 
giving them the feeling of participation in a larger federalized political structure, then the 
peoples of the border zone will have reason to exercise their own choice to the best of 
their ability.”300 The mobile nature the ethnic peoples had, as James Scott maintains, 
made them the “enemy” of the state. Ever since the late Qing era, the Chinese 
government had been complaining that the “mixture of the peoples with Chinese and 
Russian nationalities in Yili violated the sovereignty of both the Chinese and the Russian 
governments. The Russian government regarded those living in Yili but Russian by 
nationality as illegal immigrants and required the Chinese government to deport them 
back. The Chinese authority complained that it was a mission impossible because those 
immigrants had been seeking whatever chances available to come back after deportation.” 
Many measures had been taken to keep the Russians out of Chinese territory, though not 
successfully.301 
The demographic composition in that region was further complicated with the 
influx of refugees from the Soviet side. Recent research based mainly on Russian sources 
reveals that migration between China and Russia in Northeastern Asia after the 1860s 
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was increasing over time but was more and more dominated by political factors than 
demographic and economic ones.302 Political factors also played a key role in migration 
in Xinjiang during the twentieth century. In 1916, approximately 300,000 Kazakh 
tribesmen sought asylum from Russia in Xinjiang after an uprising over the conscription 
of young men into forced labor.303 During the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and a series of 
Soviet political campaigns, especially the collectivization movement of the 1930s, around 
500,000 people fled to Xinjiang. Most of these refugees were Kazakhs, along with a 
small number of Slavs.304  
When the Soviet Revolution occurred, Xinjiang became a shelter for some 
Russian citizens, most of whom settled in the Three Districts. In 1917, Russian military 
commanders and soldiers fled to Xinjiang after being defeated, and some Russian 
civilians also crossed the Xinjiang-Russian border to evade the Bolsheviks.305 The 1930s 
therefore witnessed a tide of migration to Xinjiang with much greater scope. The 
agricultural collectivization launched by the Soviet government in 1929, especially the 
“nomadic settlement” campaign in Kazakhstan, a caused great famine across the entire 
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nation.306 Documents from the Xinjiang government vividly reveal what the exodus was 
like:  
Famine refugees cannot find food, and have to flee to Xinjiang with their old dependents 
and little children … more than hundreds and even thousands of Soviet ethnic peoples 
have fled to Xinjiang in groups. Every day, several mass exoduses will happen. Once 
being driven out, [the Soviets] will cry and ask for help. … In order to strengthen the 
border, to these Soviet refugees, [we] have been using military power to drive them out. 
Furthermore, [we] have sent more soldiers to strengthen some key checkpoints. During 
the past several months, all the military and financial resources in Xinjiang had been used 
to deport the Soviet refugees. … However, the border soldiers have been kept constantly 
on the run and the expense of military expenditure is especially high.307  
 
The Xinjiang government obviously exaggerated its ability to expel the Soviet refugees 
because sources reveal that during the early years of collectivization, 200,000 had 
successfully fled to Xinjiang.308 While most immigrants fleeing the Bolshevik Revolution 
were ethnic Russians, most driven by the collectivization campaign were ethnic Kazaks. 
Most ethnic Russians lived in cities and towns in Tacheng.309 Kazaks and other ethnic 
minorities from Russia settled with their fellow ethnics and intermarried locally.310  
Most Russian nationals in Manchuria, Shanghai, Qingdao, and elsewhere were 
Slavs who could be easily differentiated from the Chinese. However, most of those in 
Xinjiang were not Slavs but Muslims from Soviet Central Asia who were difficult to 
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distinguish from their fellow ethnic Muslims in this region. While the Sino-Soviet 
borderlines so clearly drawn on maps served to demarcate the people residing on both 
sides of the border as Chinese citizens and Soviets, in reality the similarity of these 
peoples made it impossible differentiate them. Similarities in ethnicity, religion, and 
culture made Kazakhs on either side of the border essentially one nation, as is true for the 
Mongols, Kirghiz, and other ethnic groups straddling the border. Furthermore, since the 
majority of the ethnic population were nomads, border crossing as a way of life was taken 
for granted and they showed little concern for jurisdictions claimed by either Beijing or 
Moscow.311  
Not only their nationalities were difficult to identify, but the Muslims, especially 
the nomads on both sides of the border, held an ambivalent attitude toward the state.312 
As mentioned above, the national identity the Muslims gained was not based on their free 
will, but merely imposed by the big powers. The 1864 Sino-Russian Treaty of Tacheng 
instituted the principle of territoriality (rensui digui ,˃°Ɯ); to which country 
indigenous people belong depends on which country holds sovereignty over the land on 
which these people live after the demarcation. Under the pressure of the Russian 
government, the Revised Sino-Russian Treaty of Yili Commerce of 1881 offered people 
in Yili an option to either stay in Yili or move to Russia. However, in Yili, even during 
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the Xuantong era (1909–1912), around thirty years after the signing of the Sino-Russian 
treaty of 1881, many people who had chosen to become Russian subjects moved back 
and lived with their fellow ethnics. Though the local government had to deport them to 
Russia as the Russian authorities had required, they still moved back and forth whenever 
they could.313 During the Republican era, the mixture of people of different nationalities 
in the Three Districts was still common. Even in the early 1940s, the local government 
was still complaining that Kazakhs did not have any idea that national borders were to be 
respected. Kazakhs on both sides of the long Xinjiang-Soviet border crossed freely 
without any legal permission. Many Soviet Kazakh businessmen went to Xinjiang for 
business while Xinjiang Kazakh businessmen traveled to Central Asia. Since they were 
members of the same ethnic community, it was hard to discern who were Chinese and 
who were Soviets. When a riot occurred, it was hard to determine whether Chinese or 
Soviets were involved. After the Xinjiang-Soviet split at the end of the Sheng Shicai era 
in the early 1940s, the Soviets took advantage of this indistinguishability to make trouble 
with the Xinjiang government.314 During the era of the Eastern Turkistan movement, 
there was barely any border between the Three Districts and Central Asia, but the border 
between the Three Districts and the other seven districts of Xinjiang controlled by the 
KMT was tightly defended by both sides. As a result, the distinction among the ethnic 
Kazakhs by nationality in the Three Districts was further blurred. 
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The nationality imposed on the nomads by the great powers did not necessarily 
mean national loyalty. The demarcation of the Sino-Russian borderline, based not on the 
boundaries of pastures but on man-made lines, not only jeopardized the nomadic way of 
life but could cause them to freeze to death if they lost their winter pastures to the 
neighboring country. Therefore, nomads ignored and crossed the border to maintain their 
nomadic life. Another reason for the national ambivalence among the Muslims on both 
sides of the border was that they were divided into two states by geopolitical strategies, 
not their own free will. Therefore, the process of demographic demarcation was rather 
arbitrary. The grandparents of Ehmetijan Qasim, a leader of the Eastern Turkistan 
Republic, for example, after the signing of Sino-Russian Yili treaty of 1881, turned from 
being subjects of Qing to those of Russia.315 This transformation of nationality could 
hardly have won over the loyalty of the people involved.  
 
From 1949 to 1953 
Before the founding of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949, the CCP 
had been tough on diplomats and foreign aliens from so-called “Imperialist states” in the 
“liberated zones.” The CCP declined to acknowledge these foreigners as diplomats but 
treated them as normal foreign aliens, though the diplomats tried whenever possible to 
gain acknowledgment from the CCP. At the same time, the CCP adopted several 
measures to push the foreign aliens to leave. Though Liu Shaoqi himself confessed to 
Stalin that this policy brought great inconvenience to the foreigners as well as the CCP, 
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the Communists still believed that the advantages of this policy outweighed the 
disadvantages. Since nationalism was proved to be an effective ideology in mobilizing 
people to serve the purposes of the CCP during the Chinese Civil War, playing tough 
with the diplomats and foreign aliens could further satisfy the sense of nationalism 
among the Chinese, making them believe that only the CCP could help the Chinese 
people “stand up.” With this toughest diplomatic policy that any government since the 
late Qing era had adopted, the CCP aimed at promoting an image that the Party feared not 
any “imperialists.” Besides this, by not acknowledging the legitimacy of foreign 
diplomats, the CCP also aimed to distance the democratic parties from diplomats and 
ordinary people from foreign aliens. Thus, the interference of any “imperialist states” in 
domestic affairs would be diminished as much as possible.316  
But how to deal with the foreigners who were originally from Soviet Russia? The 
CCP adopted the “lean to one side” policy, according to which the CCP joined the 
communist world headed by the USSR, and Soviet nationals were to be treated 
differently. Actually, in the “liberated zones” in Manchuria before 1949, the CCP already 
treated Soviet nationals better than their fellow Chinese. They were required to pay less 
taxes than their Chinese counterparts, while being assigned quality lands during land 
reform movements.317  
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For the Soviets, they encountered a dilemma with repatriating their nationals. On 
the one hand, after losing millions of people in the Second World War, the government 
wanted desperately to draw back their nationals from all over the world. On November 
10, 1945, a Soviet edict announced, “persons residing on the territory of Manchuria who 
on November 7, 1917, were subjects of the Russian Empire, as well as persons who had 
possessed Soviet citizenship and lost it, and their children, may recover the citizenship of 
the USSR.” On January 20, 1946, a second edict of the federal Presidium extended the 
provisions of this act to persons settled in the province of Sinkiang and other cities, 
giving them until April 1949 to contact the nearest Soviet consulate.318 Filled with 
wartime patriotism and nostalgic for their hometown and relatives,319 many immigrants 
thus recovered their Soviet citizenship. As many as 200,000 ethnic Russians and Tartars 
recovered their Soviet citizenship; however, ethnic Kazaks and Uighurs from Soviet 
Central Asia were reluctant to do so and thus became stateless people.320 Even for those 
who had recovered their Soviet citizenship, the residence certificates did not entitle them 
to enter the USSR at will; they had to apply and wait for additional permission, which 
typically took a long time to receive.321 This rather unusual procedure was made 
necessary first and foremost because of the difficulty of offering suitable shelter and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
318 Ginsburg, Citizenship Law of the USSR, p. 310. 
319 Ibid., pp. 310–11. 
320 “Waijiaobu Zeng Yongquan fubuzhang guanyu Suqiao, Suji ganbu deng wenti xiegei zhongyang 
lingdao ji budangwei de baogao” À*ʤųƹƭhʤʳʸŢɓHɓȏĆʤȈ¦˔åșÄ˒êʤ˧ËǤ¸
 [A Report from the Vice Head of the Foreign Ministration Mr. Zeng Yongquan to leaders of the Central 
Committee and Party Committee of the Foreign Ministration about the issue of cadres with Soviet 
nationality], AMFA, File No. 118-01137-02, p. 5. 
321 Ginsburg, Citizenship Law of the USSR, p. 310. 
!135  
employment to potential returnees due to the wartime devastation that also hampered the 
admission of the immigrants into the USSR.322  
However, the security of the regime was another reason why immigrants 
recovered their citizenship but needed to apply for official permission to enter their 
fatherland. As indicated by Eric Lohr, the Soviet government used citizenship law as a 
“filtering process” based mainly on the idea of “class.”323 Thus, the immigrants, most of 
whom were victims of the Soviet regime, were regarded as politically untrustworthy. 
What further strengthened this negative impression of the immigrants in the eyes of the 
Soviet government was that some Russians worked as spies against the Soviet 
government. For example, Japanese documents seized by the Soviet army in Manchuria 
revealed that 470 Russian immigrants in China worked as spies for the Japanese 
government during the Second World War.324 Therefore, an expedient way for the 
Soviets to deal with this issue was to dump these Soviet nationals in Xinjiang and 
Manchuria and let the CCP carry the burden. 
For the CCP, this was something they could trade for Soviet aid. Without 
comprehensive cooperation and even encouragement from the Soviets, it would be 
impossible for the CCP to occupy Xinjiang. The CCP planned to penetrate Xinjiang no 
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earlier than 1951;325 however, Stalin encouraged the PLA to approach this vast region as 
soon as possible and showed his willingness to cooperate.326 The Soviets offered vehicles 
to the CCP, which at the time was not ready technologically.327 More importantly, it was 
the USSR that persuaded the KMT army to surrender to the PLA and forced the East 
Turkistan Republic government to give up the status quo of political independence from 
the Chinese government and become part of Communist China. One of the reasons for 
Stalin to force the CCP to occupy Xinjiang without delay was because otherwise the 
British would interfere in Xinjiang affairs and thus Muslims there and in India might be 
further encouraged to fight against Communist rule.328 Since the main purpose for the 
encouragement and aid was for the security of the Soviet regime, as a precondition Stalin 
asked the CCP to maintain Xinjiang as a Soviet sphere of influence. Therefore, for the 
USSR, not only the Three Districts but the whole of Xinjiang could better serve as a 
buffer zone as well as a place to dump nationals who were not allowed to enter the Soviet 
Union. 
After the incorporation of Xinjiang into the PRC in 1949, to reward the USSR, the 
Chinese government went all out to facilitate the Soviets in dealing with Soviet 
immigrants there. To maintain Xinjiang as a Soviet sphere of influence, according to the 
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supplementary agreement of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950, foreigners other than Soviet 
nationals should be driven out of this vast region.329 To fulfill the requirement, right after 
the Chinese took Xinjiang they set out to handle the foreign aliens there. According to an 
official report, by August 1952, the Chinese government had naturalized around 3,000 
aliens from India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and deported a few who refused to become 
Chinese citizens. To further satisfy the Soviets, only Soviet diplomats were allowed to 
remain, while those of other countries were forced to withdraw promptly.330  
The cadres of the former East Turkistan Republic, though communication 
between them and the CCP was usually bridged through Soviet consuls,331 remained in 
their positions, and some were even promoted to high offices in Xinjiang. However, the 
Soviet nationality of many cadres had become a problem. After instituting the “lean to 
one side” policy, the CCP government was regarded by not only the capitalist world but 
also elites at home as a Soviet puppet government.332 Many Soviet nationals who 
remained as cadres in Xinjiang thus provided solid evidence to demonstrate that China 
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was merely a Soviet colony. To avoid this, the Soviet counterpart decided to strip sixteen 
high officials serving in the Xinjiang government, including Saifuddin Azizi, then the 
deputy chairman of the Xinjiang government, of their Soviet nationality.333 
At the same time, the Chinese government assisted the Soviet government in 
detaining Soviet immigrants who had worked as spies for foreign powers and repatriated 
them to the USSR for further investigation.334 The religious leaders who had fled to 
Xinjiang after the Bolshevik Revolution were kept under close surveillance, and those 
who planned not to go back to the USSR but instead to immigrate to capitalist states were 
forced to stay and later even forced to return to the USSR.335  
After the Chinese Civil War, China was so impoverished that “five people have to 
share the portion of three people’s food,” to use the phrase of Mao Zedong.336 Not only 
the Chinese but the Soviet nationals had encountered tremendous economic difficulties. 
For the sake of Sino-Soviet relations, the Chinese government always prioritized all 
policies related to Soviet nationals. In November 1949 in Qingdao, a seashore city in 
Shandong province, forty-five Russians were living in poverty and decided to migrate to 
Harbin to establish a new life. Though it was only related to forty-five Russians, the 
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Chinese government treated it seriously. The Premier Zhou Enlai himself contacted Gao 
Gang, then the chairman of the Northeastern China People’s Government, to resettle 
them.337  
The CCP also benefited in several ways from cooperation with the Soviets in the 
issue of the Soviet nationals. By pleasing the Soviets, the newborn Chinese government 
could earn more Soviet aid. Furthermore, Soviet nationals could be used as manpower for 
sparsely populated regions where the labor force was always limited. More importantly, 
after occupying more and more lands during the Civil War, the CCP was facing a serious 
shortage of cadres that could be used to build and rule the local governments in recently 
occupied regions.338 The shortage of ethnic cadres was even more serious. The CCP’s 
direct experience of governing ethnic people was based on Inner Mongolia, which the 
CCP occupied right after the Second World War with assistance from the USSR. What 
the CCP had learned from that experience was that using ethnic elites rather than Han 
Chinese to serve as cadres was essential for gaining the cooperation of local residents.339 
The East Turkistan Republic cadres, being trained by Moscow and rich in revolutionary 
experiences, not only made up the shortage but served as role models for other CCP 
cadres.  
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While the Chinese government went all out to cooperate with the USSR regarding 
the issue of Soviet nationals, what bothered the CCP most was that they lacked basic 
information about these people. The official documents claimed that from 1949 to the 
early 1960s over 760,000 people were registered as “Soviet nationals” across the 
country;340 however, the Chinese government had no way to confirm these data and did 
not know who the people actually were. But the Soviet government denied to offer the 
Chinese government basic information about the Soviet nationals. For example, in early 
1950, the local government of Dalian, a city in northeastern China, arbitrarily asked the 
Soviet consulate for the name list and personal files of the Soviet nationals in the city. 
Officials were denied. Nokolai Roshchin, then the Soviet ambassador to China, 
approached Premier Zhou Enlai, asking him to withdraw this decision because the 
Soviets had some “concerns” regarding sharing the information.341 As a result, for many 
years the Chinese government was not informed by the Soviet government on the issue of 
the Soviet nationals and was unable to perform any public census. Though the Chinese 
government had been investigating the issue of Soviet nationals clandestinely,342 it 
remained a gray area.  
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While some Soviet immigrants decided to settle in Xinjiang, others planned to 
return. Before entering the USSR, they had to submit applications and be investigated 
thoroughly by Moscow. Since the process took a long time and many were rejected, the 
Soviet nationals in Xinjiang became more and more impatient. In June 1952, in a county 
in Yili, around one thousand Soviet nationals were organized by the cadres of the Soviet 
national association, demonstrating for their return to the USSR. The representatives of 
the demonstrators were received by the Soviet consulate in Yili, but their wish was not 
satisfied.343 However, the demonstration did push the Soviet government to determine a 
solution to dealing with the Soviet immigrants who were denied entry. The best solution 
was to let these immigrants settle in China.344  
On the Chinese side, how to solve the issue of Soviet nationals and the stateless 
people in China was never urgent for the CCP until 1953. In that year, the Electoral Law 
of the People’s Republic of China on the Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s 
Governments was published, and the first National People’s Congress was imminent. 
Therefore, local governments needed Beijing to inform them whether the Soviet nationals 
should be granted suffrage. In July 1953, as the local government of Yili was preparing 
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for the election of representatives for the coming first National People’s Congress, 
officials were wondering if the local Soviet nationals could vote. They sent a telegram to 
Beijing for instructions. Beijing also felt it was time to finalize a solution for dealing with 
the Soviet nationals who had been in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and other 
regions for years but were either not allowed to enter the USSR or not willing to go back. 
After obtaining consent from Moscow through the Soviet consulate in Xinjiang, the CCP 
changed its policy from treating them as foreigners of an allied country to settling them 
permanently.345 In other words, the Soviet nationals would be treated as Chinese citizens 
and gradually naturalized. On August 12, Yili government received a reply from Beijing, 
indicating that both the Soviet nationals and dual citizenship holders could be granted the 
rights to vote and to be elected. Furthermore, in order to encourage them to settle in 
China, they could participate in the election before giving up their Soviet nationality.346 
Besides being granted universal suffrage, during the land reform movement the Soviet 
nationals were also assigned lands just as Chinese citizens were.347 Thus, naturalizing 
those with Soviet citizenship and Soviet/Chinese dual citizens was the solution for both 
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the Chinese government and its Soviet counterpart to the issue of Soviet nationals in 
Xinjiang.  
 
From 1954 to 1955 
In 1954, the Soviets changed their policy regarding Soviet immigrants from 
making them Chinese citizens to repatriating them back to Central Asia to serve as part of 
the labor force. After Nikita Khrushchev rose to power in 1953, in order to boost 
dramatically Soviet agricultural production to alleviate the food shortages plaguing the 
populace, he launched the so-called “Virgin Lands Campaign.” He proposed the plowing 
and cultivation of 13 million hectares (130,000 km2) of previously uncultivated land by 
1956; the targeted lands included areas in the northern Caucasus, western Siberia, and 
northern Kazakhstan. To recruit workers for the program, Khrushchev advertised the 
opportunity as a socialist adventure for Soviet youth. During the summer of 1954, 
300,000 Komsomol volunteers traveled to the regions to be cultivated. For young men 
from poor villages, orphans, and released prisoners, even though the living conditions 
were poor, they still experience an improved lifestyle. However, the poor living 
conditions caused many workers from cities and middle-class families to leave within the 
first months to years after arriving.348 To alleviate the manpower shortages, the USSR 
decided to repatriate Soviet immigrants in Xinjiang to Central Asia.349 On April 28, 1954, 
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the Soviet ambassador to China informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC that 
they decided to repatriate 6,000 Soviet national households (roughly a population of 
16,000 to 20,000) from all of China. From June to August, the busy season for farming, 
they would be repatriated to Caucasia, Siberia, and Kazakhstan to reclaim wasteland 
there. Those in Xinjiang would be sent to Kazakhstan for the convenience of both 
location and the similarities of the population on both sides. Those of Soviet citizenship, 
fit for labor and politically trustworthy, were qualified to return. Their family members 
could go as well.350 The policy that returnees could bring back their family members in 
China regardless of their nationalities was a way the USSR tried to calm the worries of 
these people. However, this policy soon proved to be a headache for the Chinese 
government and triggered many conflicts between the alliances. 
In order to draw back the maximum number of nationals to Central Asia, the 
Soviet government offered them multiple benefits: free housing, jobs according to 
specialties, free job training, sound subsidies, and others.351 For some, the benefits the 
government offered might be modest; however, for those in Xinjiang who lived in 
squalor, the incentives were a draw. The campaign of repatriating Soviet nationals 
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collectively was launched by the Soviet consulates in Xinjiang, and those of Russian ties 
answered the call actively.352 
The Chinese government, for the sake of strengthening the Sino-Soviet alliance, 
cooperated wholeheartedly. Policies related to the USSR, in the eyes of the Chinese 
government, were usually regarded as critical because they could impact Sino-Soviet 
relations. Claiming that this “important,” “urgent,” and “complicated” political mission 
could only be a success, the policy instituted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC 
was to “cooperate initiatively, assist actively, subsidize reasonably, offer convenience 
considerately, and send them away promptly.” To further facilitate the Embassy of the 
USSR in Beijing and several local Soviet consulates to fulfill the mission, the Chinese 
government formed many “committees of assisting to repatriate Soviet nationals” at all 
levels from central to local.353 Many measures had been taken by the Chinese side to 
encourage the Soviet nationals to return. To guarantee that the Soviet nationals would not 
hesitate to return for family reasons, the Chinese government claimed that their family 
members, regardless of nationalities, could go to the USSR as long as the Soviet 
government allowed. To ensure the possible loss of property would not hinder the Soviets 
from returning, the Chinese government also enacted a policy that returnees’ properties, 
including grain, livestock, tools, houses, and seedlings, would be purchased by county 
governments. Family members who had disagreements on whether to return would enter 
mediation by the local government and be encouraged to go back to contribute. As a 
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result, both Soviet citizens and dual citizenship holders, as long as they could prove their 
Soviet origin, were allowed to return with barely any background check.354 Some 
stateless people also left for the USSR, as either Soviet citizens or their dependents.355 
The official source indicates that in 1954, 2,464 Soviet nationals in Xinjiang left 
for Central Asia; some stateless people left as dependents, though their numbers are 
unclear.356 In 1955, while 86,734 people from all of China were repatriated to the USSR, 
64,483 were from Xinjiang. Thus, from 1954 to 1955, 114,326 nationwide left for the 
USSR.357 Those who left Xinjiang for Central Asia numbered more than 66,947 and were 
more people in Xinjiang were ready to leave as well. 
In 1954, right after the USSR started to repatriate the Soviet nationals collectively, 
the Chinese government confessed that “we have underestimated the uniqueness and 
complexity of the situation of Soviet nationals in Xinjiang by assuming Xinjiang is as 
‘normal’ as other regions.”358 First, the Chinese government did not expect that so many 
indigenous residents of Xinjiang would leave, which heavily impacted farming and 
herding activities. In 1954, most of those who had left were “activists,” who had been 
longing to return. When news about a better life in Central Asia reached Xinjiang, more 
and more people decided to leave. The year 1955 witnessed a loss of workforce in the 
Yili Zone at least ten times that of 1954. Being sparsely populated, the Three Districts 
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thus witnessed a shortage of labor. Furthermore, the government found that more than 60% 
of the population of Yili (more than 500,000) had Soviet ties. If they and their family 
members were allowed to return, most of the population would leave and “the whole 
Kazak Autonomous Region” would no longer exist.359 When people immigrated, they 
brought their farm tools and livestock, which also imperiled the power of production. For 
example, in Suiding county, now a part of Huocheng county in Yili, from 1955 to 1956 
there were more than 700 households moved to Central Asia. As a result, the number of 
horses decreased from more than 3,000 to 2,000, carts fell by more than 1,000, and plows 
declined more than 100. The result was a serious shortage of tools and livestock in the 
county, impairing greatly local production.360 
Besides the loss of labor force, tools, and livestock, the timing of the repatriation 
impacted the farming and herding. Since the main purpose of the repatriation was to open 
up wasteland, the Soviets usually recalled their nationals right before the busy season. 
Rather than offering enough time for the Chinese government to prepare in advance, the 
Soviets would inform the Chinese government the date for repatriating at the last minute. 
With preparations done hastily and without any plan, the Xinjiang government felt the 
repatriation was chaotic.361 When more and more people were considering immigrating, 
the social mentality in Yili became more and more unstable, which impacted the 
production work negatively. 
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Second, with so many people deciding to leave, the Chinese government found it 
was hard to stem the tide because a clear definition of who qualified to be a “Soviet 
national” did not exist.362 As this chapter demonstrates, the lack of a clear demarcation of 
“Soviet nationals” in Xinjiang was a fundamental problem in claiming national 
sovereignty for the Chinese government and triggered numerous conflicts in Sino-Soviet 
relations. The sophistication was caused, as an official inner report indicated, by the 
“uniqueness” of Xinjiang. The report listed several elements that made Xinjiang special. 
Xinjiang neighbored the USSR, so the number of Soviet nationals and stateless people in 
Xinjiang was significant. People in Xinjiang and those in Soviet Central Asia were also 
from the same ethnic groups, such as Kazaks and Uighurs. It was hard to differentiate 
these people by nationality.363 
Furthermore, some were originally Chinese citizens but for political reasons had 
acquired Soviet nationality. After the Yining rebellion, supported by the USSR, occurred 
in 1944, some indigenous people acquired Soviet nationality, fearing genocide targeting 
Chinese citizens in Xinjiang. The rebels who had killed Han Chinese during the rebellion 
also sought Soviet citizenship, in order to avoid being punished by the KMT government. 
Under the Soviet umbrella, they hoped that they would be safer. Some young people in 
Xinjiang, impacted greatly by the Soviet Revolution, decided to bring a revolution to 
Xinjiang as well. Being disconnected from the CCP, whose revolution was at ebb tide, 
they decided to become Soviets in order to be a part of the revolution. Others were 
educated in the USSR and thus believed that Xinjiang should become either another a 
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satellite state of the USSR like Mongolian Republic or a Soviet national republic. Either 
way, Xinjiang would be under the thumb of the USSR. Therefore, they decided to 
become Soviet citizens.364 These four ways of becoming Soviet citizens, in the eyes of 
the Chinese government, complicated the borderline between the Soviet nationals and 
Chinese ethnic minorities. After two years of cooperation always in favor of the Soviet 
side, the Chinese government believed that the “uniqueness” made it necessary to treat 
Xinjiang and other parts of China such as Manchuria differently regarding the issue of the 
Soviet nationals. 
 
Stateless People, 1956–1961 
While the policy in China proper and Manchuria was intact, beginning in 1956, 
the Chinese government decided to exert more control on the issue of repatriating in 
Xinjiang. However, with the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations in late 1958, Chinese 
control was further tightened. Accordingly, the Soviet side also turned from cooperative 
to antagonistic. The confrontation regarding the borderland population contributed 
greatly to the mass exodus in 1962. The Chinese side and its Soviet counterpart had 
several issues to resolve: Who were qualified to be the “Soviet nationals”? Were those 
who had originally been from the USSR but maintained the status quo of “stateless 
people” “Soviet nationals?” If not, who were they by nationality? Who was qualified to 
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return and in what way? What was the proper way to deal with the cadres in Xinjiang 
who had Soviet nationality? 
Who was qualified to be “Soviet nationals?” In 1953, the Chinese government 
claimed that “those whose ancestry and place of birth or only ancestry belong to the 
USSR and hold Soviet passport is regarded as a Soviet national.” Others were regarded as 
either “Chinese ethnic peoples” or “stateless people.”365 In 1959, Saifuddin Azizi, then 
the chairman of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, claimed to the Soviet Embassy in 
Urumqi that “only the official Soviet passport holders are Soviet citizens.”366 Thus, those 
who did not have official Soviet passports, though they were originally from Russia or 
the Soviet Union, were not entitled to be “Soviet nationals.” The Soviet side was 
cooperative at first and agreed with this definition in 1956. Only when the deterioration 
of the Sino-Soviet relations occurred in 1959 did the Soviets widen the citizenship 
boundary to whoever was accepted by the Supreme Soviet of Russia, the legislative 
bodies of the USSR.367 
Who were the “stateless people” and what was the proper way to deal with them? 
These were the most contestable issues between the two socialist states. Troubling the 
Chinese government the most regarding the issue of nationality were those in three 
categories. The first group was those who had immigrated to Xinjiang from 1917 to 1933, 
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fleeing either the Bolshevik Revolution or the forced collectivization of agriculture. They 
numbered around 50,000. The second group was those of Sino-Russian mixed blood. 
Finally, the third group was those who recovered their Soviet citizenship in 1946 but had 
not received a passport.368 Because around 50,000 fell in the first category, they became 
the focus of both the Chinese government and its Soviet counterpart. 
In 1953, the Chinese government claimed that those who were originally from 
Russia/USSR and lived in Xinjiang for a long period but did not have Soviet passports 
could be stateless people if they were not willing to be Chinese citizens. However, when 
the Soviets started to repatriate their nationals, afraid that many people would not return, 
the Chinese government mobilized these “stateless people” to go back. To facilitate their 
return, the Chinese government even helped them to recover their Soviet nationality.369 
As a result, anyone who could prove their Soviet origin was allowed and even 
encouraged to leave as long as the Soviet side agreed to accept them. Certificates issued 
by Soviet national associations (so-called “white notes”), provisional certificates by 
Soviet embassies, and invitation letters from relatives or collective farms in the USSR 
could be used as evidence of individuals’ Soviet origin.370 In 1955, because the social 
order and production work in Xinjiang was impacted negatively due to the massive 
repatriation, on July 12 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs suggested to the Soviet Embassy 
in China that it would be better not to mobilize the stateless ethnic Kazaks and Uighurs to 
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return. Even with the serious negative impact of the massive repatriation, for the sake of 
the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Chinese government still hold a cooperative attitude toward 
its Soviet counterpart. On October 15, 1955, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs still 
instructed Xinjiang government that whether the stateless people could recover their 
Soviet nationality according to “the will of the Soviet side and the free will of the 
stateless people. If the stateless people are willing to recover their nationality, we should 
not deter but facilitate. If stateless people are not willing, we should not encourage.”371 In 
1957, the policy regarding the “stateless people” was tightened. They were not allowed to 
go to the USSR unless they were immediate family members of Soviet nationals.372 
The Soviet side was also cooperative with its Chinese ally when the Sino-Soviet 
alliance was in a good shape. The Embassy of the USSR in Beijing agreed that from 1956 
on, stateless people would not be repatriated but would stay in Xinjiang permanently. 
Neither would the Soviet government repatriate their nationals in a collective fashion.373 
The Soviet side further sent the Chinese government a memorandum, claiming that “the 
Soviet government have already instructed the Soviet embassies in Xinjiang that the 
applications of those who are not Soviet nationals but plan to go to the USSR should be 
examined strictly. Those who are allowed to return should not be repatriated collectively. 
Furthermore, they cannot return until they obtain permissions from the Chinese 
government in advance.”374  
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Either side assumed that the stateless people were their nationals, however, they 
were sensitive to this issue but handled carefully in order not to offend the ally. In late 
1957, it was very much possible that the local government in Urumqi reported to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC that the Soviet Embassy in Urumqi had regarded 
whoever was originally from Russia as Soviet nationals and thus issued them passports. 
Since this issue was serious, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC noted this to the 
Soviet Embassy to China and asked for an explanation. The Soviet Embassy in Yili thus 
had to inform the Chinese local official in Yili that “it was not in line with the fact,” but a 
“misunderstanding.” The Yili side, probably in order to avoid offending the Soviets, 
informed their Soviet comrades that they had not had an opinion like this nor had 
reported this to Beijing.375  
Though the Chinese government did not blame its ally, Beijing believed that the 
Soviets had been doing something secretly to solve the problem at their advantage. As a 
backlash, the Chinese side decided to reverse course, favoring their own interests versus 
those of the Soviets. In order to reduce the impact the massive repatriation had on the 
production force in Xinjiang as much as possible, the Chinese government required the 
Soviets to repatriate mainly the urban population, to treat the country population only as 
supplementary, and to leave the pastoralist population intact.376 Besides requiring the 
Soviets to follow this order, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC barely demonstrated 
enthusiasm for facilitating the Soviets any more. After negotiations, in March 1957 the 
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Yili Diplomatic Bureau of PRC and the Soviet Embassy in Yili drafted an annual plan of 
1957 for repatriating Soviet nationals. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC did not 
respond to the plan until three months later. During this period, the Soviet consul and 
deputy consul had been inquiring with the Yili Diplomatic Bureau multiple times and 
even suspected the Chinese government was still willing to cooperate. The attitude of 
Beijing had changed so dramatically regarding the repatriating issue, in its annual report, 
even the Yili Diplomatic Bureau confessed that the Chinese government’s position was 
too much in favor of Xinjiang but ignored the intensions and needs of the Soviet side.377 
Due to the new policy benefiting the Chinese side, 1957 witnessed a big decrease in the 
number of people who had been allowed to be repatriated by the Chinese government. 
Including Soviet nationals and their dependents, only 533 returned to Central Asia.378 The 
change from loose to tight control of the immigration policy not only made the Soviet 
government doubt that their Chinese ally was willing to cooperate but also caused those 
in Xinjiang with Soviet ties to worry if they would be allowed to go back any more. 
With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations beginning in late 1958, both sides 
turned from cooperation to conflict regarding the stateless people. The Soviet side was 
unsatisfied with the control the Chinese government had placed on the immigration 
policy and changed its policy regarding who were qualified be to Soviet nationals. On 
November 28, 1959, the general consul of the Soviet Embassy in Urumqi informed the 
Xinjiang government that the USSR believed that those who immigrated to Xinjiang 
from the USSR between 1917 and 1933, who had been labeled as stateless people, were 
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in fact Soviet nationals.379 At the same time, the Soviet consulate in Yili had been issuing 
certificates and even passports to these stateless people through Soviet national 
associations.380 As the dispute between these two socialist states escalated, in June 1960 
the conflict between the CCP delegation and the Soviet Communist Party occurred in 
Bucharest, impacting relations between two Soviet consulates in Xinjiang and the local 
governments. On the issue of repatriating the Soviet nationals, these two Soviet 
consulates changed their attitudes from cooperative to always faulting the Chinese side 
and criticizing the Chinese. For example, the Soviet consulate in Urumqi blamed the 
Xinjiang government for giving permission to the Soviet nationals to return without 
consulting the Soviet government in advance.381 In 1961, the Soviet consul in Yili even 
traveled to some counties to mobilize the locals of Soviet origins to return. The consul 
claimed that “we admit that the Kazaks originally came from the USSR, not matter they 
have Soviet passports or not, are Soviet nationals. They are welcomed to return to the 
USSR.”382 
On the Chinese side, as Sino-Soviet relations worsened, the immigration policy 
became tighter and the attitude against the Soviets became tougher. The Chinese side 
adopted a measure-for-measure policy against the Soviet consulates in Xinjiang. From 
1954 to 1958, as the Chinese government claimed, more than 99,000 Soviet nationals had 
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been repatriated to Central Asia. In this case, for the sake of the production force of 
Xinjiang, the Xinjiang government required the Soviet consulate in Urumqi to fulfil their  
work in half a year.383 In the past, the Soviet consulates in Xinjiang mainly approached 
the indigenous people through Soviet national associations. It was very possible to avoid 
being controlled by the local governments. Thus, the cadres of the associations of Soviet 
nationals usually approached their targeted people without informing local governments 
in advance.384 To cripple the ability of the associations to mobilize locals to become 
Soviet citizens, in 1959 the Chinese government froze ¥600,000 worth of association 
bank deposits.385 To further prevent the Soviet consuls from strengthening the indigenous 
people’s will for leaving, the Diplomatic Bureau in Yili required the Soviets not to 
contact any Chinese working units in Xinjiang unless through the Bureau, which 
infuriated the Soviets.  
The attitudes the Chinese officials had when meeting Soviet diplomats also 
became more hostile. In 1960, when negotiating the repatriation of Soviet nationals, an 
annual occurrence, this time the atmosphere changed greatly. Wang Huanzhang, the head 
of the Diplomatic Bureau, who used to be always friendly to the Soviets but this time 
refuted the Soviet consuls during the conference. The annual report of the Bureau even 
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confessed that the way the Chinese side dealt with the Soviet consulates was “simple” 
and “rude.”386 In October 1960, because the Chinese had made solving the issue of the 
cadres with Soviet citizenship a priority, the repatriation of the Soviet nationals who were 
not cadres was halted.387 In November 1960, Zhou Enlai instructed informally that the 
stateless people were Chinese citizens. Based on the instruction, the Chinese government 
issued them Chinese passports, which caused the Soviet government to protest. In June 
1961, the Soviet Embassy in Urumqi claimed that it was improper to issue Chinese 
passports to those who had ancestors who lived in the USSR for generations.388 
On March 28, 1962, the Soviet Embassy to China formally notified the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of PRC to determine the citizenship of three kinds of people with 
Soviet ties: those who immigrated to Xinjiang from 1917 to 1933, people who were born 
in Xinjiang with mixed Chinese and Soviet blood, and those who recovered their Soviet 
citizenship in 1946 but had not yet attained a Soviet passport. The policy the Soviets 
proposed to the Chinese government was that these people, if willing, could still become 
Soviet citizens.389 The Soviet government failed to receive a reply on issues like this as 
usual. In April, a mass exodus occurred first in Tacheng and then in Yili. The Chinese 
government believed that the Soviets had opened their borders to immigrants from 
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Xinjiang and had even mobilized them in order to solve this problem permanently in an 
unconventional way after they had failed to solve it diplomatically.390 
 
Cadres of Soviet Ties 
In the Three Districts, as mentioned earlier, a significant part of the cadres were 
from the former Eastern Turkistan Republic. Many of them had either Soviet citizenship 
or dual citizenship. In Tacheng, for example, there were 3,000 cadres, and 60% were 
Soviet citizens.391 They were high officials and CCP members though the CCP 
constitution demonstrated that foreign citizens should not become CCP members.392 In 
order not to offer the capitalist world an excuse to criticize the Soviets for colonizing 
Xinjiang, sixteen high-raking officials in Xinjiang were deprived of their Soviet 
citizenship by the USSR. 
Even when Sino-Soviet relations turned friendly, the Chinese side believed that it 
was problematic that so many cadres served for the CCP, local governments, and the 
army in Xinjiang but had Soviet citizenship. The Chinese government had been taking 
opportunities to naturalize them gradually. In 1953, with permission from the Soviet side, 
the Xinjiang government was instructed by Beijing to offer them suffrage for the 
National Convention without revoking their Soviet citizenship as a precondition. 
However, most cadres adopted a “swinging,” “wait-and-see” attitude with their 
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nationality,393 and the most common approach they had chosen was “straddling on two 
boats,” taking advantage of whatever the two countries had to offer.394 Thus, most of 
them declined to be naturalized as Chinese citizens but either claimed they were Soviet 
nationals or denied publicly that they had Soviet certificates or passports, though they or 
their family members actually had them. 
When the Soviet government started to repatriate their nationals in 1954, some 
cadres resigned their jobs before being permitted by Moscow to return. Some left 
successfully while the others were denied. When they applied to recover their positions in 
their former working units, they were informed that the working units declined to have 
them back. The reason sounded reasonable: the return of the Soviet nationals would 
inconvenient the units they were serving. Even so, many immigrated anyway and became 
jobless.395 Thus, the mobility the cadres with Soviet citizenship had made the local 
government regard them as temporary and uncontrollable. 
The best way to settle them was to naturalize them. Even in 1958, the Soviet 
Embassy to China still showed its support for the Chinese government to require the local 
cadres with Chinese ancestry to surrender their Soviet citizenship. Backed up by the 
Soviets, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC instructed the local organs in Xinjiang to 
insist on pushing the cadres to renounce their Soviet nationality or not allow them to 
serve in their positions anymore. The Ministry further instructed the Xinjiang government 
to exert pressure through the Party organization and the Communist Youth leagues. The 
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Ministry further instructed that the Soviet government should also be used to persuade 
the cadres to give up their Soviet citizenship.396 Cadres without Chinese ancestry would 
also be pushed to be Chinese citizens, though pressures facing them were fewer. 
It seems that the Soviet citizenship card some cadres played worried the CCP, 
feeling that the mobility of these cadres would cripple the goals a series of political 
campaigns planned to achieve. For example, Saifuddin Azizi complained to the Soviet 
consul in Urumqi how the Chinese government was bothered by the mobility some 
cadres had during the Anti-Rightist and Anti-Local Nationalism Movements. When some 
cadres were labeled as “local nationalists,” a political term for those who could seek 
either independence or high autonomy from Xinjiang or merely were dissatisfied with 
CCP policies in Xinjiang, they claimed that they were Soviet nationals and decided to 
return though they had never before claimed to hold Soviet citizenship. Therefore, 
Saifuddin believed that it was not convenient for some cadres serving the CCP and 
Chinese government to retain their Soviet nationality. He proposed to the Soviet side that 
the cadres, especially those with a high raking, remain in Xinjiang rather than being 
patriated.397 
The experience the cadres had during the campaigns made them feel that Xinjiang 
had become a region for Han Chinese rather than ethnic peoples. In order to elude being 
further hurt, more and more cadres switched their “straddling on two boats” attitude to 
return to the USSR as soon as they could. By May 1959, most of them had already gained 
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permission from their working units and had completed the necessary paperwork.398 
However, in the same month, the CCP committee of Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous 
Region ordered that the cadres with Soviet citizenship generally were not to be allowed to 
repatriate.399 
With the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the loyalty the cadres of Soviet 
ties had for the Chinese party and state came into question. Beijing’s policy regarding the 
steps for solving the issue of Soviet nations had made the problem of cadres in Xinjiang 
with Soviet citizenship a priority.400 In August 1960, right after the Sino-Soviet conflict 
surfaced in Bucharest, Beijing decided to solve the problem of the cadres with Soviet 
citizenship once and for all. When asked to choose either to give up their Soviet 
citizenship and resume their positions in Yili or return to the USSR, only 12 cadres 
decided to stay while around 200 determined to leave without any hesitation.401 Since the 
determination most cadres had was so strong, in 1960 the Chinese government agreed to 
repatriate 308 cadres.402 Even after the mobilization of Lü Jianren, the Party Secretary of 
Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region, and local working units, by April 1961 only 33 
cadres with Soviet citizenship in all of Xinjiang had surrendered or promised to surrender 
their Soviet nationality, while the vast majority determined to leave.403 By the end of 
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1961, the official census revealed that 1,364 cadres across Xinjiang had claimed to have 
Soviet citizenship. After intense mobilization, only 17 cadres conceded their Soviet 
citizenship. There were 1,337 cadres determined to return, constituting 98.2% of the 
whole cadre population.404 While in 1961 Beijing had instructed local government in 
dealing with the issue of cadres with Soviet citizenship “to do more work and let more 
cadres stay but fewer ones leave,”405 the local government deliberately interfered with the 
cadres’ return. Cadres who decided to leave were either delayed permission or punished 
harshly. In 1961, it was very hard for cadres to return legally, which certainly enraged 
them. 
 
After the Mass Exodus of 1962 
From April 22 to the beginning of June 1962, as the Soviet authorities admitted, 
around 67,000 border inhabitants, most of whom were ethnic Kazaks and Uighurs, 
illegally crossed into the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.406 Many factors contributed 
to the mass exodus, as Chapter Two demonstrates, and the tightening of the immigration 
policy by the Chinese government was important. The Soviet authority also indicated that 
at the beginning of 1962 local authorities in Xinjiang almost stopped issuing exit visas for 
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the USSR to Soviet citizens wishing to return.407 With things in Xinjiang worsening, 
more and more people with Soviet ties were eager to leave but were not allowed to do so 
legally, so they had to choose to cross the Sino-Soviet border without permission. 
In June, immediately following the mass exodus, the Chinese government 
believed that the Soviet side had prepared and organized the mass crossing and that those 
originally from the USSR were the leaders. In retaliation, Chinese authorities changed 
their immigration policy regarding people of Soviet origin. Before the incident occurred, 
the Chinese side had used whatever measures possible to force these people to stay and 
be naturalized, as this chapter has demonstrated. The main purpose was to maximize the 
labor force and maintain the stability of the local bureaucracy in Xinjiang. After the mass 
exodus and especially the May 29 bloody event in Yining, on June 12 the purpose of the 
immigration policy changed to “uproot thoroughly all the trouble makers,” “make the 
local environment be beneficial for purifying and solidifying Xinjiang,” and “strengthen 
the Anti-Revisionism struggle.”408 In other words, the main goals for the policy would be 
to get rid of any potential trouble makers to maintain the social order and make Xinjiang 
a region with unitary Chinese citizens. 
Thus, the Chinese government ordered that those with Soviet ties should be 
pushed out of this region as soon as possible. To prevent the Soviet side from accusing 
the Chinese government of violating the Sino-Soviet friendship, the Chinese government 
reminded local governments and organs to achieve the goal of tactical. The most 
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expedient way to drive them out, as the Chinese authorities determined, was to force 
them to cross the border directly, as had recently happened. However, since the border of 
the Soviet side was sealed, it was impossible to cross and would offer the Soviets an 
excuse for blaming the Chinese. Thus, the Chinese government urged them to apply for 
exit visas. To push the cadres with Soviet ties to leave, the local government even forced 
them to leave for the USSR by threatening to resettle them in rural areas if they refused to 
return.409 Furthermore, to prevent the Soviet government from sending agents to Xinjiang 
to manipulate the indigenous people or collect information, the Chinese government 
ordered that Soviet citizens who had left would not be allowed reentry.410 
To return to the USSR, the routine process a Soviet national went through was 
applying first for an exit visa from the Chinese government and then for an entry visa 
from Moscow. Before the mass crossing, especially in 1961, it was the Chinese side that 
was reluctant to issue the exit visa, though visas from Moscow also took long to obtain. 
After the event, while the application process was merely nominal, the applicants gained 
visas expediently. Ironically, this time it was the Chinese side that accused the Soviet 
government of delaying Soviet nationals’ entry visas. Those who had been expecting 
visas from Moscow would sometimes demonstrate their anger and even violate the social 
order since the situation in Xinjiang became more and more hostile to them. Therefore, 
the Chinese government had been exerting political pressure on their Soviet counterpart 
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to issue these visas without delay.411 At the same time, the applicants would be mobilized 
by the Chinese to pressure the Soviet consulates in person. The Chinese government even 
provided the Soviet consulates a list of those who had been issued exit visas and then 
urged the Soviets to issue entry visas earlier, claiming applicants were pressuring them.412 
In September 1962 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC requested that the Soviet 
government permit those persons seeking to leave for the USSR to do so under a 
simplified procedure.413 To keep the Chinese side from suspecting Moscow’s delay in 
issuing visas was a conspiracy to leave Soviet nationals in China to work as agents for the 
USSR,414 Soviet authorities temporarily permitted Soviet nationals and members of their 
families to enter the USSR from China without visas.415 
To further clarify the boundary of “Soviet national” after the border crossing, as 
ordered by Mao Zedong,416 on August 15, 1962, the government of Xinjiang issued an 
order.417 Because the main purpose of the order was to differentiate Soviet citizens from 
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the Chinese, it defined the boundary and the rights and duties of foreign nationals. 
According to the order, only those with both foreign passports and resident certificates 
issued by the Chinese government were qualified to be foreign nationals. In a revision to 
the former policy, foreign nationals in China were not allowed to participate in local 
political organizations or engage in political activities. Nor were they entitled to the rights 
to vote and be elected. More importantly, they were not qualified to serve in any 
government departments, political organizations, or state-owned corporations.418 Thus, 
the opportunities for Soviet citizens, dual citizenship holders, and even stateless people to 
serve as cadres in Xinjiang officially ceased. With the publication of the order, the level 
of hostility the Xinjiang government had toward those with Soviet ties had escalated. 
Under these pressures, between October 15, 1962, and May 1, 1963, as the Soviet 
authorities revealed, over 46,000 persons entered the USSR from China.419 As Soviet 
nationals left for the USSR in massive numbers, in 1963 the Soviet community in 
Xinjiang had been almost uprooted. To further eradicate any hiding Soviet citizens, 
Soviet organizations were forced to withdraw and a series of campaigns of confiscating 
“certificates of Soviet citizenship” and “catching Soviet agents” were undertaken across 
Xinjiang. All these will be discussed in the chapters to come. 
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CHAPTER 4 
GOODBYE MOSCOW 
 
Wind and rain escorted Spring’s departure, 
Flying snow welcomes Spring’s return. 
On the ice-clad rock rising high and sheer 
A flower blooms sweet and fair. 
 
Sweet and fair, she craves not Spring for herself alone, 
To be the harbinger of Spring she is content. 
When the mountain flowers are in full bloom 
She will smile mingling in their midst. 
 
———Mao Zedong, “Ode to the Plum Blossom,” 9 December 1961 420 
 
The USSR as an Enemy 
In his diary entry of April 20, 1962, Yang Shangkun, then the head of the General 
Office of the Central Committee of the CCP, wrote, “Lantao called me from Lanzhou, 
and we talked on the phone for one hour.”421 The call was made by Liu Lantao, the top 
Secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee of the CCP, who had just 
traveled from Xi’an to Lanzhou after being informed that a mass exodus occurred in 
Tacheng and Yili.422 During the conversation, Liu must have reported to Yang that border 
crossings in these areas turned from sporadic, small-scale, clandestine to continual, 
massive, and public. What should be done?  
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At the time, the CCP had just held an important large-scale working conference 
that had lasted for twenty-eight days with more than 7,000 officials and cadres 
nationwide as participants. The conference was later referred to as the Seven Thousand 
People Conference in CCP history. The purposes for holding such a conference were 
multiple. One was to boost the morale of the local officials and cadres who had been 
demoralized by the great famine caused by the Great Leap Forward campaign. 
Furthermore, Beijing decided to take advantage of this meeting to touch base with local 
officials and cadres on how serious the economic situation was and how difficult it would 
be for the central government to ameliorate grain shortages in big cities such as Beijing, 
Tianjin, and Shanghai. By doing this, the central government hoped that local officials 
and cadres would be more willing to assist the central government by contributing more 
grain that otherwise would be consumed by locals.  
Another goal was not domestic but was aimed at the USSR, which at that time 
was China’s ally, but only nominally.423 Mao Zedong believed that the Great Leap 
Forward would be his great contribution to the development of the Chinese economy, but 
Nikita Khrushchev claimed that Mao’s policies were deviations from the orthodoxy of 
Marxism and Leninism.424 Khrushchev’s attitude infuriated Mao so much that historians 
believe that it contributed heavily to the Sino-Soviet split.425 Beginning in 1958, Sino-
Soviet relations went through several ebbs and flows and reached a new nadir at the end 
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of 1961. At the Twenty-Second Representative Convention of the Soviet Communist 
Party held in October 1961, Khrushchev once again harshly criticized the Chinese 
government and Mao. Since this was the time when China was experiencing a great 
famine, Khrushchev’s criticism was regarded by Beijing as “Revisionists … taking 
advantage of our domestic difficulties to intimidate us.” In order not to show the 
weakness of the CCP, Chinese Communists should “stick to our guns and confront the 
USSR.”426 Thus, an additional goal of the Thousand People Conference was to mobilize 
the whole nation to boost the economy to rebut Khrushchev. The conference was urgent 
and crucial especially when top leaders were troubled by the food shortage. However, 
Mao was more interested in how to defeat Khrushchev than in how to better prepare for 
the conference. He believed that the worst of the famine had passed and the economy was 
recovering. Therefore, the biggest challenge China would face in the near future was 
Soviet Revisionism. He did feel remorse for the loss of his fellow Chinese caused by the 
Great Leap Forward campaign, but he still had confidence in his policy for developing 
economy. Believing that the disaster was mainly caused by the inexperience of officials 
and cadres when enacting his policy, Mao declined to apologize. He became even more 
defensive after Khrushchev took advantage of the great famine to reveal how wrong 
Mao’s heretical economic policy was.  
On February 22, 1962, the Soviet Communist Party sent a letter to Beijing, 
criticizing the CCP for adopting a “heretical” route in the international communist 
movement. To keep the CCP on the track, the Soviet Communist Party required their 
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Chinese comrades to surrender their “unique position,” “unique route,” and accept the 
“common route.”427 Khrushchev’s criticism complicated the already tough situation. For 
Mao, admitting his policy was a mistake meant not only undermining his own authority 
inside his Party, but also giving in when confronting Soviet “Revisionism.” To ensure 
everybody was in line with him, at the end of December 1961 he recommended his 
comrades read his famous anti-Soviet poem, “Ode to the Plum Blossom,” cited at the 
beginning of this chapter.428  In the poem, “ice-clad rock” refers to the “Soviet 
Revisionists,” while “Plum Blossom” is a metaphor for Chinese Communists. As Guo 
Moruo, a prolific Communist writer and then the president of the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences, later revealed, Mao’s purpose for circulating this piece was to encourage his 
comrades not to capitulate to the huge pressures of the USSR. On the contrary, they 
should stand firm in the international arena to set a role for their fellow Chinese, as a 
plum blossom flowers even when buffeted by heavy snow.429 The same idea was 
expressed more straightforwardly when Mao met representatives from northwestern 
China at the August 1962 Beidaihe meeting. He instructed his comrades that the number-
one enemy the CCP was facing in Xinjiang was “Soviet Revisionism.” To fight against 
them, powers should be concentrated. He even proposed to issue an edict so that 
provinces, cities, regions, and counties nationwide could be informed. Furthermore, 
northwestern China should be well prepared for the possible war the Soviets would 
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wage.430 Therefore, just when anti-Soviet sentiment became the priority for Mao and he 
even envisioned an impending Sino-Soviet war that the Yi-Ta incident happened. The 
CCP’s anti-Soviet atmosphere set the stage for both how to interpret the origins of the 
incident and how to deal with it. 
This chapter demonstrates how the CCP adopted the diplomatic means to halt the 
mass exodus from the Three Districts and then how Beijing used this incident as an 
excuse to finally eradicate the Soviet presence in this region as part of the anti-Soviet 
campaign. Believing that the mass exodus was mainly caused by a Soviet conspiracy, the 
Chinese government exerted serious diplomatic pressures on the USSR to force the 
Soviets to seal their side of the border. Furthermore, to uproot the Soviet presence in 
Xinjiang, the CCP took advantage of the Yi-Ta incident to abolish the associations of 
Soviet nationals first and then successfully force the Soviet consulates in Yili and Urumqi 
to withdraw. By these diplomatic means, the Soviet presence in Xinjiang, which for a 
century had been influencing Xinjiang in almost every way, was abolished.  
 
Seal of the Soviet Border 
When the border crossing was still sporadic, on April 18 the Xinjiang Foreign 
Affairs Office sent a report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the abnormal 
phenomenon and request instruction. The instruction from the Ministry was cautious: 
First, they should inform the border checkpoint officials on the Soviet side that the 
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Chinese government had found Chinese citizens crossing the border to the Soviet side, 
then ask the Soviets to help repatriate them to China. They were not allowed to mention 
that the Chinese had spotted Soviets using cars to pick up the border crossers. If the 
Soviets asked why these people had fled, they were instructed to reply that only after 
these people were repatriated might they be able to answer this question. The Chinese 
sought to avoid losing the diplomatic initiative in case the Soviets accused the Chinese 
side of initiating the problem.431 As the instruction demonstrated, Beijing was not yet 
ready to launch a diplomatic war against the USSR but wanted to see what would happen 
next before deciding how to react.  
The first official report on reasons for the mass exodus was probably issued by the 
CCP Council of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. As the KMT interpreted the 
Yili rebellion of 1944 as merely a Soviet instigation,432 the report also claimed that “the 
causes of these people’s flight are not merely because their lives are miserable but more 
importantly because of political reasons.”433 Obviously, the so-called “political reasons” 
in the report was a euphemism for “Soviet conspiracy” since China and the USSR still 
maintained mutual friendship at least nominally. This report set the tone for Beijing on 
not only why the mass exodus had occurred but also how to tackle it. 
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On April 21, the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Office sent a detailed report to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explaining why the “political reasons” were more crucial than 
the domestic ones and suggesting a solution. The Office claimed that much evidence 
proved that the USSR was the instigator of the incident: from the previous winter to the 
current spring, officials of Soviet consuls had been to Tacheng six times and met 4,743 
people there. The goal of these meetings, the report claimed, was merely to agitate people 
there to flee to the USSR. To better mobilize them, the report revealed that the Soviet 
consulate in Yili recently strengthened the leadership of the Association of the Soviet 
Nationals, the most important organization connecting the Soviet government to Soviet 
nationals in Yili; the Soviet consulate in Yili had appointed a local ethnic official to be 
the chairman.  
Soviet propaganda targeting the people in Xinjiang, after being halted during the 
Sino-Soviet honeymoon, was restored. In 1962, radio programs in both Kazakh and 
Uyghur were restarted, and some people claimed that they had heard that people in the 
USSR could have more private livestock and therefore a better life. Furthermore, local 
cadres from Tacheng found nice jobs after going back to the USSR. The Soviets were 
said to use materials beyond propaganda to agitate people. In recent months, people on 
the Chinese border had received many parcels, inside which there was a great deal of 
food, cloth, clothing, and so on. In 1961, the number of the parcels sent from the USSR to 
Tacheng reached 1,777. In the first season of 1962, 562 parcels reached Tacheng, 
weighing 4 tons, while the number of the parcels to Yili reached 2,519, weighing 20 tons. 
In the heavy anti-Soviet atmosphere, the sending of so many parcels and letters was 
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interpreted in the report as seducing people in Xinjiang to flee. Another way for the 
Soviets to mobilize people to flee, as the report revealed, was to settle Soviet nationals 
who were already back to the USSR but had broad social connections with people in 
Xinjiang on the Soviet side of the border. These people were used as agitators to induce 
people to flee. It was reported that some physical evidence had been found. When the 
mass exodus occurred, the barbed wire on the Soviet side of the border had been cut, 
leaving holes through which migrants could easily cross the border. To resettle the 
migrants on the Soviet side of the border, tents were placed for migrants to rest, and cars 
were ready to ferry them to their planned destinations.434  
This was the proof the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Office used to outline the crucial 
role of the Soviets in instigating the mass exodus. While some evidence was not baseless, 
however, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, other information was misleading. For example, 
skyrocketing parcel shipments to Tacheng and Yili in 1961 and 1962 were mainly the 
result of a shortage of daily necessities caused by the halt of Sino-Soviet trade rather than 
the USSR enticing immigrants. However, under the shadow of the anti-Soviet campaign, 
this information served a political purpose. If the mass exodus could not be halted 
immediately, the report predicted, the result would be serious. The same thing would 
happen in other regions of Xinjiang, such as Altay, Borotala, Kashgar. The mass exodus 
would sharpen the class conflicts, and those who were labeled by the CCP as enemies of 
the Revolution, such as landlords, rich farmers, anti-revolutionists, bad elements, rightists, 
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and especially the anti-revolutionary local nationalists, would cooperate with the 
Revisionists and even rebel.435  
To prevent this from happening, the Chinese government first required the Soviets 
to seal their border and repatriate the migrants. Since a Sino-Soviet alliance was 
nominally maintained and it was necessary for the CCP to avoid giving the Soviets any 
excuse to claim that it was the Chinese who were ruining the Sino-Soviet friendship, 
Beijing had to deal with this issue cautiously. Thus, on the one hand Beijing had to 
promote the Sino-Soviet friendship but merely blamed that the mass exodus was caused 
by the bed elements (huai fenzi¾^Ï) who aimed to ruin Sino-Soviet relations. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government claimed that anyone with legitimate reasons to go 
to the USSR could apply for permission from the Public Security Department. In 
Huocheng County, in order to halt border crossing, guards opened fire. To prevent the 
Soviets from labeling the mass exodus as a result of ethnic suppression in Xinjiang, the 
border guards and local cadres were informed not to halt border crossing forcibly, and 
especially to avoid employing any military means.436  
But on the other hand, Beijing decided to sternly fight against the 
“Revisionists.”437 To fulfill the requirements, the Xinjiang Foreign Affairs Office 
reported to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs what they planned to do diplomatically. The 
first step was gaining the initiative in diplomatic negotiations between the Chinese and 
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Soviet border stations (zhengqu bianfang jiaoshe de zhudong ǌʣʺ*ƵǤp). To 
achieve this, they would ask the Chinese border officials to approach their Soviet 
counterparts, not the other way around, asking them to repatriate the migrants who had 
crossed the border. The Soviets would still decline to follow the requirements from the 
Chinese side, but this guaranteed the Chinese government a favorable position. As a side 
effect, this might discourage people from fleeing as well. The second step was to collect 
whatever evidence was available for the upcoming Sino-Soviet diplomatic struggle. To 
serve this purpose, they would investigate what the Soviet consuls in Yili had done in 
Tacheng. To collect more visual evidence, they planned to photograph the cut barbed 
wire on the Soviet side of the border and the Soviet vehicles used to pick up border 
crossers. In addition, they were trying to catch those who were sent back by the Soviet 
government to work as “agitators.” Once caught, they would be repatriated through the 
border station to the Soviet government in order to be used as proof of the Soviet 
conspiracy. The most wanted people to serve this purpose would be legal Soviet nationals 
who participated in provoking people to flee. All this proof would be used to accuse the 
Soviet government in the upcoming diplomatic struggle.  
The drama of eradicating the Soviet presence in Xinjiang was following a script 
that was carefully written by Beijing. On April 23, the head of the checkpoint in Baktu on 
the Chinese side approached his counterpart on the Soviet side, asking the Soviets to help 
the Chinese government to chase the border crossers and repatriate them. The next day, 
Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in the Soviet ambassador to 
China and sent him the first memorandum, protesting that the Soviets not only opened the 
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border but resettled more than 20,000 border crossers rather than repatriating them, as 
prescribed under a previous agreement between these two governments. For the sake of 
Sino-Soviet friendship, Beijing required the Soviet government to change their border 
policy of accepting illegal immigrants and restore order on the borderland. The Soviet 
ambassador also submitted a memorandum to the Chinese side, admitting that around 
10,000 people did cross the border to the Soviet side and 6,000 crossed on April 22. They 
had failed in both halting the influx and successfully convincing them to return, as the 
Soviets claimed. Then, how to settle these helpless migrants became a headache for the 
Soviets. For the sake of Sino-Soviet friendship, the ambassador announced, the Soviet 
government believed that they should inform their Chinese counterpart about this as soon 
as possible.438 The Soviet government denied that they had accepted more than 20,000 
migrants by purpose but admitted that they had settled around 10,000 merely for 
humanitarian reasons.439 If China wanted to have these migrants back, the Soviets 
claimed, the only means the Soviet government would accept was for the Chinese 
government to send officials to the USSR to persuade the border crossers to return to 
China rather than staying in the USSR.440 Since the Soviets knew very well that no border 
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crossers would choose to return to China, promoting a peaceful rather than violent means 
to solve the dispute was a clear signal that the USSR would not repatriate the migrants 
but make them Soviet nationals.  
The protest from the Chinese government did not work out promptly. After the 
meeting with the Soviet ambassador, the regions from which people fled to the USSR 
extended from Tacheng to Emin, Yumin, and Huocheng.441 When the situation 
deteriorated even further, on April 27 Zhou Enlai held a conference on how to deal with 
the situation in Xinjiang.442 As a result of the conference, domestically the Xinjiang 
government was required to institute a plan to use bingtuan (Xinjiang Production and 
Construction Corps) to station border defense posts and restore social order in regions 
where the mass exodus was serious.443 Diplomatically, Beijing decided to exert more 
pressure on the Soviet side. On April 29, 1962, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of 
PRC called in the Soviet ambassador to China to work on the Xinjiang issue for a second 
time. The atmosphere was tense. During the meeting, the Soviet ambassador replied to 
the memorandum, but he merely repeated what he had already said on April 24. 
Instructed probably by Zhou Enlai, the Deputy Minister criticized the Soviet government 
for not answering the memorandum sincerely, and thus failed to satisfy the Chinese 
government’s concern. He further rebutted the Soviet side, claiming that the truth was not 
identical with what the Soviet side was suggesting. Not only had the Soviets not 
repatriated the illegal Chinese migrants to China, as international law required, but they 
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had been inviting and assisting people to come illegally all the time. The Chinese 
government claimed to have solid evidence of the Soviets cutting the barbed wire and 
shuttling, feeding, and accommodating border crossers. To make things worse, in order to 
prompt more people to flee, the Soviets had dispatched migrants back to Xinjiang, 
working as agitators. Beijing believed that mobilizing these people to cross the border 
and then resettling them in Soviet Central Asia was how the Soviets solved disputes on 
whether the ethnic minorities in the Three Districts were Soviets or Chinese by 
nationality.444 The second meeting between the Deputy Minister and the Soviet 
ambassador to China on April 29 was the first time Beijing publicly accused the Soviet 
government of not only accepting the migrants but also making the mass exodus in 
Tacheng and Yili happen. After a short period of tolerance and preparation, China had 
decided to turn hostile against their Soviet allay diplomatically on the Xinjiang issue. 
Thus, the diplomatic war to drive the Soviets out of Xinjiang was initiated.  
The diplomatic pressure was gradually applied. The Soviets were cautious and 
even declined to accept the immigrants who crossed the border after the second 
memorandum had been sent by the Chinese government. The Soviet consulates informed 
those who were eager to move to the USSR that they had to obtain official documents 
from the Chinese government before being accepted as Soviet nationals. As a result, the 
scope of the flight was diminishing promptly. For example, on May 8, the mass exodus in 
Tacheng was generally halted, though some crossing was still occurring in other regions 
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near the border.445 The change to the migration policy of the USSR might have helped to 
halt border crossing, but contributed greatly to the violent demonstration in Yili on May 
29, a campaign whose main purpose was asking the Chinese government to issue them 
legal permission to leave. In the eyes of the Chinese, the demonstration that later 
morphed into a violent riot was another piece of undeniable evidence for how the Soviet 
consulate in Yili stirred up people to rebel against Chinese authority.446 The social unrest 
was finally put down after the military wounded and killed many demonstrators. On May 
30, to avoid further enraging the Chinese government, the Soviets strengthened their 
border patrols and even sealed the border.447  
 
Abolishment of the Association of Soviet Nationals  
For the Chinese government, forcing the Soviets to seal the border was the first 
aim of the diplomatic struggle, while taking advantage of this chance to eradicate the 
Soviet presence permanently and forestall any Soviet intervention in the local affairs in 
Xinjiag was the ultimate goal. To achieve this, the first step was to close the associations 
of Soviet nationals (ASN), the main agency working as liaison between the Soviet 
consulates and the local people.448 On May 14, 1962, the central government ordered the 
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Party Committee of XUAZ to eradicate the Soviet presence in Xinjiang by two steps: 
abolish ASN and then gradually force the Soviets to withdraw their two consulates in Yili 
and Urumqi. 
The ASN in Xinjiang was established in 1946 right after the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the USSR changed its policy on their aliens abroad. According to the 
new policy, those who were living in Xinjiang, Shanghai, Tianjin, and other parts of 
China but used to be either the subjects of the Russian Empire or Soviet citizens but were 
deprived of their citizenship could resume it. So could their offspring. Therefore, Soviet 
consulates in Yili, Tacheng, and Altay set out to register and formalize the Soviet 
nationality of the Russians. After many Soviet nationals reclaimed their Soviet nationality, 
in order to strengthen the connections between the Soviet government and these people, 
from the end of 1946 to 1947, ASNs were gradually established in China nationwide, 
including in Yili, Tacheng, and Altay. Sub-associations were gradually established in 
counties and regions in the Three Districts.449 The most important ASN in Xinjiang was 
the association in Yili, the first ASN in China, established on January 1, 1946. Beside 
bridging the Soviet nationals in Xinjiang and their fatherland, the association in Yili 
served as propagandist for the USSR, ran Sino-Soviet commerce, engaged in agriculture 
and livestock farming in Xinjiang, served as an intelligence agency, and even provided 
judicial service. For example, when Sino-Soviet commerce was halted in the regions of 
Xinjiang controlled by the KMT, the Three Districts maintained active interactions 
commercially with the USSR. The association was the most active agent in promoting the 
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cross-border commerce.450 It also offered Russian educations for the local people by 
running several schools. The ASN had a council with a chairman and vice chairman and 
many staff members. The total number of those who were working for the association 
and for the schools reached as many as 972.451  
After the founding of the PRC, the Chinese government denied the legitimacy of 
any organizations of foreign nationals and abolished them gradually. But this was not the 
case with the ASN. Thanks to the Sino-Soviet alliance formed officially in 1950, ASNs 
were allowed to function, just not officially. To reserve the rights of abolishing ASNs in 
the future if they violated the interests of the CCP, and probably to avoid being criticized 
as a puppet regime of the USSR as well, the Chinese government adopted a “neither 
legitimize nor deny it” policy. The Soviet nationals in Xinjiang were located extensively, 
especially in the Three Districts. Therefore, the organizations of Soviet nationals in the 
1950s had braches in most counties in Yili, Tacheng, and Altay: the association of Yili 
had ten county branches, Tacheng had four, and Altay had three. With the extension of 
the network of the associations, many Soviet nationals were registered as members. For 
example, according to the survey, until 1954 the association of Yili had 27,095 people 
registered as their members, making up 73.7% of the total registered Soviet nationals in 
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Xinjiang. The survey also revealed that 54.14% of the members were ethnic Kazaks, 
20.23% were Russian, and 13.3% were Uyghur.452  
At the beginning, the association of Yili was administratively equal to its 
counterparts in Tacheng and Altay. In October 1955, after the founding of the Yili 
Kazakh Autonomous Prefecture (YKAP), the General Association of Soviet Nationals 
was established in YKAP, and the associations of Yili, Tacheng, and Altay and those at 
county level became its branches. The general association had twenty faculties, with a 
chairman, a secretary, an accountant, four typists, two translators, and eleven others.453  
What directly led these organizations to be abolished by the Chinese government 
was their service of issuing certificates of Soviet nationality to the local people. This task 
had been controlled by Soviet consulates in Xinjiang, but was assigned to the local ASNs 
after their founding. After the USSR decided to repatriate their nationals back in 1954, 
the most important task of the ASNs was “collecting, issuing, filling in, postponing and 
renewing the certificates of Soviet nationals.” To better serve their fellow Russians, all 
ASNs established offices and special groups to deal with the applications for reclaiming 
USSR citizenship, issuing documents for homecoming, and repatriating Soviet nationals. 
Since the background of the applicants was complicated and the qualification of a Soviet 
national was far from clear, ASNs had great flexibility to decide who should be issued the 
official certificates. This flexibility was later seen by the Chinese government as evidence 
of “issuing certificate illegally.” With the deterioration of both the economic situation in 
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Xinjiang and Sino-Soviet relations, more and more ethnic minorities were applying for 
Soviet citizenship and to leave Xinjiang for the USSR. With more people applying while 
the hands of the associations were relatively short, the process of investigation was rough, 
and some certificates were issued to applicants whose qualifications, from the perspective 
of the Chinese government, were problematic. The shortage of certificates also 
encouraged people to gain them either through social networks or from black market, 
which further convinced the Chinese government that the Soviet consulates had been 
registering more nationals than they should have through the ASNs.454 In 1959, three 
years before the mass exodus occurred, the Chinese authorities who were dissatisfied 
with the unending repatriation of Soviet nationals in Xinjiang started to warn the Soviet 
government by freezing the funds of the ASN in Yili.455 A year later, the government 
even detained an organizer of the association, accusing him of “illegally registering 
Soviet nationals in Yili.”456  
A catastrophe was about to come to the ASNs when the mass exodus occurred in 
1962 and the CCP believed that it was mainly a conspiracy of Soviet consulates with the 
ASNs serving as an accomplice. While abolishing the Soviet consulates might cause 
diplomatic conflicts, the Chinese government determined to abolish the ASNs for 
violating the national security of China as the initial step for at least two purposes: to “cut 
the left and right hands of the consulates” to prevent them from further agitating people 
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to flee and to obtain evidence of the consulates’ involvement in the mass exodus through 
interrogating members of the associations. 
On May 14, the association of Tacheng was forced to close.457 This was followed 
by the association of YKAP, which was informed by Chinese authorities to cease 
operations on May 21. By the end of May, the association and its seven branches in the 
YKAP were gradually shuttered.458 They were accused by the Chinese government of 
violating national security by issuing certificates to Soviet nationals illegally.459 Twelve 
people in the associations were arrested, including the chairman, two translators, the 
Principal of the Office of Repatriation of the Soviet Nationals, the accountant, and two 
other staff members in the General Association. The representatives of the associations at 
the county level such as those in Tacheng, Zhaosu, Wusu, and Turks were also arrested. 
According to the Chinese authority, seven of the twelve detainees were Soviet nationals, 
while five were Chinese by nationality. They were forced to confess their criminal 
behaviors and study the propaganda materials for anti-Soviet Revisionism such as the 
nice articles the CCP had produced for the Great Debate between China and the USSR 
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(jiupingɩ).460 By investigating these prisoners, the Chinese government claimed that 
they had discovered twenty “spies” in Xinjiang who were working for the Soviet 
consulate in Yili. One of them was the governor of YKAP, the local official who the 
Chinese government claimed to have been beaten by the angry crowd during the social 
unrest on May 29, 1962.461 The governor would be further victimized in the hands of the 
Chinese government as a “Soviet spy “ and the “head of an inside the CCP clique of 
running dogs of the Soviet Revisionists,” as the next chapter reveals. 
 
Withdrawal of Soviet Consulates 
The Soviet consulates in China had a long history. On 1851, the first year of 
Xianfeng rein, the Treaty of Commerce in Yili was signed. According to the treaty, the 
Qing court allowed the Russians to station consulates in Yili and Tarbaghatai. This was 
the beginning of the presence of Russian consulates in Xinjiang. In 1860, the tenth year 
of the Xianfeng rein, a renewed treaty between the Qing and Russia was signed, allowing 
Russians to expand their consulates to Kashgar. In 1881, the seventh year of the Guangxu 
rein, a new treaty was signed, offering the Russians the right to establish a consulate in 
one more place, Turpan. In 1887, the Russians proposed to establish a consulate in 
Urumqi, and in 1895 the Qing court finally allowed them to move the consulate in 
Turpan. After the October Revolution of 1917, Sino-Russian commerce was halted and 
Russian consulates in Xinjiang were closed. Because Xinjiang’s economy was 
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overwhelmingly dependent on Sino-Russian commerce, in 1922 Yang Zengxin, the semi-
independent governor of Xinjiang, and the Soviet government started to negotiate issues 
such as restoring Sino-Russian commerce and the reestablishment of Russian consulates 
in Xinjiang. In 1924, Xinjiang and the USSR reached an agreement that the Xinjiang 
government could base five consulates in Soviet Central Asia while the Soviets could 
establish consulates in five regions, Urumqi, Yili, Tacheng, Altay, and Kashgar. When 
Xinjiang was ruled by Jin Shuren, the successor of Yang Zengxin, the Treaty of Xinjiang-
Soviet Temporary Commerce was signed. This treaty further allowed the Soviet 
commercial organizations to be set in Xinjiang. The government under Sheng Shicai’s 
watch was a puppet regime of the Soviet Union since military and economic assistance 
from the USSR was the primary method for this region to maintain a semi-independent 
status. The Soviet presence was overwhelming until being eradicated after the split 
between Sheng and Stalin that had caused Sheng to decide to surrender to Chiang Kai-
shek.462 The Yining Incident in 1944 and the establishment of the Eastern Turkistan 
Republic as an aftermath was orchestrated by the USSR, with the Soviet consulate in Yili 
serving as headquarters. Since Xinjiang retained the status of “the sphere of Soviet 
influence” after the CCP took Xinjiang, the five Soviet consulates and three branches of 
Soviet commercial representatives remained.463 The consulates in Tacheng and Altay 
were closed in 1955 by the Soviet government, and in 1956 the consulate in Kashgar was 
also abolished. Thus, by early 1962, the USSR had two consulates remaining, in Yili and 
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Urumqi. Also remaining were a branch of commercial representatives in Urumqi and 
commercial staff in the ports of Horgos and Tuoyun.464  
The presence of the Soviet consulates and their affiliated organizations for the 
CCP was a double-edged sword. Through the Soviets who were performing the real 
leadership in the Three Districts, after 1949 the CCP could easily penetrate the vast 
region, especially the three independent districts with an anti-Chinese government. 
Furthermore, at least from the Yang Zengxin era, Xinjiang’s economy had been heavily 
dependent on the USSR. With the facilitation of the Soviet consulates and other 
organizations, the CCP government could restore the social order and make the station of 
the PLA in Xinjiang possible economically. However, the presence of a foreign state in 
China was also a source of shame for Mao Zedong, who later accused Stalin of not 
treating the CCP equally but regarding the USSR-Chinese relationship as that of father 
and son.465 Furthermore, the “leaning to one side” policy and the Soviet presence in both 
Xinjiang and Manchuria made people believe that the Chinese Communist government 
was merely a puppet regime of the USSR, an image that embarrassed the CCP’s claim as 
nationalist. The three Sino-Soviet corporations in Xinjiang were also regarded by Chinese 
elites as evidence of China being exploited by the Soviets, even after Mao claimed that 
“the Chinese people have stood up.”466 Historically, foreign consulates in China were 
regarded as a national humility, just as Mao Zedong declared that “the history of modern 
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China is a history of imperialist aggression.”467 Right after the CCP came to power and 
well before the outbreak of the Korean War, as shown by Beverley Hooper, strong 
pressure was exerted on most aspects of the Western presence.468 The Soviet presence 
was almost the only foreign power that remained. Right before the CCP took China, 
Stalin had already asked Mao to eradicate foreign nationals except Russians in both 
Xinjiang and northeast China, making these two regions Soviet spheres of influence. To 
gain more Soviet support for the new government, Mao had to acquiesce or risk losing 
the support of the mass who were eager for national independence. Though what the CCP 
gained by maintaining the Soviet presence in Xinjiang and northeast China was enormous 
in many ways, including political consolidation, economic rehabilitation, and social 
stability, Mao still felt humiliated.469 At the local level, Han military officers in Yili also 
felt that they were bossed around by the foreign Soviets.470 When the Sino-Soviet alliance 
was fruitful, Mao and his comrades tried to tolerate the Soviet presence even when 
frictions between these two states had occurred. When the relations between the states 
started to deteriorate at the end of 1958, the Soviet presence transformed from a symbol 
of Sino-Soviet friendship into an eyesore that should be eradicated as early as possible. 
When the mass exodus occurred and the ASNs and Soviet consulates were regarded as 
agitators behind the scenes, the CCP finally determined to force the Soviet government to 
withdraw.  
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To exert diplomatic pressure on the Soviet government, the Chinese side had to 
provide solid proof, prosecuting how the Soviet organizations had been engaged in some 
activities that were harmful to the government and the people of China. On April 29, 
1962, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs instructed the diplomatic office in Xinjiang to 
cooperate with other departments to collect evidence of illegal behavior conducted by 
either the Soviet consulates or the ASNs and report them to Beijing promptly.471 To 
facilitate the work, on May 18 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Public 
Security together sent to Xinjiang a working team, which was required to spend three 
weeks there collecting at least twenty pieces of evidence of the illegal activities in which 
the Soviet consulates had been engaged.472 To support the working team from Beijing, 
the local government established a Special Case Office, which was further divided into 
teams covering investigation, interrogation, evidence, foreign aliens, and materials. 
Because it was hard to find out the “illegal” activities undertaken by the consulate in 
Urumqi, they decided to first target the consulate in Yili.473  
The demonstration that occurred on May 29 in Yili contributed greatly to 
fulfilling the task of obtaining “proof.” The Chinese government seized the opportunity 
to accuse the Soviet consulate in Yili of instigating people to confront the local 
government with violence and even take advantage of the unrest to rob the Chinese 
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government of their secret official documents to serve as intelligence for the Soviet 
government.474  
The process of evidence collecting was nothing but the end justifying the means. 
For example, in order to suppress the demonstration, the CCP Committee of XUAR sent 
militiamen equipped with weapons to the spot. The cars with militiamen were stopped by 
the demonstrators; a car carrying an injured militiaman and a gun were captured. It seems 
that the demonstrators were surprised with the military force the local CCP committee 
had applied; they decided to show the Soviet consuls how badly the Chinese government 
had treated them. They drove the car to the consulate and parked it in front of the door. 
The car later was used by the Chinese government as “solid evidence” of the Soviet 
consulate serving as the headquarters for agitating ethnic minorities to confront the 
Chinese government. For several days, the Chinese government intentionally sent people 
one after another to take photos of the car, which, as noted by a local cadre, made the 
Soviets feel “embarrassed” and “hard to vindicate themselves.”475  
By June 25, the working team reported that they had already collected fifty pieces 
of evidence on five aspects. First, the Soviet consulates in Urumqi and Yili had issued 
Soviet passports among the Chinese illegally. Second, these consulates had registered 
Chinese ethnic minorities as Soviet nationals illegally. Third, their attitudes on the 
Chinese local officials and cadres were rude. Fourth, they incited the people on the 
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Chinese side of the border to flee. Fifth, the ASNs, directly under the leadership of the 
Soviet consulates, were performing illegal activities. It seems that the evidence the 
working team had collected barely satisfied Beijing, because they were asked to dig even 
further to collect hidden information, such as how the Soviet consulates provoked ethnic 
relations in Xinjiang and the activities of spreading their anti-CCP views among the local 
people.476 What the working team had collected was used by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to attack the Soviets, although the Soviet side claimed that China’s conclusion did 
“not fit the facts.”477  
To force the Soviet consulates to withdraw, the first step of the Chinese 
government was to close the ASNs, as discussed above. After all the associations in the 
Three Districts were abolished, the Chinese government then limited the activities of the 
consulates to prevent them from gaining access to the indigenous people in the name of 
“protecting their personal security.” On May 26 and May 28, the Office of Foreign 
Affairs in Urumqi and Yili separately informed the two Soviet consulates of the 
limitations to their activities. First, for the sake of the security of the consulate staff, they 
were not allowed to leave the cities where they were located. This restriction would be 
cancelled, the Chinese authority claimed, depending on how things went. Second, the 
consulate staff members were not allowed to work with the local people. Third, workers 
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at the consulates were not allowed to contact local ethnic officials directly even when 
they had business to conduct. The consulates had to contact the local government through 
the Office of Foreign Affairs.478 These restrictions kept the staff of the consulates from 
functioning as they usually did, as if under house arrest, and led to serious conflicts 
between the local government and the staff of the Soviet consulate.  
On the afternoon of May 29, the secretary of the Soviet consulate in Yili called 
the Office of Foreign Affairs in Yili, asking for permission to leave the city on May 30. 
The reply stated, “I will respond to the question you have raised after reporting it to my 
superior leader.” This was the day the social unrest occurred. On the morning of May 30, 
after failing to obtain a response and probably believing that the Chinese government 
delayed his application on purpose, the secretary left for the USSR. When he returned to 
Xinjiang in the afternoon the same day, his car was stopped. He was required by the 
checkpoint staff on the Chinese side to go through the security check that was usually 
waived for diplomats. The secretary reacted by refusing to be checked and rebuking the 
security guards; he even tried to break the checkpoint. The conflict ended up only after 
the car being forced to stopped and inspected as a way to exert more pressure on the 
Soviet consulates.479  
To exert more pressure on the Soviet side, the head of the Office of Foreign 
Affairs met the Soviet consul in Yili, protesting strongly against the behavior of the 
secretary. The head claimed that the secretary left the city for the USSR with the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
478 “Yili jiancha Sulingguan qiche jingguo de baogao” 6ǑƖƄɓ˒˘ƧʉțʝǤ¸ [Report of the Yili 
Local Government on Passing of the Soviet Embassy’s Cars], AMFA File No. 118-01082-04; “Yi-Ta 
shijian zhenxiang,” AYKAP, File No. 11-1-114. 
479 “Qingbao Sulingguan jiancha qiche qingkuang” ɯ¸ɓ˒˘ƖƄƧʉħƬ [Request to Report on the 
Soviet Embassy’s Checking of Their Cars], AMFA File No. 118-01082-04. 
!194  
permission of the local Chinese government. His behavior violated the rule of the local 
government. Furthermore, at the time Yili was under martial law. It was the order of the 
local government that the checkpoint guards inspect all cars entering Yili, including that 
of the secretary. The secretary not only refused to have his car inspected but also insulted 
the guards as “bandits.” The head further emphasized that the Chinese side was very 
angry with the secretary’s behavior, which violated the local order.480 On June 19 the 
Soviet ambassador protested orally that the secretary was treated illegally by the local 
government in Yili by offering the story from the side of the secretary. Rather than 
reaching a compromise, the Chinese government sent a note to the Soviets, refuting their 
interpretation word by word.481  
With the house arrest decreed by the Chinese government, the consulates in 
Xinjiang could barely function at all. To avoid any further conflicts, on June 15 the 
general consulate in Urumqi informed the Chinese government that they decided to 
withdraw. On June 18 the one in Yili planned to withdraw as well.482 To make sure the 
Soviet consulates withdrew as soon as possible, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Public Security ordered the Office of Foreign Affairs in Urumqi that their 
main task was to force the Soviet consulates to complete their work and leave 
expeditiously. They believed that the longer the consulates stayed in Xinjiang, the worse 
the situation would become. For example, when the Office of Foreign Affairs in Urumqi 
asked if they should let the Soviet consulates complete all paperwork for those who had 
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decided to either leave for the USSR or surrender their Soviet nationality and stay in 
China before withdrawing, Beijing replied that letting them leave promptly was more 
urgent than anything else. For the paperwork, Beijing informed Urumqi to let them do as 
much as they could before leaving. Otherwise it could be used as an excuse for the 
Soviets to decline leaving. Since the staff of the Soviet consulates were meeting people in 
Xinjiang every day, the CCP believed that it was very much possible that they were 
instigating people to rebel again. Therefore, the most urgent thing the local government 
should do was to promote their departure.483 On July 8 and August 16, the consulates in 
Urumqi and Yili finally withdrew.484  
The Soviet organs for Xinjiang-Soviet trade was also facing diplomatic pressure 
to withdraw. According to the order from Prime Minister Zhou Enlai, when forcing the 
Soviet consulates to withdraw, the same thing should be done with the Branch of the 
Soviet Commerce Representatives (ɓȵ¥q0ʍ^ɔǘ) in Urumqi and permanent port 
commerce staff (÷¥q¡) stationed in the ports of Horgos and Tuoyun.485 To exert 
more diplomatic pressure on the Soviet side, on August 30 deputy minister of the 
Ministry of Diplomatic Affairs convened the Soviet diplomat, handing over a note to him. 
It was the first time on a diplomatic occasion that the Chinese government claimed the 
Soviets were responsible for the mass exodus and the Yili riot on May 29. The Chinese 
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government also raised two reasons to force the Soviet counterpart to withdraw the 
commerce organs. One was that since the commerce between two countries was merely 
through the central governments, while the scale of the trade between Xinjiang and the 
USSR was small and the goods could be shipped directly to the port of the other side, 
there was no need to have any organs in Xinjiang. The other was that the Chinese 
government had no organ or any permanent commerce staff in the USSR, so it was 
unnecessary for the Soviets to have such an organ in China. They should be moved, 
suggested the Chinese, either to Beijing or to the ports on the Soviet side.486 On 
September 26, the Soviets informed the Foreign Trade Bureau in XUAZ that they had 
closed the commerce organ in Urumqi and that all staff planned to withdraw on October 
11.487  
 
As the “Soviet sphere of influence” that had been proved by the Chinese 
government, the Soviet consulates, associations of Soviet nationals, and commerce 
organs were the official organizations that made the Soviet influence in Xinjiang possible. 
For a century, Russian and Soviet consulates and their affiliated organizations penetrated 
this Muslim borderland in nearly every way, forcing the local power to maintain good 
relations with Russia or merely serving as a puppet regime of the Soviets. The Chinese 
Communist power was no exception. The withdrawal of the Soviet organizations was 
regarded by the CCP as a “big victory” in terms of national independence. First, after the 
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departure of the “troublemaker,” the Chinese government believed that social order 
would be restored. Second, without the presence of the “big brother,” the CCP could 
exert its power independently on the region that had been dominated by the Russians for 
a century. Thus, the administrative withdrawal of the USSR would pave the way for the 
CCP to further eradicate the symbolic Soviet presence in the Three Districts, tighten 
border controls, and catch the possible Soviet cooperators and spies in Xinjiang, which 
will be discussed in the chapters to come.488 
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CHAPTER 5 
BORDER DEFENSES!
 
Now the Bingtuan is like an iron wall; 
The border shall not move eastward e’ermore.  

——Poem by a member of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps 
 
Border Defense Before 1949 
After the conquest of Xinjiang, the Qing empire used several measures to control 
the northwestern borderlands neighboring on vassal states such as Kazak, Bulut, and 
Khoqand. The measures the court adopted were as follows: building defensive cities and 
stationing military garrisons, installing pickets, and regularly patrolling the border. Since 
most peoples of the vassal states were nomads, for the purpose of herding, these people 
occasionally entered the Qing territory without permission. Therefore, the primary aim of 
the regular border patrols, as Song Yun noted, was to “nominally check the border while 
in essence checking the nomads.”489 In other words, the main purpose for controlling the 
borders was to prevent the herders, most of them ethnic Kazaks, from crossing the 
borderline. As local military leaders discovered, wherever the border troops went, 
nomads who had entered the Qing territory without legal permission would either elude 
them or leave to escape punishment. Order was thus in effect restored along the border 
after patrolling. Regular border patrols therefore served as the primary method of 
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strengthening control of the border.490 After the Russians penetrated the Kazak steppes, 
the former Qing vassal states were gradually transformed into Russian colonies, creating 
a border between Xinjiang and Russia, and shifting the purpose of border defenses from 
“defense against the barbarians” to “defense against the foreigners.” With the weakening 
of the Qing government, it was militarily and materially impossible for the troops to 
continue regularly patrolling the borders. The primary method for controlling the border 
on the Qing side was therefore downgraded to patrols by no more than 70 pickets in the 
Yili region.491 Later, the Qing court had to accept the picket line as the Russo-Chinese 
borderline in Central Asia. Although the Qing court’s scope of control had shrunk, the 
purpose for patrolling remained the same: to prevent the Kazaks, now Russian subjects, 
from entering Qing territories. 
After the collapse of the Qing regime, Xinjiang was ruled first by Yang Zenxin 
from 1912 to 1928; Jin Shuren then succeeded in the regime, until he was forced to step 
down in 1933. To maintain de facto independence, both Yang and Jin adopted a 
pragmatic approach toward both the Chinese and Soviet governments. Toward the 
Chinese government, the Xinjiang government adopted an attitude known as 
“acknowledging the temple but not the god.”492  The Xinjiang government recognized 
that Xinjiang was part of the Chinese territories and that the Chinese government was the 
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central government, regardless of its leader. However, the Xinjiang government also 
maintained de facto independence, since the powers of the central government could not 
penetrate the local affairs of Xinjiang. Toward the Soviet government, the Xinjiang 
government maintained a policy that Jin Shuren termed “neither close nor distant.” As Jin 
noted, on the one hand, Xinjiang had to maintain friendly relations with the USSR. The 
Xinjiang government had once depended heavily on subsidies from other provinces 
during the Qing era. With the collapse of the Qing regime, the subsidies for Xinjiang 
dried up, and customs duties from Xinjiang-Soviet trade became the main financial 
source for the operations of the Xinjiang government. Without the trade between 
Xinjiang and the Soviets, the Xinjiang government would be too impoverished to 
continue operating. Furthermore, commerce between Xinjiang and the USSR could 
develop the local economy and greatly benefit the indigenous people. However, both 
Yang and Jin felt that Xinjiang should keep its distance from the USSR in certain ways. 
Otherwise, as both Yang and Jin believed, the USSR would intervene in the domestic 
affairs of Xinjiang and might even annex the region. Furthermore, by distancing the 
Soviets, the Xinjiang government could avoid criticism of being “Sovietized.”493 
Both Yang and Jin adopted a policy of isolationism, keeping Xinjiang away both 
from Russia/USSR and from China proper. In the eastern region of Xinjiang bordering on 
China proper, troops were stationed in the city of Hami near the border with Gansu, to 
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supervise entry into the region. Secret agents were employed to spy on suspicious figures 
entering Xinjiang. 
On the western side of Xinjiang, Yang and Jin resumed the methods formerly 
used by Qing government to defend the border. The pickets established during the Qing 
era were preserved, and a number of new checkpoints were established to strengthen the 
border. In the Tacheng area, after the Sino-Russian border was defined, several pickets 
fell into Russian territories. The Xinjiang government built several border checkpoints in 
Jeminay, Baketu, and the Ba’erluke Mountain area. More than ten border checkpoints 
were built in Yili, to make up for the loss of pickets after the demarcation of the Sino-
Russian border. Troops were stationed at all the checkpoints, and some of them played a 
significant role in keeping Russian refugees out.494  
After Sheng Shicai came to power in 1933, the border policy changed 
dramatically. Supported financially and militarily by the Soviets, with hardly any 
connections to the Nanjing government,495 Xinjiang nominally remained a part of China, 
but in fact was gradually being transformed into a satellite state of the USSR. In 1936, 
after Sheng’s government promulgated the “Six Great Policies,” the twin policies of 
“anti-imperialism” and “kinship to Soviet Russia” became the building blocks of the 
Xinjiang regime.496 As Sheng Shicai later confessed, while the policy of “anti-
imperialism” was designed to exclude rival influences by other great powers such as the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
494 Song Jiaren Øß- ed., Yili Hasake zizhizhou zhi6Ǒ ɒLȾƫù  [A survey of Ili Kazakh 
Autonomous Prefecture] (Urumpqi: Xinjiang renmin chubanshe, 2004), p. 384. 
495 Sheng Shiji, Jiang Jieshi de fengjiang dali, p. 91. 
496 Du Zhongyuan ſʫʠ, Sheng Shicai yu xin Xinjiang ǥ8ɀŠŠǢ [Sheng Shicai and a new Xinjiang] 
(Guangzhou: Shenghuo shudian, 1938), pp. 73–74.  
!202  
British and the Japanese, the reverse side of the coin was a “pro-Soviet” orientation.497 
With the USSR as the only legitimate foreign power in the region, Xinjiang’s status as a 
Soviet satellite was made official. In 1938, Sheng’s application to join the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was finally accepted by Stalin and Sheng’s 
relationship with Stalin accordingly shifted from diplomatic ties to a relationship between 
superior and subordinate.498 Although Sheng still held the position of governor, the de 
facto power in Xinjiang was Stalin’s man, the Soviet Consul General in Urumqi, who 
required Sheng to consult with him on any decisions.499 As a result, Xinjiang’s defenses 
were no longer independent, but rather were subsumed by the national defenses of the 
USSR.500 Xinjiang’s border defenses, which once served the region itself under the rule 
of Yang and Jin, shifted toward primarily serving the national interests of the USSR. 
Sheng established several checkpoints on the Xinjiang-Mongolian border, but on the 
Xinjiang-Soviet border, only three teams of cavalry remained in the Yili region, which 
were soon disbanded.501 Thus, during the honeymoon period between Sheng Shicai and 
Stalin, the Xinjiang-Soviet border was only loosely controlled, while the border between 
Xinjiang and China proper was tightly defended by Soviet troops.   
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From January 1938 to 1943, the Eighth Regiment of the Soviet Red Army and the 
First Detachment of the Soviet Air Force were stationed at the strategic oasis of Hami.502 
The USSR’s military presence in Hami was soon publicized, and the Eighth Regiment of 
the Red Army was renamed as the Eighth Soviet Cavalry Regiment of the Xinjiang 
Frontier Force.503 As revealed by Andrew Forbes, the Soviet garrisons in Hami could 
serve multiple purposes: to pre-empt a possible Japanese thrust into Xinjiang; to limit and 
even completely preclude Nanjing’s influence in this region; to prevent further incursions 
by the Hui warlords; and to suppress further rebellions by the indigenous Muslim peoples 
of Xinjiang against the rule of Sheng, a Han Chinese dictator.504 While scholars regard 
the stationing of the Soviet troops in Hami as evidence of Soviet aggression,505 the 
Xinjiang government actually benefited greatly from the Soviet presence, at least when 
Sheng first came to power: the troops not only blocked the Ma clan of Muslim warlords 
(Sheng’s chief military opponents) from entering Xinjiang, but prevented the obstruction 
of the main truck road between Xinjiang and China proper.506 
To better control Xinjiang, in 1936, an institution for collecting military 
information called the Border Affairs Department was established. The institution’s 
establishment was suggested by the Soviets: it was controlled by the Soviet advisors in 
Xinjiang, and functioned in the fashion of the KGB. Through the Border Affairs 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
502 Sheng Shiji, Jiang Jieshi de fengjiang dali, pp. 105–06. 
503 Xu Zhi ĜŮ, “Sujun zhu Hami de pianduan huiyi ” ɓʊ˛ áǤǎƝ¬Į [Fragmentary memories on 
the Soviet army in Hami], in Li JiaguŽªɺ ed., Zhong Su guojia guanxishi ziliao huibian, 1933–1945 
ɓ­ßʸ=ɾŝwȟ 1933–1945 [Collection of primary sources on China-USSR foreign relations, 1933–
1945] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1997), p. 398. 
504 Andrew D. W. Forbes, Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia, p. 145. 
505 Ibid. 
506 Sheng Shiji, Jiang Jieshi de fengjiang dali, p. 106. 
!204  
Department, Xinjiang could collect all kinds of information on neighboring states and 
China proper.507 Furthermore, with the aid of the Soviet military advisors, Sheng also 
established border checkpoint troops to inspect travelers and goods.508 
Xinjiang’s defenses were not reoriented until Sheng Shicai decided in 1942 to 
break with Stain and realign himself with Chiang Kai-shek.  Prior to 1942, hardly any 
border patrol troops were stationed on the Xinjiang-Soviet border. Yili had at one point 
had three small garrisons of border patrol troops, but these had been withdrawn in 1940. 
As Sheng’s relationship with the USSR worsened, he stationed a thousand soldiers on the 
border.509 As Xinjiang shifted away from the status of a satellite state, the military 
presence of the USSR became a sore spot for Sheng’s government.  On October 5, 1942, 
Sheng sent a memorandum to the Soviet government through the consul general in 
Urumqi, demanding the general withdrawal of the Soviet military from Hami.510 To push 
the Soviets out, Sheng systematically initiated and organized anti-Soviet activities, such 
as arrests of Soviet nationals in Xinjiang on a massive scale by local governments. Even 
the Soviet Ambassador to China was treated rudely in Yili, though he had twice informed 
the policemen of his identity.511  The KMT troops entered Xinjiang in January 1943, and 
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the Soviet troops finally retreated in November 1943, along with the Soviet specialists 
and advisors. As the conflicts between Xinjiang and the USSR intensified, Sheng ordered 
that several checkpoints be removed, and sealed the Sino-Xinjiang border.512 
After Sheng was ousted as governor of Xinjiang, his successor Wu Zongxin 
replaced the Border Affairs Department with institutions such as “Xinjiang Security 
Command,” and dispatched the KMT’s so-called “security troops” to patrol the Xinjiang-
Soviet border, without any involvement by Soviet military advisors.513 With the sealing 
of the border, trade between Xinjiang and Soviet Central Asia halted, which was a major 
economic blow to the region.514  Sheng’s successor tried to open Xinjiang’s border to the 
USSR to relieve the economic pressure faced by Xinjiang. However, an ethnic rebellion 
mobilized and supported by the USSR occurred in Yili two months later, in what was 
later called the Yining Rebellion. Due to Sheng’s betrayal and the stationing of the KMT 
army, the Soviets felt that this region was no longer a buffer zone, and urgently sought to 
establish another Soviet puppet government in Xinjiang.515 They turned to the Muslims 
who had been dissatisfied with the Han rule and promised to help them establish a new 
Eastern Turkistan Republic with Muslim self-rule.516 Equipped with Soviet weapons and 
led by Soviet military commanders, the ethnic army soon occupied Yili, Tacheng and 
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Altay. As a result, the KMT troops stationed on the border, particularly those in the Three 
Districts, either were killed or retreated.517 The KMT thus totally lost control of border 
defenses on the Sino-Soviet border.  
On November 12, 1944, the interim government of the Eastern Turkistan 
Republic was founded.518 The three rebel districts of Yili, Tacheng and Altay served as 
the foundation of the newborn Republic, while the other seven districts of Xinjiang 
remained under the rule of the KMT.  The Nationalist Army was founded several months 
later in 1945, composed of around 14,000 ethnic soldiers. With a significant number of 
high-ranking military officers who were either trained and dispatched by Moscow, or 
were of Soviet nationality,519 the Nationalist Army was completely subject to the 
manipulations of the USSR. On June 6, 1946, under orders by the Soviet Union, the 
government of the Eastern Turkistan Republic finally reached a peace agreement with the 
KMT after eight months of negotiations. The Three Districts of Yili, Tacheng and Altay 
became a “special zone,” maintaining de facto independence from the rest of Xinjiang.520 
To prevent KMT influence in the other seven districts from penetrating the “special zone,” 
the border defenses maintained by the Nationalist Army of the Eastern Turkistan 
Republic first and foremost targeted the seven districts in which the KMT army was 
stationed. In contrast, the borders between the Eastern Turkistan Republic and the USSR 
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became blurred as the Three Districts merged into Soviet Central Asia. No defenses were 
stationed on the Xinjiang side of the border.521 
The frontiers inherited by the CCP in Xinjiang after its takeover in 1949 were thus 
far from those of a nation-state: no border defenses existed on the Chinese side of the 
frontier bordering with the Soviet Union. As the boundary between the Three Districts 
and Soviet Central Asia blurred, the distinction between the Three Districts as the 
Muslim “special zone” and the remaining seven districts governed by the Han-Chinese 
still remained.  
 
No Need to Defend the Border 
After occupying Xinjiang in late 1949, the Chinese side gradually established 
border defenses on the Sino-Soviet border. In the 1950s, the Xinjiang-Soviet border had 
seven checkpoints, frontier stations, and sentry posts, to inspect goods and people and 
patrol the border. The patrolling methods available to the border guards were primitive: 
either by foot or on horseback. The frontier guards were first dispatched by the Ministry 
of Public Security and the Public Security troops of the Beijing PLA. From 1957 on, the 
mission of border defense was assigned to the Military Subarea of Xinjiang, with border 
institutions and guards falling under the administration of the Military Subarea.522 
However, the Chinese side of the Xinjiang-Soviet border remained porous. The border 
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between Xinjiang and the USSR was 3,084 kilometers long,523 and it could not possibly 
be controlled merely by seven border checkpoints and a limited amount of border guards. 
However, this was not an urgent problem for the CCP at that time, if it was a problem at 
all, because the USSR was the CCP’s closest ally, and the two states had no border 
conflicts during that period. The urgent sovereignty issue for the CCP was how to 
reintegrate the Three Districts where the former Eastern Turkistan Republic was based 
into the rest of Xinjiang, so that the region as a whole could be reunified with China 
proper. Another concern was building a railway within five or seven years, to connect 
China proper with the chief cities of Xinjiang and even Soviet Central Asia.524 For the 
CCP, the presence of the USSR in Xinjiang was a blessing with respect to achieving 
these goals. The crucial aid from the Soviets to support the CCP’s occupation of Xinjiang 
convinced the Chinese that it was unnecessary to station defensive troops on the Chinese 
side of the Xinjiang-Soviet border, since the Soviet border troops could work on behalf of 
both countries. The Three Districts bordered the USSR for a stretch of 2,000 kilometers, 
but the Chinese side had only two border-control stations and one checkpoint along the 
entire length, thus the Chinese government only exercised actual control over about 300 
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kilometers. Furthermore, the Chinese border guards only patrolled about 30% of the 
border area every few days, and some areas were not even accessible.525   
The officially forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance in the 1950s tended to 
discourage the Chinese state from strengthening the border, both diplomatically and 
ideologically. As mentioned above, since the Soviet Union was a close ally, the CCP felt 
it was not necessary to defend the Chinese side of the border against the USSR. 
Ideologically, Marxist-Leninist doctrine holds that once human beings reach “a high state 
of development of communism,” “the complete withering away of the state” occurs.526 
Based on this theory, Khrushchev once told Liu Xiao, the Chinese Ambassador to the 
USSR, that it was meaningless for socialist states like the USSR and PRC to engage in 
any border conflicts. He claimed: “For communists, borders are something merely 
temporary. In a communist society, borders will perish once and for all. Whoever does 
not know this is not qualified to be a Marxist.”527 Both the Soviet Union and China 
claimed that the Sino-Soviet border was merely nominal. Both announced that the sole 
reason for a border between the two great fraternal socialist countries was to avoid 
providing imperialists with an opportunity to suggest that China had lost its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity, which would give the West an excuse to engage in a global war 
of aggression. Neither the Chinese nor the Soviet border guards were defending against 
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each other, but rather against imperialism. Both sides were to work together in cracking 
down on the activities of spies and secret agents dispatched by the imperialists, so as to 
coordinate closely in protecting the common interests and security of the people of their 
two countries.528 Given that the nominal border was believed to be a symbol of Sino-
Soviet friendship, the Chinese side was dissuaded from strengthening the border until the 
relations worsened. Geographically, the border was also not easy to defend. It was 
ambiguous, without natural boundaries such as rivers, waterfalls, mountains, or boundary 
stones.529 Being economically and technically impotent, the CCP was not able to 
effectively control the long border.  
Thus, it could be argued that, during the 1950s and early 1960s, the Sino-Soviet 
border was essentially “a frontier without a clear border and a boundary without defenses,” 
a phrase which appeared frequently in reports by local officials. The border was 
essentially porous due to the loose control on the Chinese side. The Soviet side was more 
strictly controlled in comparison,530 though not as strictly as the Soviet borders 
neighboring with Europe.531 Soviet diplomats later confessed that only one hundred 
border guards had been stationed to patrol the long Sino-Soviet border.532 
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Without strict border defenses, border crossings were frequent, especially from 
the Chinese side to the Soviet side. People in Xinjiang, most of whom led a nomadic life, 
often herded, hunted, collected firewood, or gathered antelope horns on both sides of the 
border on a daily basis. They were also able to visit their friends and relatives or seek 
jobs on the other side of the border without applying for any official documents. There 
was some crime involved. Taking advantage of the price differential, some smuggled 
goods such as gold and antelope horns from one side to the other. People imprisoned by 
the Chinese government sometimes crossed the border to escape punishment. 533 Most 
indigenous people in the region had no sense of the authoritativeness of borders, and the 
loosely controlled border did not evoke a sense of inviolability.  Furthermore, some areas 
of the borderland did not even have any signs to remind people where the borders fell.534 
Between 1954 and 1957, according to government reports, dozens to hundreds of people 
from China crossed the eastern and western sections of the Sino-Soviet border each 
year.535 
Before 1962, both sides of the border normally dealt with illegal border crossers 
by blocking entry. If the migrants had already crossed the border, border-control stations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
ƨąǸɮɪȓʰˮ ʸŢŠǢʣ»°xìŚƠŤñƠÁĻʗęɓȵ#Ǥ*Ƶ [Memo of the vice minister Zhang 
Hanfu meeting the Soviet consul Stepan Chhervonenko, on how to deal with many ethnic groups in 
Xinjiang who escaped to the Soviet Union], AMFA, File No. 118-01764-05. 
533 “Yili Hasake zizhizhou renmin weiyuanhui guanyu bianjiang gongzuo de zhishi,” AYKAP, File No. 11-
1-57; AXUAR, File No. 118-002940-01. 
534 “Yili Hasake zizhizhou renmin weiyuanhui guanyu bianjiang gongzuo de zhishi,” AYKAP, File No. 11-
1-57. 
535 Heilongjiang Provincial Archives, File No. 34-3-257. 
!212  
would contact their counterparts on the other side and repatriate them.536 This gradually 
became a normal method for the two socialist states to deal with illegal border crossing.    
Although border-crossing activities in Xinjiang had a long history, predating the 
party-state, the forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance during the Cold War in the 1950s 
tended to encourage these activities. As the USSR provided China with massive material 
aid and human resources, during the 1950s, the Chinese government initiated a series of 
mass campaigns nation-wide to motivate people to learn from the Soviet Union. Some 
indigenous people were so enamored of the Soviet Union that they crossed border simply 
to satisfy their curiosity about what the USSR looked like.537 When caught, they refused 
to take it seriously, saying, “The USSR is our big brother. It is fine to take something and 
eat something of our brother’s.”538 Despite being caught multiple times, some made no 
efforts to change their behavior.539 
To solve the problems caused by border crossings, as early as 1950, the Soviet 
Commander of Border Defenses suggested that the Chinese government establish a 
“border committee” to mediate the daily disputes.540 In 1952, Beijing respectively 
established a “Foreign Affairs Branch” in Yili, Tacheng, and Altay. Following the 
withdrawal of the Soviet consulates in Tacheng and Altay in 1955, the “Yili Bureau of 
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Foreign Affairs” was established to handle diplomatic issues with the USSR in the Three 
Districts.541 One aspect of the work of these organs was to handle the disputes caused by 
the porous border. Yet regardless of what occurred on the border, both sides held that the 
principle for mediating disputes was to “strengthen the Sino-Soviet friendship,”542 
promoting cooperation between the Chinese and the Soviets.  
Though internationalism superseded nationalism in some ways in the matter of 
the Sino-Soviet borders, this does not necessarily mean that the governments allowed 
people to cross the border without any official permission.  On the contrary, the frequent 
“illegal” border-crossing activities made both states worry that the capitalist states would 
take advantage of this loophole to send agents to disrupt social order. Furthermore, the 
Chinese government believed that the capitalists had being using whatever methods 
available to spy along the Sino-Soviet border. Official documents presented several 
pieces of evidence to prove how dangerous the capitalists were. In the spring of 1956, an 
unmarked airplane was spotted in the sky above the Sino-Soviet border. It was believed 
to be quite possible that the plane had airlifted several spies to the border, since some 
tracks were found. The local authorities also claimed that on June 28, 1957, several 
balloons were spotted in the sky near the Sino-Soviet border. These balloons, the Chinese 
authorities claimed, were sent by the American government to collect information. Five 
of them flew into Soviet territory and landed there. One of the balloons was found to be 
carrying spying equipment. A balloon similar to that seen in the USSR was also found in 
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a border city in Huocheng County.543 It was clear that frequent border crossings by the 
local people made the work of spy hunting difficult. To restore order along the border, 
the local government decided to launch a campaign to develop rules-consciousness 
among the people. The propaganda materials used several analogies to help local people 
to understand why borders represented national sovereignty, explaining that entering 
Soviet territory without legal permission was similar to entering a friend’s house, not 
through the door, but by sneaking through a window without his consent.544 However, 
later events demonstrated that the effects of the campaign were very limited.  
 
No Pretext to Defend the Border 
Strengthening the Sino-Soviet border had gradually become an issue over time. In 
1958, during the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, in order to resist any possible attack by the 
Taiwanese government and its ally, the United States, Mao Zedong, likely inspired by his 
experiences in Yan’an, felt that building up the militia would be an effective method. A 
CCP decision of August 1958 ordered that, aside from the professional Army, “all men 
and women nation-wide who are able to carry weapons should be armed. The entire 
nation should be a nation of soldiers in the style of militia.”545  In September, after 
reviewing several provinces and cities in Yangzi Delta, Mao was interviewed by the 
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Xinhua News Agency. In his speech, he said: “The imperialists bully us to such an extent 
that we must take it seriously. Not only do we need powerful professional army, we must 
also extensively build up our divisions of militia. Thus, when the imperialists invade us, 
the militia will make it difficult for them to move a single step.”546 Echoing Mao’s call, 
Xinjiang government held a conference on militia work and decided to assign this 
mission to the Bingtuan (Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps of the PLA).547 In 
February 1960, just after the national conference on militia work, the Xinjiang 
government ordered that Bingtuan recruit more than 80% of youth within the age range to 
serve as militia by the end of July.548  
The brewing conflicts between China and the USSR came to the surface in June 
1960, during the Bucharest Conference. In reaction, Nikita Khrushchev announced in 
July that all Soviet experts should withdraw from China. Under Beijing’s instructions, the 
Xinjiang government decided to set up a headquarters to deal with the withdrawal of 
Soviet experts from Xinjiang.549  As the Soviets withdrew, the atmosphere on the border 
shifted from friendly to tense. The Soviets had completed surveying along the entire 
Sino-Soviet border, which was regarded by the Chinese government, as a possible first 
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step in Soviets territorial aggression. The Chinese also found that the Soviets had pushed 
the border eastward into Chinese territory in several areas. Aside from this territorial 
expansionism, the Chinese side also observed that the Soviets had been strengthening 
their border defenses. More border posts had been built, and more soldiers had been 
stationed there, and were better equipped with weapons. Border patrols were 
strengthened and watchtowers were heightened. The Chinese side also found that Soviet 
border guards along the border with Tacheng and Yili had been exposed to more military 
training. The border guard reinforcements at the checkpoint of Khorgas, for example, had 
been practicing shooting every night. Furthermore, the Soviets began changing the way 
they treated illegal border crossers from China. First, the Soviets would interrogate the 
people they seized for information on domestic issues and border defenses. Furthermore, 
the Soviet border guards no longer evinced a friendly attitude when turning border 
crossers back over to the Xinjiang government. The activities of the Soviets were 
suspicious in the eyes of the Chinese,550 and the Chinese side had to act accordingly.  
Although propaganda on the Sino-Soviet friendship resumed and Chinese border 
guards were instructed to treat illegal border crossers from the Soviet side in as friendly a 
manner as before,551 Beijing secretly ordered the Xinjiang government to prepare for 
Soviet aggression.552 To counter territorial encroachment, local people in border regions 
were organized to enter certain territories in dispute to claim Chinese sovereignty over 
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these lands. For example, in late June 1960, around 100 nomads with about 15,000 sheep 
were asked to move westward into the Republic of Kirghizia and resettle there, in a 
region 3 to 4 kilometers from what the Soviets assumed to be the Sino-Soviet border. The 
nomads were instructed by the Chinese government not to leave without the permission 
of the head of their People’s Commune. When the Soviets initiated negotiations on this 
issue, the Chinese side insisted that the region settled by the nomads was a part of 
Chinese territory. Later, the Chinese side evaded discussion of this issue with the 
Soviets.553  
From being tough on territorial disputes, the Chinese side turned toward 
strengthening border defenses as well. The continuation of the nominal Sino-Soviet 
alliance, however, made it diplomatically inappropriate for the Chinese side to station 
more troops on the border. Otherwise, the CCP feared that the Soviets would blame the 
Chinese side for creating obstacles to the Sino-Soviet friendship. Furthermore, if 
professional troops had been stationed there, it would have been financially difficult to 
meet their supply needs. Therefore, Beijing and Urumqi decided to move several 
divisions of Bingtuan into the border regions.  Local governments, mostly led by ethnic 
people, apparently held an unfriendly attitude toward the decision. Another alternative is 
that the ethnic leaders of the local governments feared that penetration by Bingtuan, 
which was dominated by Han Chinese, would render ethnic cadres powerless. 
Furthermore, the divisions stationed in the borderlands were barely self-sufficient in 
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terms of food production, and had to seek support from other nearby divisions. Given 
these obstacles, only two divisions were moved to the borderlands in 1960. The 90th 
Division moved to Alashankou, while the No. 5 Farm Division (nongwushi ʏ&Ā) 
resettled in Bole,554 a county whose border with the USSR stretched 95 kilometers, but 
which lacked any border defenses.555 The resettlement of the No. 5 Farm Division proved 
to be a success for Beijing and Urumqi. The presence of this division not only allowed 
the borderlands to serve an economic purpose, but also prevented local indigenous people 
from crossing the border when the mass exodus occurred two years later.556 The success 
later inspired Beijing to build farms all along the frontier as the most efficient way to 
Sinicize and defend this strategically important ribbon of land, as this chapter will show 
in the pages to come.  
 As Sino-Soviet relations worsened, in early 1961, Beijing decided to further 
strengthen the Xinjiang-Soviet border, and ordered the Bingtuan to take control of the 
area. For the same diplomatic reasons, to avoid offering the Soviets an excuse to blame 
China for causing conflict between the two socialist states, at that time Beijing upheld the 
principle of “neither crossing nor retreating in border efforts; and neither increasing nor 
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reducing defensive forces.”557  As a leader of Bingtuan claimed, the local government’s 
take on this principle was that it was “inappropriate to station a formal army” for border 
defenses, even if Sino-Soviet relations worsened.558 Therefore, the only way for the 
Chinese government to strengthen the 5000-kilometer border was to build up a militia. 
While the relations between Beijing and Moscow were tense, at the local level, cross-
border interactions continued, and were even still friendly. For example, the checkpoint 
near Huocheng County was directed by a Chinese Russian, who maintained a friendly 
attitude toward the people on the Chinese side of the border even as Sino-Soviet relations 
deteriorated. Trucks crossed back and forth from both sides through the checkpoint. It 
was only after the mass exodus took place in 1962 that the atmosphere changed on both 
sides. The head of the Huocheng checkpoint was transferred as both sides turned 
hostile.559 Before the imminent threat descended to the local level in 1962, the plans to 
build up a militia had been regarded by many as “unnecessary,” and had not been taken 
seriously.560 Only after 1962 did Bingtuan put the plans into practice.   
 
Strengthening Border Defenses 
The mass exodus in Tacheng shocked Beijing greatly. To halt the flight and 
restore social order, aside the serious diplomatic pressures China exerted on the Soviet 
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side,561 domestically Beijing decided to use Bingtuan to control the borderlands. On April 
25, 1962, in response to the reports on the situation in Xinjiang sent by the Xinjiang CCP 
Committee and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Shaoqi suggested that the 
opportunity should be seized to send several divisions of Bingtuan to the border, to take 
over herding and farming work in the area, and control the situation in the Three 
Districts.562 For years, the Chinese side had been unable to find a reasonable excuse to 
legitimize efforts by the Chinese government to strengthen the Chinese side of the Sino-
Soviet border, without providing an opportunity to the Soviets to blame the Chinese for 
violating the Sino-Soviet alliance, despite the fact that the alliance was already nominal. 
In Liu’s eyes, the events in the border region could finally grant the CCP an opportunity 
to station the military forces in the area and exercise tighter control of the border.  
Furthermore, since Bingtuan engaged in both military service and production work, they 
seemed to be the best choice for stationing in the borderlands.  Liu’s recommendations 
were well received by other high-ranking CCP leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Deng 
Xiaoping.563 Zhou Enlai and other high officials such as Yang Shangkun began discuss 
the pros and cons of sending three Bingtuan divisions to the Three Districts, along with 
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senior Xinjiang officials.564 The reports sent by the local government depicted the 
situation in the Three Districts as grave and potentially deteriorating: “If things continue 
in this way, it is very possible that rebellions may occur in some places.”565 Deng 
Xiaoping therefore echoed Liu’s suggestion and declared that once Bingtuan divisions 
were sent, they “should not come back.”566 His comment demonstrates that Beijing’s 
decision to use Bingtuan to control the borderlands was not mere expediency, but rather 
was regarded as a permanent solution for the instability in the pro-Soviet borderlands. On 
April 28, following a conference attended by Zhou Enlai as a representative of the State 
Department, Deng Xiaoping as a representative of the CCP Central Committee, Luo 
Ruiqing as a representative of the Department of Defense and the Headquarters of the 
General Staff, and Liu Lantao as a representative of the government of the Grand 
Northwestern Region,567 a decision was made: the Bingtuan was to establish five camps 
in the five border regions most affected by the mass exodus: Altay, Tacheng, Huocheng, 
Zhaosu and Tuoli. Their missions would be first to maintain social order, and second to 
restore production in the region.568  
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
564 Yang Shangkun ƍíŧ, Yang Shangkun riji ƍíŧťɤ [Diary of Yang Shangkun] (Beijing: Zhongyang 
wenxian chubanshe, 2001), Vol. 2, p. 153; “Guangyu pai liangsange nongkenshi dao sanqu bianjing de 
piyu,” Xinjiang shengchang jianshe bingtuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian 1949–2014, p. 76. 
565 Leng Rong and Wang Zuoling chief eds., Deng Xiaoping nianpu 1904–1997, Vol. 3, pp. 1702–03. 
566 “Guangyu pai liangsange nongkenshi dao sanqu bianjing de piyu,” Xinjiang shengchang jianshe 
bingtuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian 1949–2014, p. 77. 
567 Si Tao ģǀ, Liu Lantao shengping jishi jǃǀǛĄȓ# [Biography of Liu Lantao] (Beijing: Zhongguo 
wenshi chubanshe, 2010), p. 114. 
568 “Zongcanmoubu guanyu Xinjiang shengchang jianshe bingtuan choudiao wugeying jiaqiang bianfang 
de mingling” ȢɱʤʸŢŠǢǛǜďɧV®ľɭ&BǋmēʣʺǤ1 [Order from the general staff on 
dispatching five battalions of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corp to strengthen the borders], in 
Xinjiang shengchang jianshe bingtuan gongzuo wenxian xuanbian 1949–2014, p. 78. 
!222  
The “Three Replacements” Campaign 
After the mass exodus, the situation in the Three Districts was fragile. Villages 
were nearly vacant, and production work ground to a halt. Tacheng, Yumin and 
Huocheng were the top three counties in terms of loss of population. Tacheng County lost 
28,984 residents by the end of May, or 68% of the total population of 33,000.569 Yuming 
County lost more than 50% of its total population, while Huocheng County lost 14,000 or 
38% of its total population.570 At first, most participants in the exodus were peasants, 
herdsmen, and local cadres from rural and pasturing areas. Later, urban residents, 
students, policemen, state employees, and even county-level minority officials and 
county heads also began crossing the border. In Tacheng County, more than 150 county-
level cadres fled.571 According to Soviet sources, during the period from April 22 to the 
beginning of June 1962, around 67,000 people entered the USSR.572 
As the indigenous people fled, they forsook both their crops and their livestock. 
The mass exodus occurred during the sowing period in spring, and more than 400,000 mu 
of land was left unsown, while fields with growing crops were abandoned. Some crops 
had already matured, but the labor required for harvesting was unavailable. The livestock 
fared no better. The border crossers had taken more than 300,000 head of livestock with 
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them to the USSR.573 The animals left behind were scattered across mountains, 
grasslands and villages, or trapped in sheep pens and mangers, starving. Thousands of 
lost animals were scattered near the border.574 Before fleeing, some had taken property 
belonging to the communes, such as livestock and carts, while others robbed stores and 
warehouses. In Tacheng, for example, six of the eleven warehouses were robbed.575 
According to an official source, in Tacheng and Yili, the total economic losses were more 
than 70 million Chinese Yuan.576 Crossing the border by foot required physical strength, 
and it was a difficult task for the old and young, the sick and the disabled. They were 
therefore left behind in the villages as almost all the young, able-bodied people fled.  
Already lacking in food and daily necessities, the flight of their family members from 
whom they might have expected aid worsened their situations.577 When the Bingtuan 
arrived at the villages where the mass exodus occurred, they generally found a near 
wasteland. 
Dispatched on his mission by Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping, Zhang Zhonghan, 
then the commissar of Bingtuan, returned from Beijing to Urumqi and held a conference 
to mobilize the soldiers and officers of Bingtuan to initiate the “Three Replacements” 
campaign.578  The “Three Replacements” literally referred to “replacement of farming,” 
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“replacement of herding,” and “replacement of governance.” The mass exodus left 
Tacheng and Yili with deserted lands and livestock, and with the departure of the local 
cadres, some local governments were no longer functioning. All these voids were to be 
filled by the soldiers and officers of the Bingtuan as “replacements.” To avoid be accused 
of confiscating the property of indigenous people, the CCP committee of Bingtuan 
claimed that the purpose of this campaign was to care for the property abandoned by the 
runaways, and return it to them once they returned.579 To fulfill the mission, beginning on 
May 11, 1962, the Bingtuan dispatched work teams to four border counties that had 
suffered a great impact by the mass exodus: Yumin, Tacheng, Huocheng and Emin. The 
work teams were composed of 810 officers, 16,750 staff members, 39 trucks and 730 
farming machines.580  
The first mission was to halt people from crossing the border. Inspired by 
successful crossings into the USSR, more people were planning to leave as well. The 
most urgent task of the Bingtuan was to stop them. Once the Bingtuan arrived, villagers 
were supervised and even controlled.  If any signs of flight were detected among the 
locals, the Bingtuan staff would approach them and ask them to stay. Intermediation 
might work in some ways, but, the government’s most effective way of controlling the 
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exodus was state violence. Those suspected of involvement in organizing the exodus and 
even those employed by the Soviet consulates were arrested and promptly sentenced to 
imprisonment.581 This signaled to the indigenous people that the government would be 
tough on border crossing, and that the Soviet umbrella could no longer shield them from 
punishment. Bingtuan members with good military training and combat experience were 
organized into cavalry troops. As the armed and uniformed military forces swept through 
the villages, the people considering flight were left terrified.582 In the lands near the 
border, before professional soldiers were stationed there, the Bingtuan militia functioned 
as border guards, patrolling and halting migrants. In Huocheng County, the Bingtuan 
militia opened fire in order to halt border crossing.583 The methods used by the militia to 
halt the migrants was effective but bloody. Moreover, these actions could offer the 
Soviets an opportunity to claim that the mass exodus was a direct outcome of ethnic 
suppression being enacted by the Xinjiang government. To avoid these circumstances, 
Beijing was compelled to order the militia not to use force to halt border crossings, and 
especially to avoid employing any military means.584!Those involved in crimes such as 
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robbery, arson, and killing would be jailed, while those who spread rumors, mobilized 
people to flee or instigated riots would be harshly suppressed.585 
The presence of the Bingtuan proved effective in halting the exodus. For instance, 
the efforts of the Bingtuan were a contributing factor in the circumstances of some 
14,000 residents of Emin County who reached the border, but were forced to turn back.586 
Furthermore, as border crossings became more difficult and the organizers of the mass 
exodus were subjected to harsh punishment, those who had hoped to follow were forced 
to abandon their plans. The social unrest was thus gradually pacified. Even after 
professional troops were transferred from Gansu Province to the border for patrolling and 
more border stations were built, the Bingtuan’s role in border defenses continued to be 
strengthened, as Bingtuan militia were organized to supplement professional forces in 
border defenses.   
The Bingtuan’s other role in the “Three Replacements” campaign was to 
rejuvenate the local economy, which had been destroyed by the mass exodus. This would 
not only relieve economic pressures, which had been exacerbated by the mass exodus, 
but would also allow the CCP to exert control over all levels of local government, which 
had once been self-governed by ethnic leaders.   
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The border counties suffered grave losses in terms of the labor force and cadres. 
In Tacheng County, for example, 68% of the overall population took flight. Besides 
replacing the labor of the farmers and herders, many positions for cadres at the level of 
small teams (xiaodui), big teams (dadui) and communes (gongshe) also needed to be 
filled. In Tacheng County, 54 positions needed to be refilled for commune cadres, 
amounting to 79% of the total commune cadres; 199 positions needed to be refilled for 
big team cadres, accounting for 93% of big team cadres. For the small teams, 499 cadre 
positions had to be refilled.587 As part of the “Three Replacements,” Bingtuan members 
had to perform the work abandoned by those involved in the exodus. Mature crops had to 
be harvested, and fields had to be sown. Abandoned livestock had to be cared for, while 
those scattered across the hills had to be reclaimed. The physically weak and disabled 
who had been unable to cross the border also required care, and were in danger of 
starvation.  The Bingtuan members engaged in relief work, visiting one household after 
another to investigate the local circumstances and understand the needs of the refuges.588 
The “Three Replacements” campaign turned out to be a success for the government. In a 
short period of time, the flight was halted, social order was restored, the economic 
pressures were relieved, and the local People’s Communes were reorganized.589 Over the 
long term, with the replacement of the local ethnic cadres, the power of the Han-
dominated government finally penetrated the borderlands. Prior to the mass exodus, 
resistance by ethnic elites, with the Soviet consulates as their patrons, meant that the Han 
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government’s control was merely nominal. The fact that several local governments had 
rejected the plan to station the Bingtuan in the borderlands to serve as border defenses in 
1960 was vivid evidence of the autonomy the local governments had once enjoyed. The 
power vacuum left by the mass exodus turned out to be a blessing for the CCP. After the 
three-month “Three Replacements” campaign came to an end in August 1962, the 
Bingtuan work teams withdrew and turned local affairs over to the local governments.590 
However, after the campaign, the local governments were no longer self-governed by the 
indigenous people, but instead were tightly controlled by cadres loyal to Beijing. With 
the replacement of the local government elites, the project to transfer the Bingtuan to 
borderlands to establish border farms along the frontier, and to Sinicize and defend the 
ribbon of land against the Soviets, no longer encountered any resistance.  Moreover, 
when the work teams left, some Bingtuan members remained under Beijing’s instructions 
to continue engaging in farming and herding:591 they would later serve as a building 
block for the Border Farm Belt (bianjing nongchang dai ʣ»ʏ¹Ă) project.   
 
Building the Border Farm Belt  
Believing that the primary instigating factor for the entry of more than 76,000 
indigenous people into the USSR was a Soviet conspiracy, the Chinese government 
urgently sought to strengthen the border to prevent such events from occurring in the 
future.   Another concern was the fact that, after sealing the Soviet border on June 8 
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under diplomatic pressure from the Chinese government, the Soviet government declared 
that it was improper to seal the borders between two socialist states for a long period of 
time. On August 9, the Soviet Embassy to the PRC made the same comment to the 
Chinese government, and further claimed that the Soviets would soon reopen the border 
to normalize relations. The prerequisite for this plan, the diplomat claimed, was that the 
Chinese government would take actions to build up their own border defenses.592  
Given the mass exodus into the USSR and the impending Sino-Soviet split, the 
Chinese government interpreted this as another Soviet conspiracy to mobilizing people in 
flight. Xinjiang was thus transformed from a safe “heartland” into “a battlefront against 
Soviet aggression,”593 and strengthening the border defenses became crucial. The success 
of the “Three Replacements” campaign convinced the CCP that Bingtuan was the best 
choice for defending Xinjiang, since it could fulfill both military and economic functions. 
A certain number of professional soldiers had been stationed in the borderland, but given 
the length of the Sino-Soviet border, the Chinese government could not economically 
support the number of professional soldiers required for a full patrol. Therefore, 
professional soldiers would never be the primary forces.  However, the Bingtuan could 
remedy the limitations of the Army.  Its members could occupy a vast area and operate 
multiple checkpoints for inspections, and with abundant manpower to carry out their 
missions. Moreover, as an organization that combined both border control and economic 
production, Bingtuan had the most sustainable pathway to survival in the remote 
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borderlands.594 A persuasive factor in Beijing’s decision to build the farm belt was the 
stability of the population in Bole. While most border counties had lost a significant 
portion of their population in the spring of 1962, the losses in Bole County were slight, as 
mentioned earlier in this chapter. The main reason for the stability of Bole County was 
the presence of the No. 5 Farm Division, which had established a border farm in the 
area.595 The Bingtuan’s successes thus convinced Beijing that using Bingtuan to establish 
farms along the frontier was the best choice for border defenses.” On August 11, Beijing 
and Urumqi made a decision to “instruct Bingtuan to deliberately and promptly construct 
several border farms along the borderline, as a united barrier for border defenses.”596 In 
November, Bingtuan submitted a report to Urumqi on how to build the farm belt, which 
was approved. Thus, under the heavy hands of the work team from Urumqi, Bingtuan and 
local governments worked together to fulfill the mission.597 
Building the farm belt along the border required at least two steps. First, the lands 
of villages in the borderlands which were organized in the fashion of the People’s 
Communes had to be expropriated by Bingtuan to build border farms. Given that most of 
the local powers at all levels had been replaced by those loyal to Beijing, this objective 
was not difficult to achieve. Border regions including Yili, Bole, Tacheng and Altay 
allotted 17,600,000 mu of land along the border for building border farms.598 The second 
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step was to transfer Bingtuan farm divisions to the region, to reclaim and cultivate the 
borderlands. Cultivating the vast border regions as agricultural farms, tree farms, and 
pasturelands would make it possible to block cross-border communications. Furthermore, 
agricultural cultivation in the border areas would make it possible to support the material 
survival of more than 80,000 Bingtuan members.  The presence of Bingtuan members 
serving not only as farmers and herders but also as militias allowed the border to be 
secured.  Furthermore, 19 of the undefined and therefore disputed border regions on the 
border between the PRC and the USSR fell inside the farm belt.599 With the building of 
farms and the presence of the Bingtuan members, the Chinese side had already seized a 
favorable position in the impending Sino-Soviet border disputes.   
In the Yili region, for example, the border defenses were greatly strengthened 
after the May 29 Incident. The region had once had only two border defense posts and 
one checkpoint. Soon, the number of defense posts had been increased to nine. More 
border guards were stationed in the region, and their patrol line was greatly extended.600 
By December 1962, the local government in the Yili region had formed 8 militia patrol 
troops and 7 independent platoons, with a total number of 2181 militia members.  The 
eight militia patrol troops had 641 members, all of whom were stationed in the border 
regions.601 12 border farms had also been built along the border,602 further distancing Yili 
from the Soviet side.   
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By late 1966, the Bingtuan had built 38 border farms along the Sino-Soviet border. 
The border farm belt was made up of 2,341,300 mu of land, with a population of 155,500, 
including 82,100 Bingtuan members.  The regional breakdown of farms included 12 in 
Yili, 9 in Tacheng, 8 in Boertala, and 3 in Altay. The length of the ribbon of border farms 
was 2,019 kilometers, and its breadth varied between 10 and 30 kilometers.603 According 
to the orders given by the Central Military Committee in August 1962, Bingtuan was to 
form 300 militia patrol troops over the course of two years. By late 1962, 148 militia 
patrol troops had been established, and by the first half of 1964, the number of divisions 
had risen to 315.604  
 
Further Strengthening Border Defenses 
The local government in Xinjiang had to block migrants from both sides of the 
border.  The local authorities spared no effort to prevent the exodus of inhabitants in 
border regions on the one hand, while also blocking the re-entry of those who had already 
fled to the USSR on the other. Even after the “Three Replacements” campaign and the 
construction of the border farm belt, some local people still had thoughts of flight. The 
Police Bureau in Yumin County reported that, being determined to leave, some nomads 
no longer carried out their work, instead butchering their livestock and preparing for 
flight. Fourteen households had been spotted moving toward the border to seek 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
on farming the land and defending the borders in contemporary Xinjiang] (Urumqi: Xinjiang renmin 
chubanshe, 2012), p. 334. 
602 Xinjiang shengchan jianshe bingtuan dashiji, p. 145. 
603 Ibid. 
604 Ibid. 
!233  
opportunities to leave.605 The situation in Tacheng was similar. According to the 
investigations carried out by the Tacheng County Police Bureau in the Yemener 
Commune, most of whose population had failed to cross the border during the exodus, 
some ethnic Kazaks were still restive, either demanding that the government allow them 
to make way to the USSR, or seeking opportunities on their own. The commune was 
composed of 144 households and 637 people. Among them, 70 households had been 
transferred from neighboring Emin County. 90% of the population were ethnic Kazaks.   
Aside from 4 households, the rest had attempted to flee, but were either blocked on the 
border or repatriated by the USSR. The report revealed that some of them were planning 
to flee again and 25 households were preparing to move to a region only 6 kilometers 
away from the border in late February or early March.606  
Given the social instability amongst the indigenous people, especially among the 
Kazak population, local governments were gravely concerned by the letters sent from the 
Soviet side. The people who had managed to cross the border into the USSR sent letters 
encouraging their relatives to leave as well. The Police Bureau also found that, as of 
December 1962, two People’s Communes in Emin Country had received more than 140 
letters from their relatives in the USSR. Some letters were intended to reveal the writer’s 
better life post-resettlement, and suggest that their relatives join them. The official report 
of the local government demonstrated that the letters from the other side of the border 
had strengthened some local people’s resolve to flee. The content of other letters was 
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completely the opposite, as some who had earlier fled decided to return.  The letters 
revealed multiple reasons for considering a return to the Chinese side of the border.  
Some yearned to return because they missed their hometown and relatives. Others found 
that it was difficult to become accustomed to the Soviet life, or else experienced 
discrimination on the part of the local Soviet government because of their Chinese 
nationality.607   
Beginning on June 8, 1962, the Soviet side had repeatedly informed the Chinese 
government that they would soon reopen the border, and that defending the Chinese side 
of the border was not a Soviet duty but the duty of the Chinese government.608  Given the 
claims made by the Soviet side, the influx of letters, regardless of their content, appeared 
to the Chinese government to be solid evidence for an ongoing Soviet conspiracy. 
Furthermore, in March 1963, the Soviet government decided to hand over 300 Chinese 
citizens who had entered the USSR during the mass exodus, but decided to return for 
family reasons. In the past, Chinese citizens who had crossed the border into the USSR 
were handed over to representatives of the Chinese Border Defense Army. Fearing that 
the Soviets would use some of the border crossers as agents once they reentered Xinjiang, 
this time, the Chinese government firmly rejected the Soviets’ requests to repatriate the 
Chinese citizens.  Due to the failed repatriation, some of the border crossers made plans 
to reenter Xinjiang illegally.609 As they snuck into Xinjiang, the already suspicious 
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Chinese government became further convinced that the Soviets were engaged in a 
conspiracy. The local governments claimed that some suspects in the conspiracy had 
been captured, and that most had reentered from the Soviet side. The general view held 
by the local governments with regard to the situation of the border inhabitants as follows: 
Some people had sought opportunities to cross into the USSR, while the Soviets had been 
using whatever means available to send their agents back into Xinjiang to make trouble 
for the Chinese government.610 
At the same time, the diplomatic environment faced by the Chinese government 
had gravely deteriorated, making the cause of strengthening the border even more urgent. 
The Sino-Indian border had been tense since the border conflicts of 1960. On July 21, 
1962, armed conflict broke out on the Xinjiang-Indian border, leading the PRC Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs to strongly condemn the Indian government for attacking the Chinese 
sentry post.611 The CCP also no longer enjoyed the once-friendly Sino-Mongolian 
relations.  As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated, so too did the relations between China 
and the Mongolian Republic, a Soviet satellite state. After the mass exodus in Xinjiang, 
conflicts occurred frequently on the Sino-Mongolian border.612 The Soviet conspiracy 
and border conflicts between Xinjiang and its neighboring states left Xinjiang insecure 
and Beijing determined to take measures to further solidify the border defenses.    
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First, the Military Area of Xinjiang gave instructions that the border defense 
project should maintain three lines of defense. The first line of defense was the border 
defense posts, which were controlled at first by the Bingtuan militia, and later by both the 
militia and soldiers in the Xinjiang Frontier Defense Army. Since May 21, 1961, 
Bingtuan had built 19 border defense posts along the Sino-Soviet border. The mission of 
the border defense posts was to patrol the borders, inspect goods and people, and most 
importantly, halt undocumented border crossers.613 The areas where border defense posts 
were located were “military restricted areas,” which were the most tightly controlled: 
those who needed to enter not only had to have reasonable cause, but also a pass issued 
by the local security office. Without a pass, they were forbidden entry.614 On September 
14, 1964, the Yili government issued detailed rules and regulations for supervising the 
restricted areas.615 In August 1965, the Department of Public Security of the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region instituted requirements for “border region certificates” and 
“border restricted area passes” to further extend its control.616 As more regulations were 
implemented, the restricted areas were gripped more tightly.  
The border farm belt served as the second line of defense, controlled by part-time 
militia and Bingtuan members.617 The difference between the second line of defense and 
the first was that the border farm belt was tasked with farming and herding, as well as 
defense. Farming was generally sedentary, and the lands being farmed could easily 
coincide with the lands being defended. Bingtuan farmers were therefore required to 
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function as border defenders while farming. It was not as easy to match up herding with 
border defense due to mobility during grazing. To make sure that personnel were 
assigned to take charge of each section of the farm belt, the grasslands were divided into 
several sections. Each section of grasslands and the livestock that pastured there were 
assigned to the care of a given group.618  
The third line of defense was composed of People’s Communes and Bingtuan 
units in border regions. This line was assumed to be defended by the indigenous people 
(most of whom were ethnic Han Chinese) loyal to the Chinese government, alongside the 
personnel in the Bingtuan units.619 Indigenous people were allowed to inhabit these 
regions, but only if they had been issued a residence certificate.620  The checkpoints, 
border farms, and People’s Communes in the border regions thus formed the so-called 
“three lines of defense.”621 
The purpose of the three lines of defense was to guarantee that the farm belt along 
the Sino-Soviet borderline was defended by both the army and common people, ranging 
from the front lines to the heartland.  During peacetime, military and civilian forces 
would work together to halt undocumented migration and capture Soviet agents. During 
wartime, they would be brothers-in-arms to wage a “people’s war,”622 a military strategy 
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that Mao Zedong believed to be an important contributing factor in the communist 
victory over the KMT during the Chinese civil war.  
The second step was to move indigenous peoples, especially Kazak nomads, out 
of the farm belt, and resettle them.  Not long after the mass exodus, because herding was 
not a specialty of the Bingtuan members, who were predominantly ethnic Han Chinese, 
in order to supplement labor shortages in herding, 5,077 nomads from the neighboring 
Emin county were resettled in Tacheng, a county whose Kazakh population had declined 
from 30,803 in 1949 to 9,613 after the mass exodus of 1962.623 As the three lines of 
defense were put in place, most of the borderlands became the property of Bingtuan. The 
indigenous people therefore had to be assigned to lands elsewhere. To resolve this 
problem, Bingtuan allotted 140,000 mu of land for the resettlement of migrants whose 
lands had been expropriated.624 Another issue was that the mobility of the nomads made 
difficult to conduct inspections. Their resettlement would prevent them from fleeing 
across the Chinese border, while also making it easier to spot anyone entering from the 
Soviet side. For instance, in Zhaosu County, a border county in the Yili region, 89 
households had to be resettled. 25 of the households were resettled in a region around 100 
kilometers away from the border, while 64 were moved to Tekes County, far from the 
border.625  
As the ethnic population of the borderlands was moved out, the government 
simultaneously moved ethnic Han people in.  The CCP’s decision to transfer the ethnic 
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Han population to the borderlands to strengthen border defenses was inspired by a legacy 
of the Chinese imperial system.  Furthermore, before China consolidated its control over 
Xinjiang, Stalin had informed his Chinese comrades that Xinjiang could be exploited and 
better secured only if the percentage of the Han population in this region was increased 
from the current level of less than 5% to 30%. To strengthen the border defenses, the 
Chinese government was to resettle ethnic Han Chinese to populate all the border 
regions.626 After seizing Xinjiang, the Westward Campaign was launched in the name of 
“contributing to the construction of socialism in the borderlands,” and Han Chinese were 
dispatched to the area through multiple channels. Most entered Xinjiang as soldiers in the 
People’s Liberation Army, and later served as members of Bingtuan.  Due to a lack of 
bureaucratic personnel, over the course of several years, a large number of college and 
high school graduates were sent to the area as “youth for frontier support” (zhibian 
qingnianŐʣˋą). Military veterans were sent to the region in order to provide them 
with jobs. With the development of industry and a shortage of manpower, workers and 
their families were also resettled in Xinjiang. Between 1960 and 1962, Xinjiang also 
experienced an influx of refugees from China proper due to the Great Chinese Famine. 
As the refugees settled in the area, their relatives came to join them.627 After the mass 
exodus, the government found that most of the residents of border counties who had not 
entered the USSR were ethnic Han Chinese. As most People’s Communes devolved into 
wastelands and villages were left vacant, majority-Han communes remained as usual.  
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Tacheng County had 50 production brigades, two of which were majority Han Chinese, 
while the remaining 48 were primarily composed of ethnic Kazaks. By April 1962, most 
members of the 48 Kazak production brigades had fled, while the two Han Chinese 
production brigades were essentially intact.628 This fact reminded Beijing that ethnic Han 
Chinese living in the borderlands, who had no Soviet ties, would seldom flee, and could 
instead serve as a “human fence” to halt border crossing from either side. The most 
effective means of resettling Han Chinese in the borderlands was assigning Bingtuan 
members and their families to the area through administrative orders. For this purpose, in 
September 1962, the General Political Department of the PLA decided to transfer 1500 
military cadres from the military zones of Beijing, Shenyang, Nanjing and Jinan, to 
Xinjiang. While some were determined to contribute to the project of the construction of 
socialism of Xinjiang, others were subject to deception.629 Bingtuan members who had 
participated in the “Three Replacements” campaign did not return to their places of origin, 
and instead were ordered to settle down on the spot. 38 border farms were built by the 
end of 1966, and the population in the farm belt was 155,500, primarily comprised of 
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ethnic Han Chinese.630 With the influx of ethnic Han Chinese, aside from the 
strengthening of border defenses, the demographic composition of the border regions 
shifted accordingly from ethnic Kazaks to ethnic Han as the predominant ethnicity.  
Collection posts were established for the resettlement of those who fled to the 
USSR but were repatriated Xinjiang, designed for accommodation but also separation 
from the local people. In Zhaosu County, for instance, two collection posts were built to 
collect the border crossers. The Bingtuan militias were ordered to supervise, detain, and 
escort border crossers when necessary.631 Physical barriers were also built to halt 
undocumented migration. Wire nets, walls, visible and concealed blockhouses, and 
observation posts were installed as part of the defense program. At some farms, military 
structures such as tunnels, air-raid shelters, fortresses, and ditches were built. Some 
militias on the front were equipped with communication devices such as radios and 
electrical engines.632 The Yili incident of May 29, 1962, had resulted in the seizure of 
some classified bureaucratic archives by the Soviets. To prevent the re-occurrence of 
such events, in 1964, the archives of Bingtuan units in the borderlands were transferred to 
regions far from the border, such as Hami City.633 Once the Border Defense Army of 
Xinjiang took over some of the militias’ border defense operations in 1963, the Sino-
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Soviet border in Xinjiang was transformed from a “boundary without defenses” to 
systematic border defense operations. In the description of a Bingtuan veteran, the 
operations were “four in one,” with a united defense project involving soldiers, 
policemen, militia and civilians.634  
As relations between the two socialist states of China and the Soviet Union 
deteriorated, the borderlands became a contested region. Once the Bingtuan militias were 
present, the Chinese side tended to pick fights with the Soviets in almost every conflict. 
The tensions sometimes snowballed into border skirmishes, causing a death toll.635 The 
presence of the Bingtuan militias appeared as a threat to the Soviets. According to an 
autobiography written by a Chinese individual who fled to the Soviet Kazak Republic in 
1970, during the interrogation by Soviet border officials, the question most frequently 
asked was, “Were the militia in Xinjiang equipped with guns?” The author concluded that 
the Soviets were most terrified not by the Chinese professional soldiers, but by the militia 
and their skill in guerrilla warfare.636 It would appear that the defense works centered on 
the Bingtuan militia contributed greatly to China’s state-building process. No further 
loses were conceded to the Soviet side in the disputed borderlands after the establishment 
of the farm belt, as claimed by Chinese authorities.637 As the border defenses were being 
built up, any documents held by local people that could confirm their Soviet nationality, 
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such as Soviet passports, were confiscated. Cadres with Soviet ties were purged and their 
positions were filled by Han cadres. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The transition of the Three Districts of Xinjiang from a Soviet frontier to a 
Chinese one in the 1950s and 1960s can be viewed as a “victory” achieved by the CCP at 
the cost of both the USSR and the indigenous ethnic people. The Soviet lost this Muslim 
borderland as a buffer zone, while the ethnic people had to accept the Chinese communist 
rule as a precondition of having autonomy. As a result, Xinjiang, for so long served as a 
meeting point between the Muslim population in Soviet Central Asia and their Xinjiang 
counterparts was turned into a battlefield between the USSR and the CCP. If one 
interprets this story as another evidence to verify the evil nature of the Chinese 
communism, just like how people view the historical events such as the Great Chinese 
Famine, the Chinese Cultural Revolution, and the Tiananmen Massacre, he or she has 
only understood it superficially. This study shows that it is the nature of a nation-state 
system that made it possible for Beijing to gain full sovereignty over the once fragile 
suzerainty of the Northwest borderland of Xinjiang, a region highly dependent on the 
Soviet Union from the1920s to the 1940s.  
Over the years whenever a territorial dispute occurred, the PRC government often 
claims that the contested land has been a part of Chinese territory since the beginnings of 
its recorded history. However, the very concepts of territory, sovereignty, nation, and 
borderline are modern political constructs. The transition from pre-modern empires to 
modern nation-states reconfigured the global political geography into finite and bounded 
entities. Nation-state is a system in which authority radiates outward from the center, 
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with the elastic and imprecise borders replaced by definite ones within which “state 
sovereignty was fully, flatly, and evenly operative over each square centimetre of a 
legally demarcated territory.”638 The shift had important implications along the margins 
of empire, transforming them from peripheral borderlands where sovereignties 
overlapped, into valuable and vulnerable bordered lands where territory needed to be 
constantly patrolled and guarded.639 Thus, Clarles Maier states, the twentieth century 
could be defined as an epoch of “territoriality,” where state elites used all kinds of 
modern methods to “saturate,” “enclose,” and “energize” the bordered political space. 
Thus, a territorial nation became a “space of identity,” “space of decision” and even 
“space of ideology;”640 Allegiance to a bounded geographic community replaced pre-
modern social hierarchies and vertical forms of group identity.641  This is a useful 
interpretive framework to understand the history of modern China. 
As Wang Gungwu points out, the Chinese academia is very much dominated by 
the Sinocentric view, from which China is considered in every way as a growing “central 
state.” During its interactions with borderland peoples, the central state pushed outwards 
to secure its borderlands when it was strong; when it was weak, the influence of the 
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center on these borderlands decreased. 642 The elastic border under such a “Chinese 
World Order” system could no longer persist when the Qing Empire was defeated during 
the Opium War. No matter how reluctantly, the Manchu Qing had to accept the European 
nation-state system, which was authenticated as the only legitimate expression of 
sovereignty. The implement of the nation-state system made the Qing court lose its 
tributary states one after another. Not only the influence of China on its peripheries had 
shrunk, even the security of Qing court which used to be defended by “barbarians on four 
sides” (siyi «Å) was challenged. However, the accidental outcome for the Chinese was 
that the nation-state system based on international law helped prevent the Western 
powers and the Japanese from further encroaching the territory of China as long as it was 
demarcated by international treaties. 
In his chapter on Inner Asia of Cambridge History of China, Joseph Fletcher 
outlined three most important changes occurred in the eighteenth century that set the 
course of China’s subsequent history—the solid establishment of Europe’s presence, a 
doubling of Han Chinese population, and the dramatic expansion of its territory under the 
Manchu Qing empire.643 Different from what occurred to Ottoman, Habsburg, and 
Czarist empires, China did not fall apart following its ethnic and sociocultural lines after 
the collapse of the Qing empire. The subsequent regimes successfully maintained the vast 
Qing territory and thus kept a population of multi-ethnicity in the form of one nation-state. 
On the other hand, the Chinese political elites had and still has to face severe challenges 
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when the ethnic people on borderlands seek independence to build up their own nation-
states. Thus, twentieth-century China witnessed how militarily and economically weak 
states attempted to stretch “the short, tight skin of the nation over the gigantic body of the 
empire,” to use the words of Benedict Anderson. They intended to form a bounded and 
homogeneous nation from among the fluid and poly-ethnic boundaries of the Qing 
empire, while replacing the Manchu court with a Han-dominated autocratic state. Thus, 
the so-called “frontier question” and “ethnic question” became a significant agenda for 
the two major revolutionary party-states, the KMT and the CCP.  
When the CCP was just founded, its frontier policy was to support the “national 
self-determination” of Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and Kolonor, a policy designed by the 
Comintern.644 As Xiaoyuan Liu’s study reveals, from the Yan’an period to the 1940s, the 
CCP gradually changed its policy in regard to the frontier/ethnic issue, supporting 
unification rather than partition with the borderlands.645 Right before the communist take 
of Xinjiang in October 1949, Mao Zedong publicly praised the Ili rebellion in 1944 as 
“part of the democratic revolutionary movement of the Chinese people,” while it was 
notorious as a genocide against ethnic Han population.646 For the same reason, “self-
determination” was no longer the policy that should be promoted; neither was the Soviet 
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federal system a choice. To better incorporate the former East Turkestan to China proper, 
Beijing declared that from December 20th onward, the status of the Three Districts as a 
“special zone” should be abolished; it should be well connected to the rest of Xinjiang via 
a new transportation system.647 To further cripple the power of the Muslims of the former 
Eastern Turkistan Republic, the CCP reorganized the Muslim Army as the fifth troop of 
the PLA in December 1949,648 and soon it was disarmed and the members were made to 
serve as herders and workers of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. 
Without any military forces to rely on, the autonomy of the region barely existed. 
Sino-Soviet cooperation was the key reason for understanding the “peaceful 
liberation” of Xinjiang. After the People’s Liberation Army entered Xinjiang, Stalin 
suggested disbanding the Muslim Army to prevent Xinjiang from declaring 
independence.649  It was through the cooperation of the USSR that the CCP occupied 
Xinjiang without adopting any military means. At the same time, however, the Soviet 
presence in the Three Districts violated the core value of the nation-state system: Beijing 
desired to exert its full sovereignty on this vast Muslim borderland. It was indeed a 
dilemma: On the one hand, Soviet support was crucial for the CCP regime to “liberate” 
Xinjiang. For this reason, Mao Zedong should claim that he and his comrades were not 
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Tito-like nationalists but internationalists; On the other hand, as the ruling party of the 
nation-state called People’s Republic of China, Mao and his comrades should behave as 
nationalists who always prioritize China’s national interests. When the Beijing was 
vulnerable and desperately relied on Soviet aids, the CCP could sacrifice a part of the 
territorial sovereignty, though under great pressure from people at home. But it has been 
proved that CCP’s sacrifice was merely expedient. The full sovereignty over Xinjiang 
that was authenticated by “territoriality” soon made the eradication of Soviet presence in 
the Three Districts a mandate. During the two decades of the 1950s and 1960s, the CCP 
totally reshaped the borderland of Xinjiang according to the principles of a nation-state: 
choosing population that was allegiant to the state, eradicating a hostile foreign power, 
and stationing border defence.  
In China Marches West, Peter Perdue argues that the conquest of Xinjiang and 
Mongolia by Manchu Qing was a contingent product of the crosscutting wills of many 
players, and thus should not be viewed as merely one link in a chain that inevitably led to 
a nation-state.650 However, this dissertation reveals that the incorporation of Xinjiang 
with China proper was not contingent but inevitable. Then, why the Communists 
succeeded while the Nationalists failed in the process of nation-building in the borderland? 
The main reason, as James Leibold noted, was not ideological but tactical. While the 
Nationalists failed to rein in regional warlords the ethnic people associated with, the 
Communists successfully deployed the tactic of united front on both the Soviets and the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
650 Peter C. Perdue, China Marches West: The Qing Conquest of Central Eurasia (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 4. 
!250  
indigenous people.651 This is the key to understand how Xinjiang became a relatively 
stable part of China’s frontier in the 1960s. 
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